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This study has two major objectives. The first is to analyze and to assess the role
and the impact of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 onthe peace process between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The second objective is to set forth the
Israeli government’s practices and its policies against the Palestinians during the
uprising. These two objectives were investigated by searching the available literature
that is related to the subject matter and by conducting face-to-face and telephone
interviews from both sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis. Students, farmers,
businessmen, prisoners, teachers, politicians, military and religious leaders were
interviewed.
From the findings, many factors worked together and played a significant role in
bringing both parties to negotiate peace. Some of these factors, including the Israeli
harsh treatment of the Palestinians which brought a wide range of condemnation to Israel
by various governments around the world, and the media coverage of the incidents in the
Occupied Territories, brought a great deal of support to the Palestinians and their cause,
and produced temporary peace between the PLO and Israel. Our investigation and our
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analysis showed in detail how both parties to the peace negotiation tried to adjust their
position toward each other after forty years of hostility in ways that may help to achieve
long-lasting peace in the land of peace.
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Figure 1. Palestine Map After 1948 2
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
In 1948, the Zionist movement succeeded in occupying most of Palestine and in
creating the State of Israel. As a result, 750,000 Palestinians became refugees in the
surrounding Arab countries. Two major regions of Palestine that remained under Arab
control were the eastern sector and the Gaza Strip, with the former being the larger and
more populous of the two. In the early 1950s, Jordan annexed the eastern sector, which
came to be known as the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian
administration. In 1967, Israel invaded these two regions and brought them under its
control. (See Figure 1).
After twenty years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the
Palestinians felt the heavy burden of the occupation in every aspect of their lives. In
1987, a Palestinian Uprising erupted in the Occupied Territories and continued until
Israel and the PLO signed a peace accord in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993.
Since this is the period being studied, one is bound to ask some pertinent questions
regarding the Palestinian Uprising and its impact on the peace process.
1See the attached map on the following page. This map adapted from: H.M. Sachar, A History of
Israel (New York, New York: Knopf 1981).
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Figure 1. Palestine Map After 1948
The shaded area, Palestinian land occupied by the Jews and now
called Israel. The two lighter shaded areas are the West Bank that was
given to Jordan and the Gaza Strip that was given to Eg’pt. Both were
occupied by Israel in the 1967 War.
Questions that are likely to arise include the following: Why did the Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories wait twenty years before they started their uprising? To what extent
had the Israeli policies affected their decision to stage the uprising? Why did the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) fail to end the uprising? What was the impact of the uprising on
Israel’s society and political system? What role did the media coverage play in
mobilizing people around the world to support the Palestinian cause? How did the
uprising force the PLO to change its policies and tactics regarding Israel? And finally,
how did the uprising contribute to the creation of an environment in which peace may be
achieved?
It is not the intent of this work to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The purpose of this endeavor is to assess the impact of the Palestinian Uprising
on the on-again off-again peace process between the PLO and Israel, and to expose the
harsh Israeli reprisals against the Palestinians during the Uprising.
Hypothesis
The relationship between the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 and the peace process
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is still a controversial
issue. Some believe that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 played a core role in pushing
both sides (Israel and the PLO) to first dialogue and subsequently, to negotiate peace. To
others, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had nothing to do with the peace talks or the
peace process.
I propose two hypothetical statements. First, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had
no or little if any impact on the peace process between Israel and the PLO. Second, the
Palestinian Uprising of 1987, as defined in this study, significantly impacted the peace
process between Israel and the PLO. Data collected for the purpose of this study will test
both hypotheses. The null one will be the winner and will be confirmed, and the
alternative result will be rejected.
Research Methods
Both primary and secondary data will be used for the study. Primary sources will
include:
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1. Official government documents: Government of Israel, the U.S.
Government and documents from the Palestine Liberation Organization.
2. The United Nations documents.
3. Official statements and speeches of both Israeli Prime Ministers, Shimon
Perez and Itzhak Rabin, partners in the peace process with the PLO.
4. Statements from Palestinian Leaders.
5. Statements from interviews with Palestinians and Israelis living in Israel,
the West Bank and the United States.
Secondary sources will include:
1. Published works dealing with the subject matter.
2. Scholarly and journalistic articles.
3. Newspaper reports. In this case, the study quotes from major Israeli
newspapers such as Haaretz, Jerusalem Post, Yediot Aharonot, Davar and others. My
choice of Israeli media is essentially because of their easier access to reported events in
the Occupied Territories and Israel. Other data used in this study were obtained through
investigating specialist literature produced by many investigatory bodies including the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding Israel, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, the
Israeli Peace Movements and the Palestinian Human Rights Organization (AL-Haq).
Many important materials were available in the library of the Emory University in
Atlanta. Also, other data were obtained from the database center at Robert W. Woodruff
Library, Atlanta University Center.
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Secondary analysis will be used to evaluate that data which had been collected
from various sources. According to Bailey, secondary analysis is the examination of a
document or data gathered or authored by another person. The secondary analyst
generally has a research goal different from that of the first researcher.2
Interviews will be conducted in the process of collecting data for the purpose of
this study. Some interviews were conducted through telephone, others through face-to-
face, and some others through the email. In general, one question will be asked of the
participants: Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-93 had any impact on
the peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)?
Furthermore, if your answer is yes or no, please substantiate your personal views.
Finally, scholars should maintain high ethical standards in their research by
presenting the truth in a scientific manner.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is based on the frustration-aggression
theory, which explains the violent behavior of individuals, groups, and society as a
whole. In social science, it is difficult to give a clear-cut explanation or definition to any
social phenomena, and this theory is not an exception. In their book, The Dynamics of
Aggression (1970), Megargee and Hokansons wrote the following:
There are almost as many theories of aggression as there are individuals
doing research on it. Partly, because different scholars studied the
problem from the viewpoint of different disciplines and research methods
vary tremendously. The situation here is similar to the situation of three
2Kenneth D. Bailey, Methods ofSocial Research, 3t1 ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 295.
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blind men asked to describe an elephant. Each one touched a part of the
elephant. So each one described the part he touched. For this, their
description will be different.3
In this theory, there are concepts that need to be clarified so the reader will
appreciate their contextual meaning. The first concept is “frustration,” which is defined
as any event or act of others that prevents an organism from obtaining a goal that is
actively being pursued.4
According to John Dollard, the second concept “aggression” is defined as an act
whose goal-response causes injury to an organism.5There are two concepts that are
related to aggression. One is “instigation,” which refers to those forces within the
individual that motivate, drive, or impel a person towards behaving aggressively. The
second concept is “inhibitions,” which refers to those factors in an individual’s
personality that oppose the overt expression of aggression.6
To further delineate, Megargee and Hokanson wrote the following:
We have to understand that man does not live in a vacuum. His behavior
is a function not only of his individual personality traits but also of the
situation in which he finds himself. These situational factors may either
act to facilitate or to inhibit the expression of aggressive behavior.7 Also,
relative deprivation is an idea first advanced by Aristotle as an explanation
of political discontent and revolt. Those who seek to disturb the stability
of society, he argues, are not necessarily the poorest and most under
3Edwin I. Megargee and Jack E. Hokanson, The Dynamics ofAggression (N.Y., N.Y.: Harper
and Row Publications, 1970), 1-2.
4James T. Tedeschi and Richard B. Felson, Violence, Aggression and Coercive Action
(Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1994), 39.
5John Dollard, et al, Frustration andAggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 11.
6Megargee and Hokanson, 2.
7lbid., 2.
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privileged. Any group or social category that feels it is not being given
due reward for its status and merits may become discontented.8
On the other hand, Frank W. Bealey wrote the following about political violence:
This can be an all-embracing term as violence is ubiquitous, but it is usual
to use it only to mean domestic political violence to exclude ‘state
violence,’ violence committed by the state against its citizens, and also
repression without physical harm often called ‘structural violence.’ Hence,
political violence means rebellion, rioting, looting, sabotage, terrorism and
physical conflicts between groups. This last includes communal violence,
usually between different ethnic andlor religious groups which, at its
worst, can descend into civil war and massacres. Statistics show that the
worst examples have been in Africa and Asia and coincide frequently with
autocratic rule. Internal extremes of wealth and poverty are often
associated with political violence, especially where economical difference
is linked to ethnic difference. Violent groups also seem to emerge in
countries which have lost wars so that a decline in national self-esteem
may provoke political violence.9
The third concept is “relative deprivation,” which can be defined as a perceived
discrepancy between one’s hopes and one’s reality. Increasing relative deprivation leads
to more frustration, more frustration leads to more anger, and more anger leads to more
violence.’0
The fourth concept is “political instability,” and the definition used in this study
limits its meaning to aggressive, politically relevant behavior. It is specifically defined as
the degree or the amount of aggression directed by individuals or groups within the
8Frank Bealey, Dictionary ofPolitical Science (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1999),
284.
9Frank W. Bealey, 260.
‘°Steven E. Barkan and Lynne L. Snowden, Collective Violence (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn
and Bacon, 2001), 18.
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political system, against other groups or against the complex of officeholders and
individuals and the groups associated with them.”
It is not the purpose of this section to give a complete historical account of the
development of frustration-aggression theory; this would require an independent volume.
The basic processes postulated in frustration-aggression theory can be stated very simply.
Frustration produces aggressive energy, which activates aggressive behavior.’2In order to
say that frustration exists, one must be able to specify two things: (1) that the organism
could have been expected to perform certain acts and (2) that these acts have been
prevented from occurring.’3
The frustration-aggression hypothesis presented aggression as a natural and
inevitable consequence of frustration. In later modifications of the hypothesis,
aggression was regarded as a natural, but not inevitable, consequence of frustration, since
nonaggressive responses to frustration could be learned. Nevertheless, aggression was
still considered the naturally dominant response to frustration, and nonaggressive
response was likely to occur only if aggressive responses had previously met with no
reward or with punishment.’4In addition, frustration may lead to other models of
behavior, such as constructive solutions to problems. Furthermore, aggression is not
likely to occur if aggressive behavior is inhibited through devices associated with the
11Megargee and Hokanson, 23.
‘2Tedeschi and Felson, 39.
‘3John Dollard and Others, 7.
14Megargee and Hokanson, 35.
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notion of punishment. Aggression may also be displaced onto objects other than those
perceived as frustration agents.’
In applying the frustration-aggression framework to the political sphere, the
concept of punishment may be identified with the notion of the coerciveness of political
regimes. Also, the constructive solution of problems is related to the political as well as
to the administrative, entrepreneurial and other factors within the political environment.
The notion of displacement may furthermore be associated with the occurrence of
scapegoating against minority groups or with aggression in the international sphere, or
with individual behaviors.’6
John Dollard and others, in their book, Frustration andAggression (1939), stated
the following about Germany:
They were defeated in the War itself after an exhausting effort. They lost
the “place in the sun” for which they had fought and their national prestige
suffered a staggering blow. At Versailles and thereafter they had to admit
defeat and the hopelessness of further aggression toward the conquerors;
they were compelled to relinquish their colonies and additional territory.
Their navy was confiscated, their army was reduced to one adequate only
for internal policing, and in almost every way they were made to feel a
third-rate power. Nor can it be forgotten that millions of people were
partially starved during the war and that large number of Germans had to
abandon military careers. Economically, too, the country remained
frustrated. The inflation of German currency brought loss and misery to
the middle class and interfered with the plans of all others who were
attempting to achieve personal security through saving. As a result of
these conditions almost every German experienced and resented at least
some of these various frustrations personally. It is clear that aggression
would increase and would be expressed in one form or another. Direct
aggression toward the Allies was not possible; such a response had already
failed and had been punished in part by new frustration. For that, this
‘5Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, “Aggressive Behavior within Politics, 1948-
1962: A Cross-National Study,” (Public Affairs Institute, San Diego State College, January 1965), in
Megargee and Hokanson, 214.
16Feierabend and Feierabend, in Megargee and Hokanson, 215.
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aggression had to be displaced. It was easy, consequently, for Nazi
propagandists to suggest that Jews and Jews alone were economic rivals.
The presence of a number of foreign Jews, especially from Poland, and of
other Jews who had not been completely acculturated was used as
evidence of a cultural threat. German persecution of the Jews, in short, is
aggression that has been displaced from the agents really responsible for
the frustration.’7
It is clear that Post-World War I Germans were faced with conditions which
interfered with a variety of strongly instigated goal responses. They were defeated in the
war itself after an exhausting effort. They lost their “place in the sun” for which they had
fought, and their national prestige suffered a staggering blow. Frustration remained and
increased the strength of instigation to aggression. As the Germans began to appreciate
their humiliating position in the eyes of the world and as the economic life of the country
declined, this aggression had to be displaced. Hitler’s movement (National Socialist
German Workers) was overtly aggressive toward the republic, which had not prevented
what was considered antisocial aggression; toward Russia, which symbolized the rise of a
proletarian state internationally; toward the Treaty of Versailles and the European order
that it had established; and toward an internal scapegoat group, the Jews.’8This is just
one example of what can occur as a result of unbridled manifestations of frustration and
aggression.
From the brief discussion of the frustration-aggression theory and its related
concepts, one can see that it is the best choice for this study, because it can offer a good
‘7John Dollard, et al, 153-155.
t8John Dollard, et al, 154.
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explanation for Palestinian behavior and their actions in the Occupied Territories against
Israeli oppression and mistreatment.
From this theory, one can also infer that the Palestinians had no control over some
aspects of their daily life, which could be interrupted by the Israelis at any given time
without prior notice. Michael Adams described the situation in the Occupied Territories
(CT’s) as follows:
Indeed, the level of repression in the CT’s was at its highest level for
many years. A record number of Palestinians had been “administratively”
detained (i.e., without trial) during 1987, and deportations, house
demolitions, and other repressive measures were beginning to take their
toll on the Palestinians’ collective patience.’9
Mariam Ward, in her article, “Another Perspective on Middle East Peace,”
(1995), described the Palestinians’ life in the CT’s as follows:
Palestinians may not build homes on their own land without a permit, and
it is rarely given. When their children marry and build an addition to their
home, Israelis demolish it. There are midnight raids at homes, arrests and
detention without charges, and curfews imposed on entire villages.20
Emile Nakhleh, a Palestinian-American scholar who had visited the area a few
months earlier added, “Gaza resembles a pressure cooker ready to explode” and advanced
a very revealing and astute observation:
In this forgotten corner of Palestine, one witnesses overcrowding, poverty,
hatred, anger, frustration, drugs and crime. The Palestinian population is
daily becoming more resentful and rebellious. The military occupation
responds by becoming more insecure and oppressive.2’
‘9Michael Adams, “The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1967-1988.” The Middle East and North
Africa, 1989, 35th ed. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), 57.
20Mariam Ward, “Another Perspective on Middle East Peace,” America, 173, no. 1(1995): 8.
21Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Coiflict (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 682.
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In an interview by the Israeli Radio’s English language service in December 10,
1987, Rasghad Al-Shawa. former mayor of Gaza and a highly respected Palestinian
politician, described the situation in the Occupied Territories as follows:
One should expect such things (the Uprising) after twenty years of
miserable occupation. The people have lost hope. They are absolutely
frustrated. They don’t know what to do. They have taken the line of
fundamentalists, being the last resort they can take up. They have lost
hope that Israel will ever give them their rights. They feel that the Arab
countries are unable to accomplish anything. They feel that the PLO,
which they regarded as their representative, has failed to accomplish
anything.22
Some described the situation and the Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories
as follows:
Books by the thousands were banned, The colors of the Palestinian flag
were outlawed; even the word “Palestine” could earn its user a jail
sentence. To plant a tree you required a permit. To hold a meeting
required a permit. Entry and exit required a permit. To dig a well
required a permit. . . one that was never given.23
Israel Shahak, one of the well-respected scholars in the field of political science in
Israel, saw how the occupation affected the Palestinians and tells an illustrative story
about the “Confiscated Cake.” Shahak related:
When a new house was finished in the town of El-Bireh, a big cake was
ordered for the celebration party. The military governor had heard that
this cake was coated with icing in the four colors (the colors of the
Palestinian flag). He sent an officer to the party and the cake was
solemnly confiscated.24
22Aryeh Shalev, “The Intifada: Causes and Effects,” Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem. 1991),
13.
23Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Intfada. Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation
(Boston: South Press, 1989), 7.
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A Palestinian graduate student from the Territories described the miserable
situation in the Occupied Territories as follows:
‘The Revolt” is a result of the ceaseless harassment and humiliation. It
makes no sense to shoot at young people who are throwing stones. It is
senseless to order armed soldiers to face population. . . Our life here has
become an indescribable nightmare. The prisons are crowded with
humiliated detainees. Who hears about them? Where is the coexistence
they are talking about?2
Hadly Cantril, in his book, The Psychology ofSocial Movement (1994), wrote the
following:
When institutions and social values are disturbed, it means the people are
disturbed. And the people are disturbed. They are anxious to regain
mental stability. The easiest and most usual way to accomplish this is to
look for a leader, identify oneself with him, transfer one’s troubles to him,
and believe that he can always cope with things, that he always has
another trick up his sleeve, that he can safely protect one against external
danger.26
I will investigate whether Cantril’s conclusion is valid based on my analysis.
Ted Robert Gurr, in his book, Why Men Rebel (1970), wrote the ensuing words:
The potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and
intensity of shared discontents among members of the society. The
potential for political violence is a function of the degree to which such
discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents.27
24Israel Shahak, “Palestinian Life Under Israeli Apartheid,” Race and Class 30, no. 1(1988): 1-12.
25David McDowall, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1989), 106.
26Hadly Cantril, The Psychology ofSocial Movement (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1994),
234.
27Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 8.
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To Gurr, the basic frustration-aggression proposition is that the greater the
frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration.28
Also, intense politicized discontent can be widespread and persistent over a long period
without overt manifestation, because a regime can monopolize coercive control and
institutional support. A weakening of regime control or the development of dissident
organizations in such a situation is highly likely to lead to massive violence.29
Hoselitz and Willner, delineating their distinction between expectations and
aspirations, link deprivation with potential revolution.
Unrealized aspirations produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealized
expectations result in feelings of deprivation. Disappointment is generally
tolerable. Deprivation is often intolerable. The deprived individual feels
impelled to remedy, by whatever means are available, frustration produced
in him. Whereas disappointment may breed the seeds of incipient
revolution, deprivation serves as a catalyst for revolutionary action.30
In a similar vein, H.L. Nieburg, in his book, Political Violence: The Behavioral
Process (1970), wrote the following:
Deprivation begins with a discussion of relative inequity, injustice, and
inequality among social groups, postulating that the sharper the perception
of inequity, the more intense the tactics of protest. Frustration-aggression
theory is frequently used to explain violent behavior. Frustration imposed
by external sanctions of the physical world generates accumulative rage
that, at some point, breaks through violent behavior.3’
28Ibid., 9.
29lbid., 15.
30Bert Hoselitz and Ann Wiliner, “Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American
Aid,” 363 in Gurr, 39.
31H.L. Nieburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.,
1970), 39-40.
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Anthony Oberschall, in his book, Social Movement: Ideologies, Interests, and
Identities (1995), substantiated Gurr’s central hypothesis that:
Gun’s central hypothesis is that relative deprivation is the basic
precondition of civil strife, and the greater the deprivation, the greater the
magnitude of strife. Relative deprivation in turn is produced by
discrepancy of what people think they are entitled to and what they are
actually getting. As deprivation increases, frustration and anger will
ensue. These psychological states will produce aggression. At the level of
aggregates, many aggressive acts and tendencies will produce civil strife.32
Also, I will show in subsequent chapters and in my analysis of the subject matter
how characteristics and tactics of the Israeli occupation impacted the decision to go with
the Uprising.
Organization of the Study
This study will be divided into five chapters.
Chapter I — Introduction
In this chapter, many areas will be discussed such as the statement of the problem,
the hypothesis, the research methods, and the research tools used in this study, what
theoretical framework will be adopted to fit the study, and what kind of information this
study will need. The literature review will answer the question. Also, this chapter will
discuss the significance of the study, why this study is important. The last issue in this
chapter will address the efforts of the Palestinian national struggle and why it failed on
many fronts.
Chapter II — Factors Behind the Palestinian Uprising
32Anthony Oberschall, Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 48-49.
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This chapter will explore some factors that pushed the Palestinians to stand up
against the Occupation and to have their own uprising. Some factors have something to
do with the Arab-Palestinian relationship such as the treatment of the Palestinians in the
Arab world, the ignoring of the Palestinian problem by Arab leaders, and the killing of
Palestinians in some Arab countries. Also, this chapter focuses on the Israeli Occupation
and the bad treatment of the Palestinians. Finally, the chapter will discuss some other
economic, political and social factors affecting Palestinians and the impact of worldwide
opinion about Palestinian liberation.
Chapter III — Israeli Reaction to the Uprising
This chapter is concerned with the means used by Israel to quell the Uprising. For
example, enforcement of curfews, random killings, jailing of dissidents and ordinary
citizens alike, deportation, house demolition, restrictive water policies, economic
punishment, and many other descriptions of reprisals against Palestinians will be
included.
Chapter IV — The Palestinian Uprising and Peace: The Impact on Israel, the
Palestinians, and the International Community.
The media coverage for the events in the Occupied Territories played a significant
role in convincing the world that this situation could not be allowed to continue and that
something must be done.
In this chapter, I will discuss how the Uprising affected the Israelis as well as the
Palestinians and the PLO. Also, I will examine how the international community
worldwide participated in pushing both parties to negotiate peace.
Chapter V — Conclusions and Recommendations
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This chapter will present analysis of the findings in the study, and determine if the
findings will support the hypothesis around which this study evolved. Also, this chapter
will present recommendations to the Palestinians and to the Israelis and their leaders. If
these peace opportunities are missed or ignored, the gates of hell will be opened and the
stream of blood will be running again.
The Palestinian’s National Liberation Struggle
A brief history of the Palestinian National Liberation struggle shows that the
Palestinians learned from previous revolutions, specifically those of the people of
Vietnam, Algeria, Korea, Angola, Congo, and Mozambique.
It can be noted that the first Palestinian national movement started in 1936 against
the British forces in Palestine. By 1939, the Palestinian Uprising or the General Strike as
they still call it in Palestine, was virtually at an end. As a military force, the Palestinians
had been defeated. Official British figures for the number of Palestinian casualties during
the 1936-1939 disturbances have never been made fully known, but according to the
careful calculations of the Palestinian scholar Dr. Waled Al-Khaldi, the dead must have
exceeded 5,000 and the wounded 14,O00. During its various phases, the 1936-1939
uprising was more spontaneous and less organized.
By the end of the 1948 War and the loss of the majority of Palestine to the Jews,
part of what was left of Palestine came under Jordanian rule. Jordan used active
suppression and repression to prevent any public voicing of a national Palestinian
33David Hirst, The Roots of Violence in the Middle East: The Gun and the Olive Branch (London:
Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 93.
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identity.34 Abdullah, King of Jordan, erased the identity of the Palestinians in a single
act: in March of 1950, Abdullah instructed the word “Palestine” to be removed from all
maps and official statements.3’
The PLO was established at an Arab summit conference in Cairo in 1964 as an
official voice of the Palestinian people, and shortly thereafter, organized a conventional
military component — The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). Both the PLO and the
PLA were centered in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and kept under tight control by
the Egyptian government. Fatah, which was formed in the late 1950’s, was committed to
guerilla warfare.36
Robert 0. Freedman, in his book The Intfada (1991), wrote the following:
Conditions were marginal at best. While these political and economic
conditions contained the seeds of popular support, there were limitations
inherent in other elements of the human milieu. The fractious nature of
Palestinian society, with its segmented structure of competing families and
clans, plus residual political loyalties to the Hashemite regime in Jordan
on the part of some local elites, impeded insurgent efforts to mobilize the
people behind their cause. Moreover, Jordanian political and economic
discrimination against the Arab states had created the PLO in 1964; this
was considered more a means of controlling Palestinian nationalism that
allowing it free reign.37
Fatah’s emphasis on violent resistance was due to the attractiveness of the
alternative guerilla focus strategy popularized by the Cuban revolution. The guerilla
34Robert 0. Freedman, The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers
(Miami: Florida International University, 1991), 22.




focus strategy differed from the popular war strategy in that it downplayed the need for
substantial political organization prior to hostilities.38
In order for any revolution to succeed, the human and the physical environment
have to be suitable and fit a revolutionary war. In the period after the 1967 War, the
human environment was moderately conducive to armed struggle. The people of the
Territories were Arabs (mostly Muslim) who resented subjugation to Jewish military rule.
Moreover, tens of thousands of Palestinians were living in refugee camps where living
conditions were marginal at best. Ironically, Jordanian political and economic
discrimination against West Bank Palestinians prior to the 1967 War provided an
opportunity for Israel to make relative improvements, especially in the economic arena,
which might contribute to stability in the short term. In short, while the human
environment contained some aspects generally favorable to an insurrection, it was not
ideal.39
Robert 0. Freedman, in his book the Intfada (1991), wrote the following
describing the physical environment in the Territories:
The physical environment in Palestine was highly unsuitable for
protracted popular war, since the area was small and open. The road and
the communication system were excellent in Israel and good in the
Territories. The guerilla fighters could not set up their bases in the rural
area of the West Bank. Even moderate concentrations of fighters or
supplies were easy to spot and destroy. The Gaza Strip, with its heavy
population, was out of the question as far as guerilla bases. In the final
analysis, the poor physical environment was a major impediment to the





The Palestinian armed struggle of 1968-1973 can be described as a failure due to
poor organization.4’The Palestinian fighters lost their bases in Jordan after September 17,
1970 (Black September). Many fighters were killed. Others crossed the Jordan River to
Israel, some were left in the Jordanian prisons and other survivors fled to Syria and then
to Lebanon.42
Furthermore, the Palestinian armed struggle from Lebanon came to an end by
August 30, 1982, after three months of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. A total of 14,398
Palestinian fighters were evacuated. Between September 16 and 18, 1982, with the
approval of the Israeli army, the Maronite Phalangists (a military wing of the Maronite
Christian Political Party) entered the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla to “clean out”
the 2,000 Palestinian guerillas who, according to reports, were still hiding there. They
massacred between 600 and 700 Palestinians — children, women, and men.43
By 1982, the Palestinian struggle received its biggest blow when the Palestinian
forces evacuated from Lebanon. The Palestinians of the Territories realized that there
was no hope for them from outside of the Territories to free them from the Israeli
occupation. It was the time for them to stand up to the Israeli army and to take their
salvation into their own hands. On December 7, 1987, the Palestinian Uprising erupted.
Men, women, and children participated in the Uprising, each according to his or her
41Ibid., 41.
42For more information about this subject see David Hirst, The Roots of Violence in the Middle




ability until 1993, when the peace accord was signed by the Palestinians and the Israelis.
According to the late Dr. Edward W. Said, the Palestinian Uprising of 1978 changed not
only the Palestinians and the Israelis but the whole Middle East.
Review of the Literature
A tremendous amount of literature has been written on the Arab-Israeli conflict
from both sides of the fence, as well as from third and independent parties. Therefore,
the gigantic task of sifting through this great amount of literature for relevant data is
further complicated by the differing views presented by the biases of the authors.
It is not the intent of this study to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict. The purpose of this work is to assess and to examine the impact of the
Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993, on the peace process between the Israeli and the
Palestinian. Since the subject of this study is specific, it became imperative that a closer
look should be focused on literature which employed the micro-view approach to the area
of study rather than the macro-view approach which is interested in the whole Arab-
Israeli conflict from historical perspective, which is not our intent in this study. I will
discuss some works which examined the impact of some Israeli policies in the Occupied
Territories, and how these policies ignited the Uprising, and how the Uprising forced
both parties with the help of the international community to come to agreement to
negotiate peace.
In the economic arena, Ted R. Gurr and others, the authors of Revolution ofthe
Late Twentieth Century (1991), acknowledged that Israeli’s policy after 1967 aimed to
prevent the development of a strong Palestinian economy, which might compete with the
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Israeli economy. Israel tried in every way to make the Palestinian economy dependent on
the Israeli economy by creating a work force out of thousands of Palestinians.44
Supporting Gurr’s arguments, Frank Collins, in his article “Palestinian Economy in
Chaos After Gulf War” (1991), stated:
The Israelis have systematically done everything in their power to block
the normal development of the Palestinian economy. They have striven to
make the Palestinian economy totally dependent on, and subordinate to,
that of Israel. A major result has been creation ofa work force of 120,000
who are forced to cross the Green Line every day.4
Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, in his book The Economics ofthe West Bank and Gaza
(1985), argued that Israel induced the Occupied Territories’ dependency through three
major avenues: recruitment and exploitation of Palestinian labor, restriction on
movement of products from the territories to Israel, and the free flow of Israeli goods into
the Occupied Territories.46
Israel also controlled the water of the West Bank and its use to serve its own
interests. Israel Shahak, wrote an article, “Palestinian Life Under Israeli Apartheid,” that
acknowledged by fall of 1987, according to Israeli data, the 60,000 Israeli settlers in the
West Bank were using more water than the 850,000 or one million Palestinians.
Similarly, in the area of Land Confiscation, it was, and continues to be, the policy of the
State of Israel to confiscate Palestinian land, and they found all kind of legal justifications
to take it. Sixty percent of the land on the West Bank was susceptible to expropriation
44Ted Robert Gurr, et al, ed. Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Centmy (Bolder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1991), 303.
45Frank Collins, “Palestinian Economy in Chaos After the Gulf War,” The Washington Report on
the Middle East Affairs X, no. 2 (1991): 23.
46Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1985).
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under the Israeli interpretation of the Ottman Law. Any uninhabited land and land
beyond the sound of the human voice from the nearest village revert to the state.47
In the political arena, Israel tried hard to prevent the rise of any Palestinian
nationalist movements in the Occupied Territories. In his book, Palestinian Leadershzp
on the West Bank (1985), Moshi Máoz affirmed that:
A major theme in Israel policy toward the West Bank was to forbid, by
both word and deed, Arab political activities and to curtail the
establishment of an all-West Bank leadership, be it Palestinian-nationalist
or Jordan-oriented.48
To achieve their political goals, the Israelis attempted to assassinate the mayors of
Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Beireh in 1982, after they were elected by Palestinian voters.
Also, Máoz provided material and insight into Israel’s hostile stance and ceaseless effort
to prevent the rise of a genuine Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. For many years,
Israeli officials insisted that there be no Palestinian leaders in the Occupied Territories.
In another work, Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (1986),
David Shipler reached a similar conclusion as Mãoz, when he mentioned the
assassination attempt on newly elected mayors of the cities of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al
Bireh, because they were nationalists and they did not like the occupation. The first two
mayors were maimed by explosions, while Ibrahim Al-Tawil escaped injury in 1 982.
47Israel Shahak, 1-12.
48Moshi Máoz, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank (London, England: F. Cass, 1985). in
Jalal Abed, 13.
49David Shipler, Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a PromisedLand (New York, New York:
Time Books, 1986).
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The Israelis always denied the existence of the Palestinians and if they
acknowledged their existence. they did not and currently do not want to be with them in
the same place. Arie Bober, in his book, The Other Israel (1972), acknowledged that this
country (Israel and the Territories) is too small for both of us. I have to transfer them to
neighboring countries, not one of them should be left. This idea was supported by Ben
Gurion, the first Prime Minister to Israel in 1948. He said, “Israel is the country of the
Jews and only the Jews,”50 In 1969, Golda Meir, then Israeli Prime Minister, said of the
Palestinian people, “They do not exist.”51 On April 17, 1989, in an interview with Time
Magazine, Ariel Sharon, then Prime Minister of Israel, affirmed, “Jordan is Palestine.
The capital of Palestine is Amman. If Palestinian Arabs want to find their political
expression, they will have to do it in Amman.”52
Many authors have their own interpretations. Lockman and Beinin, in their book
Intfada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (1989), argued that the
mistreatment of the Palestinians from 1967-198 8 led to the Uprising. Also, they
described the Israeli government:
The new Israeli government is composed of men whose hostility not just
to the Palestinian aspiration but to Palestinians as human beings is
undying. Men like Rabin, Sharon, Netanyahu, Ares, and Shamir are the
inheritors of a tradition of uncompromising brutality and lying, in which
all means are justified as long as the end — Israel ascendancy at the
expense of Palestinian life itself— can be assured.3
50Alfred Lilienthan, “Zionism the Occupying Power.” Middle East Perspective XVIII, no. 3
(1984): 4.
51Ali Jalal Abed, Israel’s Policies in the West Bank and Gaza (Ph.D. dissertation, Clark Atlanta
University, 1988), 17.
52M.J. Gart, “Never, Never, Never!,” Time Magazine, 17 April 1989, 40.
53Lockman and Beinin, 21.
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Lockman and Beinin came almost to the same conclusion as Máoz that the
Uprising affected both people--Israelis and Palestinians—and peace is the only way out of
this mess. Also, they added that the Middle East will not be the same because of the
influence of the Uprising.
Sharing the view of Lockman and Beinin about the causes of the Uprising, Baruch
Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal argued in their book, Palestinian: The Making of the
People (1993) that the bad economy and the political situation led to the 1987 Uprising.
In addition, the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories can be described as harsh and
bad.54 With the same point of view about the cause of the Uprising, in his book, Israel’s
Wars 194 7-1993 (2000), Ahron Bregman argued that the Palestinian Uprising could be
caused by many factors, such as the unjust treatment of Palestinian workers by their
Israeli employers, or because of the high unemployment rate among the young
Palestinians. On the eve of the Intifada, 15,000 graduates were unemployed: they were
desperate and bored and directed their anger and frustration at the Israelis.5 Joost R.
Hilterman, the author of Behind the Intfada. Labor and Women ‘s Movement in the
Occupied Territories (1991), acknowledged that some incidents that took place in the
areas sparked the Uprising. First, the killing incident which took place in Jabalya
Refugee Camp, where four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli driver; and second, the
Arab summit in Amman, Jordan, which completely ignored the Palestinian issue and the
humiliating reception of Yasser Arafat by King Hussein. The Palestinians realized that
54Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinian: The Making of the People (New York,
New York: The Free Press, 1993), 236.
55Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars, 1947-1993 (London: Routledge Publishers, 2000), 118.
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they could not rely on Arab states to help them in their struggle for national liberation,
and they had to take their struggle completely into their own hands. Third, the harsh
Israeli treatment of the Occupied Territories sparked the Uprising.56
Israel used all available means to quell the Uprising, and their leaders threatened
to use more punishment against the Palestinians. Geoffrey Aronson, in his book, Israeli
Palestinians, and the Intfada: Creating Fact on the West Bank (1990), acknowledged
that Rabin declared that he was going to make the Palestinians suffer more and more if
they tried to achieve their goals through violence and terror. The author also
acknowledged that the “riots” represented no mere skirmish or passing episode of civil
unrest, but a full-scale rebellion against Israel.57
The author presented the story of the village of Qabatiyah — south of Jenin — as
an example of Rabin’s policy of sanction and of the high costs attending the campaign
against collaborators. The Israel Defense force (IDF) placed the village under a complete
blockade, which lasted more than a month. Supplies of running water, electricity, and
cooking gas were shut off, and outside medical assistance was forbidden. No export
licenses were granted, so that economic hardship was created. Bridge crossing permits
for visiting relatives were denied and most of the village youth were detained.58
56Joost R. Hilterman, Behind the Intfada: Labor and Women ‘s Movements in the Occupied
Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1.




In terms of peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians, a number of books
have been published with varying points of view. Aryeh Shalev, author of the book, The
Intfada. Causes and Effects (1991), pointed out that the Palestinian Intifada created a
new situation in the Middle East. He argued this situation cannot be solved by the use of
force; according to Shalev, political initiative and negotiations between Israel and the
PLO will solve the problem:
Israeli political leadership finds it increasing difficult to put forward and
initiate a political process acceptable to the United States and certainly for
Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the OT’s. The central element in
such a process must be negotiations on a Palestinian (not Jordanian)
option. Thus, it was not until April 1989, sixteen months after the start of
the Uprising, that Israel proposed a political initiative.59
Shalev acknowledged that Israel was unable to suppress the Uprising. For that, Shalev in
another place affirmed:
The United States concluded that the Intifada had generated a new
situation in the Middle East, which it could not ignore. Therefore, it was
incumbent upon the United States to begin looking seriously for a political
solution to the Palestinian problem.6°
Sharing the same viewpoint, Zéev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ an, in their book, Intfada:
The Palestinian Uprising Israel’s Third Front (1990), acknowledged that the
Palestinian Uprising created a new situation in the Middle East and its impact can be felt
everywhere in Israel:
Frustration also stems from the fact that many Israelis, of all political
persuasion, have come to feel that where the conflict with the Palestinians
is concerned, their country has been living a lie. They now believe that
their leaders deceived them in pronouncing that the Palestinian people did




not exist; that the Arabs in the territories did not want their leaders; that
the PLO forced itself on the Palestinians by violence and intimidation; that
the status quo of occupation could be maintained indefinitely; that Israel
could control the inhabitants of the territories by punitive action and never
face revolt; and that only Israel wanted peace; while all the projosals
coming out of the Palestinian camp were merely cynical ruses.
Schiff and Ya’ari in another place in their book, acknowledge that the Uprising affect can
be felt in Washington:
While Schultz’s aides were still puzzling over how to proceed after his
decision to “leave the Middle East alone,” the Intifada broke out and
forced the Secretary to overcome his irritation and turn his attention back
to the region.62
At the same time, positive signs were coming from the Israeli side:
Shamir had even announced that he would be prepared to enter into
negotiations without any preconditions, leaving Schultz and his staff
feeling that the Intifada might indeed be the long-awaited opportunity to
score a breakthrough.63
Both Schiff and Ya’ an concluded that without reaching an accommodation with
the PLO, any other settlement would be a partial one and thus liable to collapse.
Don Peretz is another author who looked at the Uprising from different points of
view and from a different perspective. In his book, Intfada: The Palestinian Uprising
(1990), he acknowledged that the Palestinian Uprising enjoyed widespread support
throughout the world and put back the Palestinian issue on the international agenda. At
the same time, Peretz argued that finding a peaceful solution to the conflict is remote, as
remote as ending the conflict in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan or Cyprus.
61Zëev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intfada: The Palestinian Uprising — Israel’s Third Front (New




Barry Rubin, in his book, Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of
the PLO (1994), argued that the Intifada was incapable, by itself, of ending Israel’s rule
or creating a Palestinian state. Only a diplomatic agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians could achieve this goal. Since the Intifada had no structured, independent
leadership or power to force Israel’s withdrawal, it was the task of Arafat and the PLO to
reach a negotiated solution. If he was unable to do so, local activists might look
elsewhere for leadership: or deprived of hope, the Uprising could collapse.64 This
viewpoint was similar to that one put forth by F. Robert Hunter, the author of The
Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means (1991), that it was the Intifada that brought
Arafat’s strategy to fruition. Without the impetus provided by the revolt, the PLO could
not have moved so fast or traveled so far toward a political settlement.6DAccording to
Nassar and Heacock, there are two national communities, with two separate and distinct
national identities who have distinct values and norms and are governed by two sets of
social, cultural, and political institutions. One political structure may not meet the
national needs of the two peoples in a satisfactory manner; each must seek its expression
equally and independently in a structure of its own making on the same soil.66 In another
perspective on the Uprising’s impact on peace, Rex Bryen, in his book Echoes ofthe
Intfada (1991), agreed with many previous authors that Israel has no choice but to
64Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO (Cambridge, MA;
Harvard University Press, 1994), 92.
65F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War By Other Means (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1991), 153.
66Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Jntfada: Palestinians at the Crossroads (New York,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 10-11.
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negotiate peace with the Palestinians as a way out of its present situation. Gad Yáacobi, a
Labor Party minister in the national unity government, said, “Negotiation with the
Palestinians is the only way to stop the Uprising.”67 Also, Shlomo Lahat, mayor of Tel
Aviv, and a prominent Likud politician, told an interviewer during the 1988 election
campaign, “I believe a Palestinian state is inevitable. I believe, unfortunately, that the
PLO represents the Palestinian people. I know that the price of peace and real security is
withdrawal.”68Furthermore, an Israeli intelligence report discussed in the news media in
March 1989 concluded that Israel has no choice but to talk with the PLO if it wishes to
end the Uprising and make progress toward peace. The report also concluded that the
PLO is sincere in its call for accommodation with the Jewish state.69
In concluding this literature review I will discuss Moshe Máoz’s thoughts about
the Uprising and about peace. In his book, From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations
1973-1993 (1994), Máoz argues like many other before him that peace between the two
parties cannot be achieved by using military forces; peace can only be achieved through a
direct negotiation with the Palestinians and their leadership (the PLO). Máoz affirmed:
By 1989 the fourth stage of negotiating peace had started. When the
Israeli leadership, even the government led by Prime Minister Yhzhak
Shamir, understood that if they wanted to go ahead, there was no serious
possibility of doing so without confronting the Palestinian problem. By
May 1989, Shamir and Rabin came out with what became known as the
Shamir-Rabin Plan. It emphasized the need to come to terms with the
Palestinians and suggested a method for bringing the Palestinians into the
67Rex Brynen, Echoes of the Int(fada: Regional Repercussion ofthe Palestinian-Israeli Conflict




negotiating process. Moreover, on the Palestinian side the Intifada created
the need to achieve practical results on the ground that they knew were
attainable only by means of negotiation, with Israel, and thus induced the
Palestinian leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude and seek — like the
government of Israel — an acceptable formula that would enable the
beginning of the peace negotiations.7°
Máoz also acknowledged that the Palestinian Uprising affected the Israelis’ life:
The Palestinian Uprising, in my opinion, had led to the opening up of the
arenas of security, international relations, and military relations, to
intensive political debate, the like of which has not been known in the
State of Israel since its establishment in 1948. Also, the Israeli society has
been undergoing a process of changing its own format in a very intensive
way, even if it was not always fuiiy conscious of it.71
Based on this literature review, it may be argued that the Palestinian Uprising of
1987-1993 paved the way for more political negotiations between the Palestinians and the
Israelis. I shall attempt to use rigorous analysis to investigate and document whether the
Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993 had any impact on the peace process between the
Palestinians and the Israelis.
Significance of the Study
I believe this study will enhance the reader’s knowledge by adding information
about the Occupation, its tactics and its methods of oppressing the Palestinians. At the
same time, it shows how the Palestinians with limited resources — manpower, guns,
ammunition, war gear, food supply, and many other things — could fight back the
occupational forces.
70Moshe et a!., Fro,n War to Peace. Arab-Israeli Relations 19 73-1993 (New York: New York
University Press, 1994), 103-104.
71Ibid., 151-152.
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In addition, this study may give the reader or the researcher a better understanding
of the history of the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I believe there has
not yet been a paradigm shift with regard to Frustration-Aggression Theory. By that, I
mean frustration will almost always lead to aggression. In this case, the diplomatic
process may or may not be put in place as a political process.
CHAPTER II
FACTORS BEHIND THE UPRISING
INTRODUCTION
Au Baghdadi, in his article, “Palestinians Denied the Right to Work,” wrote the
following description of Palestinian life under the Israeli Occupation:
The Palestinians have been abused by the Israeli government and the
Israeli Jews for half a century. Not only have their lands been confiscated;
their homes demolished; their water and their natural resources stolen;
their livelihood taken away; their skull and bones broken; but their rights
in entirety have been usurped. They have been denied the most basic
rights guaranteed by all laws and constitutions—to move freely in their
own homeland; to look for a job; to feed their children; to provide for their
own families; and to eat a loaf of bread so they may live and work.’
Also, Walid Khaldi, in his book, Palestine Reborn (1949) wrote the following:
After forty years of ghostly wandering in no man’s land and twenty-one
years of occupation, the Palestinians want to start living and stop dying.
They want to start laughing and stop crying. They want to breathe
Palestinian oxygen, plough
Palestinian soil, watch Palestinian skies, hear Palestinian accents. They
want their own, their very own nest, hole, perch or haunt. They want to
turn this into a badge of identity, a center of pride, a symbol of dignity and
a refuge of last resort.2
In the search for the causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 against the Israeli
occupation, it is difficult to give one clear-cut reason as a cause for the Palestinian
‘Au Baghdadi, “Palestinians denied the right to work,” The Final Call 16, no. 7 (1996): 13.
2Walid Khalidi. Palestine Reborn (London, England: 1.8. Tavris and Company, Ltd., 1992), 158.
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Uprising of 1987. But it can be said that more than one factor worked together to
produce the Uprising of 1987 in Palestine Occupied Territories. Indeed, there were two
factors that can be targeted as the major causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987: (1)
The Arab Palestinian factor and (2) the Israeli factor. Also, there were many other issues
that can be seen as minor elements in the dynamic.
For the purpose of this study, many interviews were conducted. Some were face-
to-face dialogues and others were completed by phone. Too, others were conducted by
asking the interviewees to answer questions in writing, particularly if access by
telephone, transportation issues, or safety challenges were operative.
In their book, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: A Palestinian Christian In Occupied
West Bank (1990). Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K. Beebe, wrote the following:
Palestinian despair turned into action in 1987. From the bottom of their
hearts our people cried for respect. Israel’s insecurity is understandable,
given their victimization throughout history. They have suffered
dehumanization and treatment as non-persons. Yet, who better than they
should identify the deep inner longing for freedom, the desire to have
one’s own nation? Who better than they should recognize that enforced
indignity embitters the victim and promotes retaliation? Persistent
dehumanization burns in every Palestinian consciousness and calls out for
redemption. Jews should understand.3
The Palestinians realized with a shock that henceforth, their own liberation was
up to no one but them. Arab armies were of no further use to them or the Palestine
3Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K Beebe. Blessed Are the Peacemakers: A Palestinian Christian In
Occupied West Bank (Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1990), 113.
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Liberation Organization commandos in Beirut or Tunis; they had at last to fight their own
battles against their oppressors, and in doing so, they energized their people.4
Ten days of serious clashes took place in Gaza in October 1987, during which
seven supporters of a resistance group new to the Occupied Territories, who called itself
“Islamic Jihad,” were killed by the Israeli Security Forces.5
Indeed, the level of repression in the Occupied Territories was at its highest level
in many years: a record number of Palestinians had been “administratively” detained (i.e.,
without trial) during 1987, and deportations, house demolitions, and other repressive
measures were beginning to take their toll of the Palestinians’ collective patience.6 In
addition to the Israeli measures against the Palestinians, the Amman Summit itself was,
doubtless, another factor in driving the Palestinians to revolt.7
In an interview, Dr. Abu Jaber, the head of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to
Madrid sent to negotiate peace with Israel, suggested that many factors could have
inflamed the Palestinian Uprising in 1987:
1. The political and the economic situation in the Occupied Territories which
had been worsened lately, with the majority of the population young
people who lived all their lives under military rule, for that they have no
fear from the military and they are ready for confrontation.
2. There is no hope that Israel will withdraw from the Occupied Territories.
Also, day after day the Israeli confiscation of the Palestinian land and its






natural resources increased. Also, the building of new settlements on the
Palestinian land increased, too.
3. The Palestinian leadership outside and inside Palestine have been
convinced that the popular resistance is the only way to force the enemy to
back off. . . and to start negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict.8
In another interview, during his February 23, 2001 visit to Harvard University, a
PLO member, who refused for security reasons to give his name, mentioned the
following as causes for the Uprising:
1. The departure of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in 1982, which
created more frustration for the Palestinians than they had before, which
resulted in increased Israeli violence and harsh treatment to the
Palestinian.
2. The silence of the Arab world and the International Community about
what had happened to the Palestinians in Lebanon after being killed and
slaughtered by the Israeli and by the Maronite forces.
In another interview, Mr. Main Erakat, from the Department of Negotiation
Affairs — The Palestinian Authority, posited, “The Uprising was a result of the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli military practices against the
Palestinians, the miserable economic situation.”9
in another interview, Salama Hijawi, General Director for the Palestinian
Planning Center, acknowledged that the Uprising was a result of the Israeli military
pressure against the Palestinians. He also acknowledged that the PLO had found in the
8Kamel Abu Jaber, a university professor, a former Minister of Economics in the later 1970s, a
former foreign Minister of Jordan in 1993. He is the Director of Jordan Institute ofDiplomacy. The
interview was on March 14, 1998.
9Máin Erakat, interview by the author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
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Uprising a chance for creating an alternative place for the Palestinian struggle after the
loss of their bases in Lebanon.’°
Mr. Hassan Al-Kashif, another Palestinian official from the Authority — Ministry
of Information, mentioned several causes for the 1987 Uprising, and they can be stated as
follows:
1. The continuation of the occupation, over twenty years, and the absence of
the efforts to find a solution to the situation.
2. The evacuation of the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in 1982, and before
that, from Jordan in 1970, and then from Syria.
3. The mistreatment of the PLO by the Arab countries, and the closure of the
borders in the face of the Palestinian fighters prevented the PLO from
getting into Israel/Palestine.
4. The Israelis failed to find alternative leadership to the PLO, either from
the Arab countries or from the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
5. The Palestinians had the faith and the trust in themselves to do their job
and not to depend on someone else, because they have no trust in anyone
but themselves.”
In another interview, Mr. Said Ouida from the Financing Ministry mentioned
several causes for the 1987 Uprising against the Israeli Occupation, as he saw them:
1. After twenty years of occupation, there was no sign of a solution to the
problem in the near future.
2. Too many long term frustrations and latent anger lingered in the hearts of
the Palestinians, as a result of the Israeli military practices against them.
So they were waiting for the right time for expressing their anger and their
frustration.
10Salama Hijawi, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
‘1Hassan Al-Kashif, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21
February 2001.
3. The building of the secret organizations and institutions in the Occupied
Territories to run the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation
forces.
4. The killing of the four Palestinians and the injuries of several more in
Gaza ignited the Uprising.’2
Osama Al-Farra from the municipality of the City of Khan Younis in the Gaza
Strip, explained the causes for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 as follows:
1. The feeling of injustice among the Palestinians was the major factor that
promulgated the Uprising.
2. The international neglect of the Palestinian problem was another crucial
factor. For example, Secretary of State Shultz said, “We have to keep the
Palestinian issue in the refrigerator after the election in the U. S. is over.”
3. The Palestinian issue was an unimportant issue on the Arab leaders’
agenda during 1985, 1986. and 1987, especially during the Amman
Summit where the Palestinian issue was not on the Summit agenda.
4. The Israeli military rule in the Occupied Territories and the difficulties
created by it to the Palestinians in all aspects of their life.
5. The growth and development of national aspiration in the Occupied
Territories and the establishment of students and workers
Dr. Hussein Al-Araj, Under Secretary for the local governments, was the last one
I interviewed. To Dr. Al-Araj, there were many factors that worked together and led to
the Palestinian Uprising of 1987. These factors and causes can be summarized as the
following:
12Said Ouida, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
‘3Ossama Al-Farra, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
1. The long years of occupation and Israeli military practices in the Occupied
Territories can be seen as a major cause for the Uprising of 1987.
2. The increased level of frustration and the growth of nationalist sentiment
among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories fueled the need to be
independent of Israel.
3. Economic difficulties led to daily hardships for families confined in often
inadequate housing and sometimes in refugee camps.
4. The treatment of the PLO in the Arab world proved demoralizing to
those who supported the goals of the PLO.
5. The universities could be credited with heightening a national awareness
among the students and that sensibility helped in the formulation of a
resistance strategy against the Israeli occupation.’4
In a series of interviews conducted by the author’s brother, Khaled Khader, with
citizens from the Occupied Territories, dated June 14, 2003, the causes of the Palestinian
Uprising of 1987 can be seen as almost similar to the interviewees’ answers in most of all
the interviews.
In an interview, Mr. Abu Alrub from the village of Messilyah, a 36-year-old
member of the militant group Black Panther, revealed that he spent three years
characterized as an outlaw by the Israeli forces. was captured, given seven life jail
sentences, spent seven years in jail, and was subsequently released as a result of the
White River Agreement. He is now the head of the local government. Alrub stated the
following as causes for the Uprising of 1987:
1. The Uprising was planned by the PLO, especially after the departure of
the Palestinian forces from Lebanon in order to transfer the battle and the
struggle against Israel to the Occupied Territories.
14Dr. Hussein A1-Araj, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21
February 2001.
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2. Israeli treatment of the Palestinians was inhuman. An example is the
demeaning procedures used when Israeli police searched Palestinians at
various street check points, of which there were many.b
3. Resentment about the prevention of students from completing their
educations, because schools were forcibly closed.
4. The Israeli policy of randomly arresting students at critical times during
the school year, such as the final exam period, which meant that students
were not going to get their diplomas and had no chance to attend an
institution of higher learning. Also, Israel prevented those who had
diploma from leaving the country to continue their education.
5. The unjustified arrest and jailing of young men and women was another
point of contention. Ironically, these jails became schools for the
Palestinians to become radicalized by senior prisoners. These sometimes
hardened revolutionaries educated them to awareness of their historical
mistreatment and advised them as to what should be done to protect their
identities and their lands against the occupation forces.
6. The Israeli methods of forcing people to work for them as collaborators
against their own people, by giving them money or offering them sexual
relationships with Israeli women was anathema to many Palestinians. The
prevailing Israeli attitude was that one way or another, you work for us or
you will suffer economically and in other ways as well.
7. The willingness and the desire of the Palestinians to be free and to get rid
of the occupation finally morphed into active violence.
8. The desire of the Palestinians to preserve their identities, especially when
some Arab countries tried to erase Palestinian identities in the fifties, in
the sixties, and even in the seventies, was a key motivating factor.
9. The refusal of Israel to allow significant populations of Palestinians to live
in most areas, by not giving them permission to build homes undermined
the stability of families. At the same time, Israelis allowed other Israeli
settlers to expand their settlements in legally designated Palestinian
lands.’6
‘5Anonyn-ious, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
16Abu Al-Rub, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Messilya,
14 June 2003.
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In another insightful interview, Dr. Maruan Jarar, 35 years old, from the village of
Jabá, and a Ph.D. in Political History, remembered that he was a high school student
during the Uprising of 1987. Dr. Jarar mentioned the following as causes for the
Uprising of 1987:
1. The economic situation was unacceptable when the vast majority of
Palestinians existed at levels far below the poverty line.
2. PLO frustration increased at the time of their departure from Lebanon. In
addition, the shifting of the Palestinian struggle from outside to inside and
the building of a new leadership base in the territories resulted in a good
relationship with the outside leadership of the PLO.
3. The closure of many PLO offices in key Arab countries was interpreted by
many Palestinians as a debilitating loss of support for the cause of
liberation.
4. The division among the Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories led
to the creation of a new front and leaders inside the territories.
5. The Iraq-Iran War drew attention away from the Palestinian issue forcing
the Palestinians to find a way to regain a place on the world political
agenda. The Uprising was a way to recapture the previous level of world
attention.17
In another interview, Dr. Waled Said Jarar, 59 years old, from the village of
Aljadedah, and Ph.D. in Current Palestinian Literature, said the Palestinian Uprising was
caused by:
1. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza resulted in severe
damage to the Palestinian economy, to their educational system, and to
their political aspirations.
2. Israeli control over Palestinian labor forces did not include recognition of
Palestinian worker rights. Palestinians were not allowed to join labor
17Dr. Marwan Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank Villiage of
Jabá, 14 June 2003.
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unions, and had no medical insurance or retirement benefits. Most of the
time, the Israelis gave the workers no wages for their work because the
Palestinians had no legal redress in Israeli courts. In addition, working
conditions, especially for lower level laborers, were typically unsafe.
3. At the educational level, the Israelis closed schools and universities,
changed a lot of the material in the books and added information about the
Palestinians that was either distorted or untrue.
4. Palestinians typically have many political parties and a variety of interest
groups, but all of them were united in their desire to get rid of the
Occupation, thus igniting the Uprising.
5. Village leagues had a bad impact on the Palestinian way of life because
they are working with Israel to oppress the Palestinians.
6. A final cause was the rise of nationalist sentiment and the feeling that
Palestinians had their own identity and deserved their own country, the
same as any other people in the world.’8
In another interview, Mr. Abu-Ahmad, 40 years old, from the city Brukin, who
spent one year in jail and is affiliated with Fatah, mentioned the following as the causes
for the Uprising:
1. Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were unacceptable.
2. The lack of basic freedoms led to frustration among the Palestinians, and
the feeling that there was no future in the Occupied Territories under
Israel’s heavy handed rule.
3. Arab countries would assist in freeing Palestinians from the oppression of
the Occupation. The Palestinians had to depend on themselves for their
salvation.’9
‘8Dr. Waled Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Al
Jadedah, 14 June 2003.
19Abu Ahmad, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Burka,
14 June 2003.
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In yet another interview, Abu-Assem, a 36-year-old Master’s Degree recipient in
Education and a Fatah affiliate from the village of Yabad was a student at the University
during the Uprising and cited the following as causes for the Uprising:
1. The Israeli policies as enforced by the authorities in the Occupied
Territories were oppressive and intolerable.
2. The psychological pressure on the Palestinians brought about by such acts
as random and unjustified arrests and the humiliation felt by Palestinians
at the check points and roadblocks eventually led to violence and
rebellion.
3. The poor economic situation and the financial difficulties because of an
unjust and unequal Israeli taxation system were further irritants.
Palestinians were unreasonably taxed at much higher levels than Israelis.
4. There was a general loss of hope that a political solution to the Palestinian
problem would ever come to fruition.2°
In another interview, Abu-Qais, 40 years old, from Jenin Refugee Camp, jailed
twice for 15 months, and with a Fatah affiliation, works as a cab driver. Abu-Qais
believes the Uprising was a result of:
1. The Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, along with psychological,
social, and economic pressure and lack of citizen freedoms, led to unrest.
2. The discrimination against Palestinian workers by Israeli workers was
offensive and often turned violent. An example of the repeated instances
of disrespect by Israelis was the habit of calling Arabic workers names
like Arabi, which was offensive to Palestinians.
3. The dehumanization of the Palestinians at the many roadblocks throughout
the country was a key cause of the rebellion.
4. The unjustified arrests and killings were a primary cause of the Uprising.2’
20Abu Assem, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Yabad, 14
June 2003.
21Abu-Qais, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Jenin Refugee Camp,
14 June 2003.
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In another interview, Mr. Abu-Zainah, a 52-year-old businessman from the city of
Jenin, added that the Uprising was a direct result of the killing of the workers in Jabaliah
by Israeli drivers. Also, Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were concomitant
causes of the rebellion and included, in his opinion, a kind of general discrimination that
severely reduced the quality of life. That, along with the dehumanizing treatment of
,,2
Palestinians at check points and roadblocks, was a re-occurring complaint. -
Mr. Abdulah Zakarnih, 39 years old, from the city of Qubattia, was jailed 27
times for a period of eleven and a half years. He is a high school graduate with Fatah
affiliation, and believes the Uprising took place because of the following:
1. The harsh treatment of the Palestinians, such as the unjustified arrests and
killings, was a basis for deep-seated anger, which was at long last
expressed in outright rebellion.
2. The occupation and the confiscation of Palestinian lands remained a
source of latent pain.
3. The destruction of the Palestinian education system with Israeli-trained,
uncertified teachers who knew nothing about the Palestinian culture.
Additionally, the Israelis closed educational institutions for long periods of
time, which ultimately prevented thousands of students from going to
college, earning degrees and perhaps establishing viable careers.
4. The continuous unemployment among the Palestinians exacerbated
restlessness.
5. The accident which took place in Jabalia refugee camp, during which
seven Palestinians were killed by an Israeli truck driver, was a catalyst for
immediate violence.
22Abu-Zainah, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Jenin, 14
June 2003.
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Khaled Jamal, from the city of Qubattia, 33 years old, jailed three times for a
period of 18 months and owner of a clothing factory, stated the causes for the Uprising as
follows:
1. The occupation of the Palestinian lands, which was considered a grave
injustice.
2. Life under the Occupation was like life in jail and the cause of much
frustration.
3. Preventing students from completing their education was an Israeli
strategy that truncated ambition and lowered expectations for future
success. It also was a key cause of the Uprising.
4. The unavailability of careers for average citizens, who found themselves
working in Israel on jobs that did not fit their social status, caused much
unrest.
5. The Israeli policies of preventing Palestinians from traveling abroad for
work or for education and an increased awareness among the young about
their history, identity and mistreatment contributed to the beginnings of
the Uprising.
6. Mr. Jamal owned a clothing factory and used to employ thirty workers and
their families. The Israeli authorities made business travel to Israel
difficult because of their refusal to issue the needed permits. Thus Mr.
Jamal could not purchase materials unavailable in the Palestinian sector.
The inability to purchase needed supplies caused him to lose customers
and finally, he was forced to close the factory. Thirty families remain
without jobs or support. This is one example of Israeli maneuvers
designed to prevent the development of a thriving industrial sector in the
territories. Their tactics included not only refusal to import or othenvise
obtain raw materials from Israel, but stringent restrictions on imports from
abroad.23
23Khaled Jamal, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Qubattia,
14 June 2003.
46
Khaled Dwiakat, 38 years old, from the city of Nablus, with a Masters degree in
Education from Jerusalem Open University Center in the City of Tubass, mentioned the
following as causes for the Uprising:
1. The Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories for the last twenty years of
occupation and the suffering of the Palestinians during this period caused
hardship and unrest.
2. The desire of Palestinians to be free from outside domination and to have
control over their land and over their destinies was a fundamental
motivation for the Uprising.
3. The Jabaliah incident further incensed Palestinians.
4. The deep seated fire of revolt inside each Palestinian’s heart led to an
explosion of violence.
5. Palestinians felt isolated, as though they were the only nation in the world
under occupation.24 Such feelings encouraged unity of thought and action.
Abu-Ahmad, 40 years old, from Al-Fará Refugee Camp and a teacher by
occupation, proposed the following as causes for the Uprising:
1. Israel’s unethical and demeaning policies, such as forcing citizens to take
their clothes off in the street or kiss a woman in public, even if she was a
stranger — all these policies created instability and discontent.
2. The growing awareness of the Palestinian people about the true meaning
of an occupation and the danger to their values, identity and way of life
promoted a general feeling that the only means to break free was an
uprising.
3. The Jabaliah incident.2
24Khaled Dwiakat, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Nablus,
14 June 2003.
25Abu-Ahmed, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, A1-Fará Refugee
Camp, 14 June 2003.
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In another interview, Mr. Abu-Hassan, 28 years old, teacher at Jerusalem Open
University who was born in the village of Maythaloun and has a Fatah affiliation, offered
the following as causes for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987:
1. The occupation and the psychological pressure which it imposed on
Palestinians were acceptable.
2. The occupation policy of television broadcasting of programs not
compatible with Palestinian traditions and values served to verify the
insidious nature of the perceived enemy.
3. The occupation methods used to force Palestinians to work for Israelis as
spies by threatening to use their wives or daughters in a shameful way
proved a strong impetus for rebellion.
4. The destruction of educational and learning opportunities, particularly by
suppressing any information that might develop Palestinian national
identities or help the Palestinians to understand their own history, was just
one more way that the Israeli government exercised illegal powers over
the Palestinians. An insurrection was inevitable.
5. The destruction of the agricultural sector by flooding the Palestinian
market with Israeli products at very cheap prices prevented Palestinian
farmers from competing with Israeli farmers. Along with prohibitions
against digging wells to extract the needed water for growth and irrigation,
Israeli policies drove many to near starvation.
6. The expansion of Israeli settlements and confiscation of Palestinian lands
virtually at will was a constant source of conflict.26
Abu-Ali, 33 years old, who earned a bachelor’s degree in the field of Islamic
Studies, spent four years in jail, and has Hamas affiliations, believes the Uprising was the
result of:
1. The Israeli’s punitive and ruthless economic, social and political policies
that caused much suffering among Palestinians also were the genesis of
the Uprising.
26Abu-Hassan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of
Maythaloun, 14 June 2003.
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2. Israel exploited many Palestinians by forcing them to spy on their fellow
citizens. This divide and conquer scheme backfired in that it caused some
of the most virulent bitterness and eventually led to sporadic, and then
sustained violence.
3. Resentment was especially kindled by the unjustified arrest and killing of
Palestinians.27
To Uzi Amit-Kobn, author of Israel, the “Intfada” and the Rule ofLaw, there are
many reasons for the Palestinian Uprising of 1987, and he mentioned the following:
1. The first major cause for the Uprising can be found in the nationalist
sentiments of the residents of the Occupied Territories, coupled with a
profound dissatisfaction with the PLO and its lack of progress in
advancing the Palestinian status in the political and social realms. From
1982 until 1987, a decline in the influence of the PLO in the international
arena can be noted. This failure is exemplified by the PLO’s refusal to
have the Palestinian issue addressed during the Amman Summit
Conference in November 1987 “at which the Palestinian cause had been
totally eclipsed by the gulf War, and King Hussein had given the PLO the
cold shoulder. Young Palestinians in the Territories came to the realization
that achievement of their nationalist aim would not come from abroad and
concluded that it was incumbent upon them to take matters into their own
hands.”28
2. The second cause for the Uprising can be seen in the internal infrastructure
that had been built in the Territories since the late I 970s. The Palestinians
in the Gaza District, Judea, and Samaria had established a number of
social and professional organizations, each espousing the political line of
one of the various groups within the PLO or Islam. These organizations
did not incite the start of the Uprising, which began unmistakably as a
mass outburst. They did, however, provide an organizational base for the
continuation and direction of the “Intifada” once it had begun and they
provided the leadership necessary to chart its course.29
27Abu-Ali, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, 14 June 2003.




3. The third cause of the Uprising can be seen in the changing of the guard
within the Palestinian society in the Territories. A new generation of
Palestinians was born and educated. This younger generation did not
possess memories of Jordanian rule over Judea and Samaria, or Egyptian
rule over Gaza, during which the government of these countries did not
hesitate to use tanks and live ammunition to quell civil unrest. Rather, this
was a generation that had grown up under the leadership of an Israeli
democracy and had learned that the organs of democracy, such as the
Supreme Court and the free press, were at its disposal. These young
people, moreover, worked in Israel and learned what it means to live in an
open society. Consequently, the fear of military or governmental
intervention and retribution for internal strife had not been inculcated into
the consciousness of this generation. A year after the onset of the
“Intifada,” Salah Khalaf, a member of the General Committee of Fatah,
stated that a new generation had emerged that knows no fear, [and] is free
of the complex that we suffered from when we lived in the Arab world.3°
4. The fourth reason can be seen from Israeli policy in the Territories. This
policy (military authorities) produced a feeling of absence of rule among
the young Palestinians. The laxity on the part of the Israeli military
instilled the Palestinians with the belief that Israel would not be prepared
or interested in maintaining its rule over the area at all costs. This
misguided belief fostered the protest by the Palestinian youths.3’
For those Palestinians interested in preserving their own identity, the Intifada
became the vehicle by which they could rhetorically reaffirm the existence of the
Palestinian state. For many of the social actors on the Gaza and the West Bank, the
Uprising was more than a land dispute — it was a struggle to maintain a fragile identity
in a world that has too easily erased many other colonies.32
“The Revolt,” a university graduate explained bitterly, “is a result of the ceaseless
harassment and humiliation. It makes no sense to shoot at young people who are
30Ibid., 29.
31lbid.. 29.
32MaroufHasian and Lisa A. Flores, “Children of the Stones: The Intifada and the Mythic
Creation of the Palestinian State,” Southern Communication Journal 62, no. 21 (1997): 89-106.
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throwing stones. It is senseless to order armed soldiers to face the population. .. Our
life here has become an indescribable nightmare. The prisons are crowded with
humiliated detainees. Who hears about them? Where is the coexistence they are talking
about?”33
Frustration and a powerful sense of humiliation, deprivation and discrimination,
according to a Palestinian lecturer at An-Naj ah University in Nablus, were chief catalysts
of the Uprising.34
During the Amman Summit, King Hussein of Jordan and a number of other Arab
leaders indicated that they now considered Iran, rather than Israel, to be the most serious
threat to the Arab world. The summit had failed to devote any serious attention to the
situation in the Occupied Territories or to the Palestinian struggle more generally.35
In the words of Emile Nakhleh, a Palestinian-American scholar who had visited
the area a few months earlier, “Gaza resembles a pressure-cooker ready to explode. In
this ‘forgotten corner of Palestine,’ one witnesses overcrowding, poverty, hatred,
violence, oppression, poor sanitation, anger, frustration, drugs, and crime. The
Palestinian population is daily becoming more resentful and rebellious. The military
occupation responds by becoming more insecure and oppressive.”36 To Nakhleh, more
33Geoffery Aronson, Israel, Palestinians, and the Intfada: Greating Facts on the West Bank
(London, England: Kegan Paul International Limited, 1990), 320.
34Aryeh Shalev, “The Intifada: Causes and Effects,” Jerusalem Post (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1991), 17.
35Mark Tessler, A Histomy of the Israeli-Palestinian ConUict (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 682.
36Ibid., 683.
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and more Palestinians in the territories were now persuaded that only their own efforts
offered any hope to a change in the status quo. “Reliance on outside help has proven
futile,” he noted following his visit, and hence, “It has become apparent to West Bank
and Gaza Palestinians that outside actors — Arab and foreign — have been unable either
to resolve the conflict or to end the occupation.”37
In an interview with Israel Radio’s English-Language Service on December 10,
1987, Rashad Al-Shawa--former mayor of Gaza--said, “One should expect such things
after 20 years of miserable occupation. The people have lost hope. They are absolutely
frustrated. They don’t know what to do. They have taken a line of fundamentalists,
being the last resort that they can look up. They have lost hope that Israel will ever give
them their rights. They feel the Arab countries are unable to accomplish anything. They
feel that the PLO, which they regarded as their representative, has failed to accomplish
anything.”38
A graduate student from Bir Zeit University described the situation in the
Occupied territories, by saying, “We have to remember that 75 percent of the population
of the West Bank is under 28 years old, which makes us a very young society compared
to the rest of the world.” Also, “We have been under occupation for over 20 years, which
means we have a new generation, a Palestinian generation, born under occupation. This
generation does not know anything but Israeli military rules, Israeli military oppression,




Palestinians. This is their image of the occupation. This is why they took the lead at the
beginning of the Uprising, and why they are right now fighting the occupation and
making the Uprising more successful.”39
The Intifada came on the 7O anniversary of the conquest of Palestine by the
British Imperial forces led by General Allenby. Barely 21 years after Israel’s occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza and the concomitant inhumane treatment of the local
population, the Palestinians confronted their occupiers in the Intifada. Israel should have
expected the Intifada. But, blinded by its ideological and historically rooted racism by its
role as a colonial power and by its close affiliation with the principal Western Power of
the world, Israel and its friends were caught by total surprise when the Intifada broke
out.40
The resultant Israeli attacks on Palestinian bases in Lebanon, where many West
Bank and Gaza residents had relatives, was perceived as an attempt to liquidate the whole
Palestinian community. The failure by Arab states to intervene in Lebanon or take other
action that might deter Israel — the Arab Conspiracy of Silence — was regarded by
Palestinians as an act of treachery. It — the failure of the Arab states or the attacks by
Israel? Clarification needed] was even compared to the Palestinian defeat in 1948 and to
Jordanian repressions of 197O1971.41 The Palestinians were seen as isolated and lonely,
39Phylis Bennis, From Stone to Statehood. The Palestinian Uprising (Brooklyn, New York:
Olive Branch Press, 1990), 44.
40Ibid., 12.
41Don Peretz, 1ntfada, The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.,
1990), 19.
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as distinct from other Arabs; many were thus led to feel “shame for being an Arab, but
pride in being Palestinians.”42
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, routed the 15,000 strong PLO fighting
force and put its entire infrastructure under siege for nearly the entire summer. At the
end of August, Palestinian military, administrative, and political forces were evacuated
from Lebanon under U.S. supervision. Their only shred of honor wording] was the
ability to hoist their weapons as they boarded ship in Beirut Port.43
If the PLO was still in Beirut, “there would have been no Intifada” because people
in the territories would still be waiting for salvation from the outside.44
A sense of hopelessness pervaded the territories in November 1987 — a feeling
that all the diplomatic jet-setting by PLO executive members and Arab statesmen would
not bring an end to the occupation.45
The Palestinian Uprising, in my view, is the most important political development
in the history of the Palestinian people so far. Where the Arab revolt of 1936-1939
failed, the Uprising has succeeded in uniting all Palestinians in a common endeavor.46
This is freedom of mind and spirit, the discovery of dignity and self-respect after decades
42Ibid., 19.
43Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making ofthe People (New York,
New York: The Free Press, 1993), 236.
44Barry Rubin, Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and the Histoiy ofthe PLO (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 92.
45Kimmerling and Migdal, 266.
46David McDowall, Palestine andlsrael: The Uprising and Beyond (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1989), Viii.
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of helplessness, frustration, and dependence. This is the most important outcome of the
Uprising.47
On the evening of September 16, 1982, the Phalangists entered the Sabra and
Chatila refugee camps in Lebanon — and began the massacre which was to end in the
death of perhaps 2,000 refugees. Although it has since been established that Israeli
officers knew the massacre was taking place that evening, they allowed the Phalangists to
remain inside the Camps until September 18, and even assisted them with flares and
logistical help.48
Intifada was an explosion of frustrated energy waiting to happen after 20 years of
Israeli military occupation and repression, and the repeated failure of diplomatic and
political efforts to improve the Palestinians’ conditions or move toward statehood.49
The Intifada, however, cannot be understood as an isolated event frozen in
particular time periods. In order to comprehend its underlying significance, we must
view it as a dynamic part of the Palestinian struggle, as an alternative means with a
singular goal: freedom from occupation and independent statehood — which the Israelis
have historically tried to deny rhetorically and obstruct concretely.5°
One of the indirect causes for the Uprising was the suffering of the Palestinians
while they were traveling through the Arab countries, especially if they had Palestinian
47Ibid., 206.
48Michael Adams, 50.
49Edgar O’Ballance, The Palestinian Intfada (London, England: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998),
25.
50Samih K. Farsoun and Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1997), 215.
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travel documents. But when the Palestinians traveled with a U.S. or Canadian passport,
or any other foreign passport, he or she was welcome.’
The growth of the Islamic movement in the Occupied Territories had its own impact
on the Palestinians’ life and the Uprising in the future. One Israeli officer said, “When I
used to enter houses in Gaza or in the West Bank, I used to see Arafat’s pictures and a
verse from the Quran hanging on the wall. I asked myself this question, ‘What will
happen if Arafat is gone?’ I guess nobody will replace him, but I am afraid “Mohamed”
will, then he is not going to attend the peace conference in Geneva.”2
David Muller, British Foreign Minister, described the life of the Palestinians in
the Occupied Territories as “humiliation in any civilized standard.”’3 According to
Moshe Máoz, the Intifada began on a very ripe soil of frustration, of poverty, of a feeling
that occupation would go on forever and something should be done.’4
In a 1989 interview with Hanan Ayad, a Bir Zeit University student, the following
was postulated about the causes of the Palestinian Uprising of 1987:
The Uprising was a result of the bad treatment of the occupation to the
Palestinians. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are oppressed
peoples. They cannot do what they want to do. Deportation, killing, and
economic and social war are waged against them by the occupation forces.
Planting of collaborators among the people created more and more trouble
to the Palestinian people, along with the closing of learning institutions
51Tysier Jubarah, The Palestinian Popular Uprising (Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National
University Press, 1988), 13.
52Ibid., 30.
53Rajiah 1. Sudqi, “The Palestinian Uprising and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East,”
International Politics 192, (1988): 150.
54Moshe Máoz. et al. From Peace to War, New York, New York: New York University Press,
1994), 27.
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(universities, schools, and other institutions). The Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories could not take any more of this treatment. They
were ready to explode, and, on December 7, 1987, they did.”
In another interview given on November 8, 1989, Kamal Gibril, 23-year-old
worker from the city of Kalkiliah, hypothesized that “The Palestinian Uprising erupted as
a result of frustration accumulated over 20 years of occupation. The killing of innocent
people, the demolition of houses without justification, deportation, jailing people
young, old, men, and women — all these things had left a psychological impact in the
lives of the people. Also, the Palestinians have nobody to depend on for their salvation.
They cannot depend on Jordan, Syria or Egypt or any other country in the Arab world,
because all these countries have ties with imperialist countries. For that, the Palestinians
realized that they have to depend on themselves for their salvation and the Uprising is the
way.”56
In another interview, Issam Romaneh, 25-year-old employee from Bir Ziet, stated,
“The Palestinian Uprising occurred because (1) The people used to dream that the
leaders who are charged with running their affairs are working to serve them, but they
woke up from their dream to discover that their leaders are the ones who found Israel,
and they are working hard to protect it. For that, there is no hope from these regimes to
liberate any part of Palestine from the enemy; (2) In my opinion, the problem here is a
matter ofjustice. The Palestinians were oppressed too hard and too much by the
occupation forces, and denied justice — for this they upraised [jçJ to lift oppression
55Yahia Adel, et al,, Who is Making the History? The Oral History of the Uprising (Shuffat,
Jerusalem: Tamer Publication for Social Education, 1994), 152-153.
56lbid., 195-196
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from their shoulders and from their life, in order for them to live free in their own
home1and.D7
In another 1995 interview conducted in Washington, D.C., Jamal Hassan, a 53-
year-old ex-prisoner now working with the Palestinian authority, mentioned the
following causes for the Uprising:
1. The loss of the Palestinian bases in Lebanon, and the evacuation of the
Palestinian forces from Lebanon gave the Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories a sense of hopelessness, and the feeling that their salvation had
to come from themselves and nobody else.
2. The life of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became unbearable
as a result of the military rule and the Israeli policies which intervened in
every aspect of the Palestinians’ life. For the Palestinians, the Uprising
was the solution to decades of suffering.
3. The disrespectftil treatment of the Palestinians in the Arab world included
name calling, conferring foreign status, i.e., non-membership as true
Arabs, and exhibiting no respect for Palestinian rights in their own
usurped homelands. Also, the PLO and its leaders were generally
subjected to shameless effronteries at important political and economic
meetings hosted by Arab countries, which often showed a complete lack
of sensitivity to Palestinian problems.
4. When news of secret talks between Israel and some Arab countries
emerged, the result was Palestinian mistrust of any Arab country that
negotiated on behalf of the Palestinians. Palestinians adopted a “go it
alone” attitude and realized that they had to decide their future by
themselves, depending on nobodgY but themselves -- and the Palestinians
did just that in December 1987.
57Jbid., 25 1-252.
58Jamal Hassan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of
Mavthaloun, 13 March 1995.
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The Hashemites as a Proxy for Israel
The Zionists and the Hashemites are long time allies, who through many years of
clandestine cooperation, worked to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.9 In a
series of secret meetings in the 1940s and early 1950s, Abdullah— King of Jordan and
Zionist leaders (especially Golda Meir) struck a deal whereby Abdullah would occupy
and annex Central Palestine — known today as the West Bank — and leave the rest to
Israel. This deal allowed Abdullah to transform Jordan and make himself into a full-
fledged king, while giving the Zionists a free hand to defeat the military forces of other
Arab counties and conquer most of Palestine.60
The Israeli-Hashemite “special relationship” endured for decades, rooted in a
common rejection of Palestinian rights and independence. It was, in the end, the Intifada
that finally induced Hussein to reassert Jordanian influence in the West Bank and
formally renounce his dynasty’s claim to Palestine.6’
On September 6, 1970, a civil war took place in Jordan, between the Jordanian
army and the Palestinian guerrillas. Full warfare ensued, using heavy armor, artillery,
and air attacks. The Jordanians inflicted a shattering defeat with around three thousand
Palestinians dying in the fighting. Some units (Palestinians) preferred crossing the
Jordan River and surrendering to the Israelis rather than falling into Jordanian hands. In
59Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989), 206.
60Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds. Inqfada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli
Occupation (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1989), 198.
61Ibid., 198-199.
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the aftermath of this episode, Jordan closed all the PLO institutions and arrested those
leaders who had not managed to flee.62
The Israeli Factor
It is not the intent of this section to chronicle every policy that Israel had carried
out in the Occupied Territories between 1967 and 1987. The purpose of this section is to
assess the impact of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories on the Palestinians,
and how those policies participated in pushing the Palestinians to revolt against the Israeli
occupation.
The ultimate Israeli objective in the Occupied Territories was not merely to
benefit economically from its underdevelopment policies but rather to use them as an
instrument to tear down the fabric of Palestinian society and subsequently de-Palestinize
the West Bank and Gaza.63 The Israelis were no different from the French in Algeria, the
Belgians in the Congo, or the British in Palestine.64
F. Robert Hunter, in his book, The Palestinian Uprising (1991), wrote the
following about the Palestinian Uprising and why it took place late:
Increased incomes and consumer spending prevented many Palestinians from
apprehending the dangers of the occupation more quickly. The same value of
work in the Arab world also helped produce acquiescence. Also during the 1970’s,
owing to increased oil production and higher prices, many Palestinians found
lucrative employment in the Persian Gulf. Transfer payments from Palestinians
outside to their families inside the Occupied Territories were a very important
source of exchange. This additional income contributed to consumerism, but it
also made possible higher education for Palestinian children (which raised
62Kimmerling, 230.
63Shannee Marks, Where is Palestine? The Arabs in Israel (London, England: Pluto Press,
1984), 49.
64AIi Jalal Abed, 2.
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political awareness) and the building of all kinds of social organizations that later
became a base for opposition to the occupation.6
In the early years, the occupation did not greatly interfere in the daily lives of
most people. Minimum intervention was the policy of the Labor government,
which believed that if it could enable the population to lead a “normal” life,
Palestinians would be brought to accept the status quo and be weaned away from
their own national aspirations.66
Palestinians thus possessed no right that should be defended against the
authorities of an occupation which was by no means benign.67
The Israeli Antagonism Towards the Palestinians
Most of the Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, if not all of them, are the
reflection of the Israeli way of thinking, their image, and their perception of the
Palestinian people. Many Israelis would argue that Palestinians do have a right to form
their own nation. They simply need to look elsewhere.68
Ariel Sharon, later Prime Minister of Israel, told one American interviewer that:
Jordan is Palestine. The Capital of Palestine is Amman. If Palestinian Arabs
want to find their political expression, they will have to do it in Amman. The land
west of the Jordan River, between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, is
Israel. Judea, Samaria the so-called West Bank — and Gaza are Israel. We
will never give them up. There will be no second Palestinian land west of the
Jordan River.69
65F. Robert Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising. A War by Other Means (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1991), 38-39.
66Ibid., 40.
67lbid., 45.
68T. Katriel, “Site of Memory: Discourse of the Past in Israel. Pioneering Settlement Museum,”
Quarterly Journal ofSpeech 80 (194 1): 1-20.
69M.J. Gart, “Never, Never, Never!” Time. 17 April 1989, 40.
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R. Weitz, who was for many years head of the Jewish Agency’s Colonization
Department, stated the following:
Between ourselves, it must be clear there is no room for both people together in
this country . . . There is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to
neighboring countries, to transfer all of them: not one village, not one tribe,
should be left.7°
A Zionist emissary, during an official 1 930s visit with Ghandi, the founding
father of modern, independent India, brazenly asserted that “Palestine itself was a wasted
space when we went there . . . No one else wanted it.”71
Even after they completed the conquest of Palestine in 1967, Zionist leaders
continued to reassert the view. In 1969, Golda Meir, then Israel’s Prime Minister, said of
the Palestinian people, “They did not exist.”72 A young Israeli soldier participating in the
invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 said, “I would like to see all the Palestinians
dead because they are a sickness wherever they go.”73
In a moment of undisguised contempt, Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel
in the late 1970s, declared that the Palestinians to him are “two-legged vermin.” To
General Rafail Eytan, Israeli Chief of Staff, they were “drugged roaches in a bottle.” To
Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister, they were “grass hoppers.” To the more polite,
Palestinians were “the Arab of Judea and Samaria.” To the New York Times, they were
70Arie Bober, ed., The Other Israel (New York, New York: Double Day Press, 1972), 13.
71Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, ed., Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and
the Palestinian Questions (New York, New York: Grand Street Publications, Inc., 1988), 249.
‘The Szindai’ Times, 15 June 1969.
73The Ti,nes, 17 June 1982.
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simply “Arabs.”74 General Avigdor Ben Gal, former Commander of the Northern Front,
described the Arabs inside Israel as “a cancer in the Israeli body politic.”7 Ahad Haán
observed: “We think that the Arabs are all savages who live like animals and do not
understand what is happening around.”76
In 1981, Rabbi Meir Kahane made the following assertion, “I do not feel sorry for
the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). no matter how much they feel that the land is
theirs. I do not feel for them because I know that the land is not theirs, that it is
Jewish.”77
Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister in 1948, plainly put it, “Israel is the
country of the Jews and only the Jews.”78
Until recently, most Zionists have claimed that the Palestinians do not exist or that
they are simply part of the Arab world with no distinct identity. The Zionist slogan first
coined by Israel Zangwill, a founder of Zionism, that Palestine was’ a Land without
people, waiting for people without land,’ captured the essence of Israeli denial of the
essential humanity of the Palestinian people.79
74Lockman and Beinin, 1 1-12.
75Michael Jansen, Dissonance in Zion (London, England: Zed Book Ltd., 1987), 16.
76Ofira Seliktor, New Zionism and the Foreign Policy ofIsrael (Chicago, Illinois: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1986), 48.
77A1i Jalal Abed, 17.
78Alfred Lilienthal, “Zionism: The Occupying Power,” Middle East Perspective VIII, no. 3
(1984): 4.
79Israel Zangwill, “The Return to Palestine,” New Liberal View, December 1901, 627.
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Israel has always based its institutions on the denial of equality to non-Jews. This
principle derives from the tents of Zionism from its very inception, long before the
establishment of Israel.8°
The Israeli Land Confiscation Policies
Up to 60 percent of the land on the West Bank is susceptible to expropriation
under the present Israeli interpretation of Ottoman law. Under the old Turkish law Code,
lands which are uninhabited and beyond the sound of human voice from the nearest
village revert to the state. The burden of proof is carried by the counter-claimant.81
By 1984, the total amount of land taken by Israel under this category (non
cultivation and non-registration land) had reached 1,800,000 dunams (one dunam = .25
acre). Lands were also seized through various other mechanisms; for example,
expropriation for public use (50,000 dunams were so taken with 100,000 designated for
future expropriation).82
Military orders were also used justify the expropriation of land. According to
Order 393 (1970), a military commander could prohibit construction in any area. By the
mid-1980s, 580,000 dunams had been placed under such restrictions.83 Other lands were
declared Combat Zones (Military Order 271, 1968), and thus rendered virtually
80Israel Shahak, “Internal Criticism “Anti-Semitic” Outside Israel,” The Washington Report of the
Middle EastAffairs X, no.3(1991): 23.
81U.S. House of Representatives, The Unfinished Business ofthe Peace Process in the Middle




inaccessible to Palestinian property owners.84 By the mid-1980s, 250,000 dunams had
been declared nature reserves, another way of restricting Palestinian land use and
construction. All these things were done to acquire sufficient space for Jewish
settlements.85
About 55 percent of the total land area in the West Bank and 30 percent of the
total land in Gaza are now in Jewish hands.86
Israeli Settlement Policies
Israel’s settlement policies on the West Bank together with its other West Bank
policies have led to more violence and deterioration of Israeli-Arab relations in the
Occupied Territories over the last two years. It is difficult to say today whether the de
facto annexation of the West Bank has occurred or not.87
The rate of Jewish population increase on the West Bank rose above the Arab
population growth rate around 1987 and 1988. By that time the Jewish population in the
West Bank reached around 100,000 inhabitants, excluding Jerusalem. There were 75
settlements existing or under construction and at least 25 others in the planning stages.
The most significant development is the planning and construction often urban
settlements whose population could eventually rise to 320,000.88
84Hunter, 48.
8Hunter, 48.
86Lockman and Beinin, ed., 130.
87U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Middle East, 1982:
The Unfinished Business of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 28.
88YediotAhronot, 19 October 1982.
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It is not just the Israeli army that is responsible for acts of brutality against the
local population. Both Jewish settlers and members of the Village Leagues have been
similarly involved. An article by Michael Meron in YediotAhronot (19.10.82) described
the settlement of Kiryat Arba — a Jewish settlement near Hebron in the West Bank —
following the arrest of four of their members on charges involving the use of explosives.
Meron met with a number of settlers and their view of the Palestinians was quoted. Tzvi
Katzover, husband of the deputy head of the local council, had this to say, “The Arabs
don’t understand democracy. They understand a different language. With them you
must use collective punishment in order to deter.”89
In another article about the settlers, published in Davar (9-4-82), Dani Rubinstein
wrote the following:
The truth is that they (settlers) can behave as they wish in the Occupied
Territories, not only when they are under attack, but even with their punishment
operations. Those who broke car windows in Arab towns have never been
caught. Those who threw hand grenades at the house of the widow in Hebron
have never been caught, nor those who put bombs under the cars of the Arab
mayors. And if some of them are caught, as in the case of causing damage to
Arab houses in Hebron or the murder of the Arab from East Jerusalem, the
Lederman Affairs, are not punished seriously, or they are freed.9°
Also, there are hundreds of incidents during which settlers kidnapped and killed
Palestinians and an equal number of cases involving settlers who uprooted trees,
destroyed crops, poisoned water wells, and killed livestock in many villages in the
Occupied Territories. Though the intent of this section is not to delineate every incident
89Timothy Ruler, Law in the Service ofMan/AL-Haq (Ramallah, West Bank: 1983), 17.
90Dani Rubinstein, Davar, 4 September 1982, In Al-Haq, 17.
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in detail, it is important to provide brief but insightful information about the settlers and
what they are doing to the Palestinians.
Israeli Detention Policy in the Occupied Territories
Under Military Order 378, the military authorities in the West Bank have broad
powers of arrest. Section 7 8(a) states that a soldier may arrest, without an arrest warrant,
any person who commits, or is suspected of having committed an offense under the
Order. A person so detained can be held for up to 18 days on the warrant of a police
officer before being brought before the court. A military court may then extend the arrest
warrant for a period not exceeding six months (section 78(f)).9’
Under the Defense (Emergency) Regulation, any soldier or police authority can
make an arrest in the Occupied Territories without a warrant. Suspects can be detained
up to four days by any soldier or policeman and held for an additional four days for little
or no reason. Detainees can be kept up to eighteen days before being brought to a
military court, which could extend detention up to six months without trial.92
On February 27, 1982, David Shipler reported in the I\Tew York Times on the arrest
of many Palestinian youths and their detention for a period of several weeks, “Boys of 14
and 15 are taken by the Israeli army for days of interrogation without formal charges;
without counsel, without a visit from their parents.”93
91A1-Haq, 20.
92Don Peretz, 7.
93David Shipler, The New York Times, 27 February 1982.
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Mussa Ahmad Massud, 15, was arrested on December 12, 1981, and released
after 49 days. The Israeli Defense forces’ spokesman, AlufYa’acov Even, said that he
“did not confess during questioning and was released for lack of evidence.”94From 1967
to 1982, more than 300,000 Palestinians were detained without trial for various periods
by Israeli security forces.9D
Israeli Policies in Torturing
and Harassing the Palestinians
During the months of March, April, and May of 1987, independent researchers
recorded instances of child abuse by the Israeli military. The data were collected from
children living in refugee camps established by the United Nations Relief and Work
Agency in Jalazone north of the town of Ramallah, Balata south of Nablus, Dahisha south
of Bethlehem, and refugee communities in the Gaza Strip.96 Evidence compiled from this
report reveals that children are subjected to arbitrary arrest, are interrogated, humiliated,
and tortured during lengthy periods of incommunicado detention, and are denied access
to a fair trial. The report includes instances of children being shot by the military with
live ammunition.97
The modus operandi of the Israeli military rule ensures that every child arrested,
whether held for two hours or two months, is subjected to intimidation, humiliation, and
excessive use of force. The West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of
94A1-Haq, 20.
95Lockman and Beinin, 108.
96U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
100th Congress, 1987, 97.
97Ibid., 97.
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Jurists cites as a matter of Israeli policy, the random detention, humiliation, and
intimidation of Palestinians. The incidence of torture of children is not exceptional. It is
an institutional method of controlling the population within the Occupied Territories.98
In many cases, children are imprisoned without charge and released without trial,
usually after 18 days of detention. In its 1986 Occupied Territories Human Rights
Report, the U.S. State Department found that most Palestinians do not know the reason
for their arrest.99 The research discloses that often children are tortured into confessing to
acts they never committed. Moreover, since confessions are written in Hebrew, and few
Palestinian children can read Hebrew, the children do not know to what they are
confessing. 100
Furthermore, after a child has been arrested, even if kept for 18 days without
charge and released, the child’s chance for re-arrest increases. When children reach the
age of 16, they are issued an I.D. card. If they have been arrested, that information is
stamped on the I.D., making them more vulnerable to arrest. Prisoners have a
progressively harder interrogation the more often they are arrested.’°’ Michael Adams, an
English Journalist, made an inquiry on the spot concerning Israel’s treatment of the
civilian population of the Gaza Strip. In his report he wrote: “I had my ups and downs






harshly as the Israelis are treating the Arabs of the Gaza Strip, the majority of who are
women and children.”°2
Harassment of Palestinians still persists. There are midnight raids at homes, arrest
and detention without charges and curfews imposed on entire villages. During this year’s
Passover, 60,000 Palestinians in Hebron were shut up in their homes all week so that
Jewish settlers could saunter in the streets.103 In May 1982, a press conference was called
by ten members of the Israeli group Peace Now. All ten of them had recently returned
from service in the army in the Hebron area. They outlined a long list of atrocities
carried out by the Israeli army. One of the soldiers, Yural Neriya, described the situation
in the Occupied Territories as one of “oppression, humiliation, maltreatment, and
collective punishment.” Other soldiers spoke of particular incidents:
I witnessed many cases of collective punishment; I saw a shocking case. A
soldier wrote the identity numbers of Arab prisoners on their arms. Ironically it
was Holocaust Day. The feeling is that such things are legitimate . . . Gabi
Bainot.’°4
Another soldier said, “I saw a shocking thing. They put clubs in the hands of
newly recruited soldiers, who can’t use guns yet, and told them: ‘Have a go at the local
The Arab detainees clean the lavatories, the rooms, and the plates of the soldiers. At
night they are put in a small room and beaten. Many of them can’t stand on their legs
‘°2Henry Cattan, The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice (London, England: Longmans,
Green and Company, Ltd., 1969), 112.
‘°3Mariam Ward, “Another Perspective on Middle East Peace,” America 173, no. 1(1995): 8.
‘°4A1-Haq, 15.
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afterwards. These are detainees, most of them won’t even be brought to court but will be
released due to lack of evidence . . . Rami Avni.”°
As a result of the press conference and the ensuing publicity, seven soldiers were
brought to trial to face a variety of assault charges. The Court reached its verdict on
February 17, 1983. Three of the defendants were acquitted and the other four were found
guilty and sentenced to prison terms of between two to six months.’°6
Un Benstein. in a speech before Tel Aviv University Press, stated the following,
“We, the Jews, that have been through so many fires, so much repression of religion and
repression of culture, today restrict, prevent and confiscate literature in the Occupied
Territories.”07
Israeli Economic Policies
in the Occupied Territories
For the past 24 years of their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
Israelis have systematically done everything in their power to block the normal
development of the Palestinian economy. They have striven to make the Palestinian
economy totally dependent on, and subordinate to, that of Israel. A major result has been
creation of a workforce of 120,000 Palestinians who are forced to cross the Green Line
every day to work in menial jobs in Israel.’°8 One Israeli military order in the West Bank,
‘°‘Al-Hamishmar, 5 November 1982, and in Jerusalem Post, 5 November 1982.
‘°6A1-Haq, 15.
°7Uri Benstein, Telaviv University Press, Quoted in Haáret:, 13 March 1982, also in Al-1-laq, 25.
108Frank Collins, “Palestinian Economy in Chaos After Gulf War,” The Washington Report on the
Middle East Affairs X, no.2(1991): 23.
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for example, makes it illegal for Palestinians to pick and sell wild thyme, to protect
Israeli families’ monopoly over the herb’s production.109
Israel’s policy after 1967 was aimed at preventing the development of a strong
and independent Palestinian economy, which might compete with the Israeli economy
and create the infrastructure for a Palestinian state. Dependency was assured by forcing
Palestinians to work in Israel and the integrating of road, electricity, and water
networks)’°
Economic frustration was further exacerbated by the growing number of young
people and university graduates who were not able to find employment that fit their
educational levels either in Israel or in the Territories.” It is clear that a combination of
social, political, economic, and demographic factors formed the background of the
Uprising.’12
Other Factors
Many reasons have been mentioned as causes for the Palestinian Uprising of
1987, but there are still other causative issues that should be referenced.
1. The inability of Palestinians families to visit with family members who
lived abroad is considered by some a reason for the Uprising. Tens of
thousands of applications had been submitted to the authority but they
109Lockman and Beinin, 108.
“°Ted R. Gurr, et a!, Revolution of the Late Twentieth Centuiy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1991), 303.
ill -, ,Ibid. j0i.
“2lbid., 304.
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approved only 200 cases in 1985. Israel also used the desire of
Palestinians to re-unite with family members living overseas in order to
force Palestinians to work for Israel as spies or agents, thus assuring
application and permit approval.
113 In addition, Palestinian applicants
stood in long lines for hours in front of the military governor’s office and,
in many cases, they had to come back the next day. In contrast, a Jew was
given every consideration and his or her request to go abroad for any
reason was quickly expedited. Such treatment was one more reason for
acute dissatisfaction with the status quo.114
2. The National Identity — Israel for a long time tried to suppress the
propensity of Palestinians to pursue their right to a national identity. The
Palestinians rebelled against their efforts many times and on many
occasions. For instance, they did not want King Hussein to speak in their
name on any occasion. They wanted the PLO to be their representative.
Also, the Palestinians felt that their problem — the Palestinian Case — no
longer occupied the interest of the Arabs or the International
Communities. They realized that they have to do something to put back




countries, and the Arab world who had forgotten about Palestine and its
people. The Uprising was the way to do so.”
3. The rise of Islamic sentiment in the Occupied Territories among university
students helped to keep the people in Occupied Territories from acceding
to the influence of perceived depraved values found in Israeli society and
promulgated through mass media over which the Palestinians had no
control. References to sex, drugs, and many other seeming vulgarities that
did not fit in with Islamic principles added to the pervasive aggravations
of the Palestinians. A professor from Bear Zait University explained,
“Students used to support Jamal Abdul Nasser until 1967, and the PLO
until 1982, when they left Lebanon. The students replaced the PLO with
the Islamic movement organizations.” Also, he said that, “Israel could
uproot my trees, burn my house, but they could not uproot my Islam.”16
When Ahmad Yassin, the founding father of Hamas, was asked about the
Uprising, his answer was, “the active element in the Uprising is the
Islamic element with the participation of other elements.”7 Also, when
he was asked why the Uprising had come so late, he said, “because the






4. Also contributing to Palestinian outrage were the Israeli policies of
humiliation to the Palestinians, the confiscation of their lands (65% of the
West Bank and 45% of Gaza), the control of 70% of the water resources
of the Palestinians, the construction of settlements on the Palestinian
lands, in a massive way, in order to transfer the Palestinians beyond the
Jordan River and consider the Palestinians as “aliens” in their own
5. From the Israeli point of view, there are two schools of thought about the
Uprising. One argues that the Uprising occurred because of government
policies in the occupied Territories. The other says the Uprising was a
matter of Fundamentalist Islamic fervor. The first school of thought
focuses on the fact that the Palestinians do not want Israelis to rule them,
and they do not want to live with Israelis and are trying to destroy the
Jews for good. Rabin, at the beginning of the Uprising explained, “There
are three major reasons for the Uprising. The fundamentalists, and they
are few, the local and the outside media (Arab and international and the
outside Palestinian organizations).” Rabin said later when the Uprising
was progressing, “The reason for the Uprising is because of the religious,
political, and ideological differences between the Palestinians and the
Jews.”°
“9OmarMasaleha, The ProniisedPeace (Beirut, Lebanon: DarAl-Saqi Publisher, 1994), 236.
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6. The other school of thought focuses on religious fundamentalism. For
Moshe Arens, Defense Minister during the Uprising, the Islamic
movements, especially “the radical” and the rise of radicalism and
fundamentalism in the Arab world, ignited the Uprising. Also, the two
schools of thought both allow that frustration was a major factor: the
feeling of despair, the bitterness of life for the people in the territories, and
the unacceptable way of life in the refugee camps. Economic and political
difficulties and the impact of an Israeli democracy in conflict with an
Islamic theocracy were generally thought by Israel to be reasons for the
Uprising.121
7. Palestinians, therefore, can be said to also have experienced what Ted
Gurr, drawing on James Davies’ earlier work, has characterized as a
“progressive deprivation,” as their capabilities for satisfying economic
expectations generated by contact with Israeli society and higher
education and employment opportunities during the 1 970s diminished in
the 1980s.’22
As Aryed Shaleve, Joshua Teitelbaum, and Joseph Kastiner have
indicated, the economic downturn in the Gulf countries along with Israel’s
growing economic problems, both beginning in the early 1980s,
‘21lbid., 41.
‘22Erika G. Aim, “Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising, and Consequences,” Comparative
Politics 26 (1994): 478-498.
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significantly reduced the economic opportunities and alternatives of West
Bank and Gaza Palestinians.’23
As Edward Siad indicates in Zachar Lockman and Joel Beinin’s edited
work, that following the 1967 War, Palestinians realized that they “had to
arrive at their vision of their own future on their own” and that they could
no longer depend on Arab states to fight their military and political battles
for them.’24 Yet, it was not until after the losses during the Lebanon War
of 1982 that the option of a military struggle was not considered feasible
and the PLO was forced to focus more seriously on the prospects of a
negotiated settlement. The exiled leadership shifted the concentration of
its political attention and significant financial resources to the West Bank





ISRAELI REACTION TO THE UPRISING
INTRODUCTION
During his visit to Paris in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson famously stated,
“...Trying to stop a revolutionary movement by troops in the field is like using a broom to
hold back a great ocean.”1 The Palestinian Uprising was a result of twenty years of
suffering of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories at the hands of the Israeli
Occupation, which tried to hold back that great ocean of rising rebelliousness. It was
primarily a social and political movement by the Palestinians against the Israeli
oppression.
Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, in their book, Intfada. Palestinian at the
Crossroads (1990), wrote the following:
The Uprising was essentially a movement of the lower classes, especially
the working class and
the semi-working class. For example, a sample of 160 people killed
between December 9, 1987, and October 17, 1988, reveals that 44 percent
were wage-workers, 33 percent pupils, 5 percent university students, 3
percent farmers, 2 percent office employees, 1 percent intellectual
professionals, 2 percent craftsmen, 2 percent merchants and other
categories.2
1David Sulivan and Martin Sattler, ed., Revolutionaiy War: Western Response (New York, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1971), vii.
2Jama] R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, ed., Intfada: Palestinian At The Crossroads (New York,
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 177.
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The Israeli Shin Bet, the intelligence agency responsible for detecting and monitoring
subversion in the Occupied Territories since the 1967 War, was criticized by the Israeli
government and senior officials for failing to give advance warning of the Intifada.3
Israel used every available means to quell the Uprising. In that regard, Israel’s
Justice Minister, Dan Meridor, said on 25 September 1989 that “Israel must take
extraordinary measures of deterrence, including collective punishment to deal with the
Intifada. Since this is a “war” that Israel must win.”4 Security has thus become the
ultimate justification for the use of live ammunition, for throwing tear gas canisters into
mosques, for breaking bones, for house demolitions, and deportations, and for a
Security Service that can beat alleged terrorists to death with impunity and lie under oath
in the court.5
During the six-year-long Palestinian Uprising against Israeli occupation, Hanan
Ashrawi, then a professor of Arts at Bir Zeit University, wrote a poem entitled “From the
Diary of an almost Four-year-old” which poignantly captures the human dimension of
Palestinian fear and suffering:
Tomorrow the bandages will come off.
I wonder, will I see half an oven?
Half an apple?
Half my mother’s face with my one remaining eye?
I did not see the bullet.
But felt its pain exploding in my head.
This image did not disintegrate





The soldier with the big gun and steady hands.
And the look in his eyes
I could not understand.
If I can see him so clearly with my eyes closed,
It could be that inside our heads
We each have one spare set of eyes
To make up for the ones we lose...
I hear a nine-month-old has also lost an eye.
I wonder if my soldier shot her too.
A soldier looking for little girls
who look him in the eye.
I’m old enough, almost four,
I’ve seen enough of life.6
From the beginning of the Palestinian Uprising on December 7, 1987, the Israeli
government, with the help of the IDF and other security agencies, attempted many kinds
of initiatives to stop the Uprising at any cost, but they failed, at that point, to do so.
Military action and measures taken by the IDF within the framework of the law
and with a national consensus included curfews and clamp downs, the use of riot batons,
teargas, rubber and plastic bullets, and in some cases, live fire. Measures imposed in the
civilian sphere by Civil Administration proved unsuccessful in stopping the violence.7
In May 1989,the Defense Minister of Israel stated the following:
The mission set for the TDF in the Territories was to lower the level of
violence significantly and to allow the normal functioning of the
government apparatus and the Civil Administration in the Territories.
Unfortunately, I am unable to say today that these objectives have, in fact,
been attained.8
6Hanan Ashrawi, “From the Diary of an Almost Four-year old,” in Nancy Murray, Palestinian:
Life Under Occupation (Boston, Massachusetts: Middle East Justice Network, 1991). 68.




In this work, some of the policies and procedures which were taken by the Israeli
government and its apparatus to stop the Uprising will be discussed.
Israeli Defense Forces Shooting Policy
Israeli forces, under the direction of then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
attempted to control the Uprising by use of extraordinary violence, especially that of
breaking Palestinian bones.9 Hundreds of Palestinians were killed outright, while
thousands were injured or permanently maimed. Thousands more were interred in
concentration camps without trial. None of these measures had the slightest effect on the
Intifada, whose time, evidently, had come with a vengeance.’0
In the first 18 months of the Uprising alone, according to Chicago-based Data
Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, 650 Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops
and settlers. Serious injuries to fighters or civilians receiving hospitalization or
outpatient treatment exceeded 64,000. Forty-six Palestinians were expelled from their
homeland, and 30 others were in the process of appealing expulsion orders.1’
Israeli soldiers used the latest in advanced weapons technology to quell the
Uprising. Palestinians sardonically called the steel bullets used in the most current
weaponry, “exploding chocolate bars,” Majid Sub’hair said. The 14-year-old from the
village of Qabatiya, south of Jenin, spoke from his hospital bed: “I was in the camp
9Elaine C. Hagopian, “Is The Peace Process a Process for Peace? A Retrospective.” Arab Studies
Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1997)
10Andrew C. Kimmens, 176.
11Phyllis Bennis, From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising (Brooklyn, New York:
Olive Branch Press, 1990), 8 1-82.
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outside the village with my sheep,” he told us. “I saw the soldiers throw something. I
did not know what it was. There were about 10 soldiers in the patrol, and they kept
walking after they threw it. I picked it up, and it looked like chocolate. It exploded when
I tried to open it. Two of my sheep were killed in the explosion. The flames were about
two meters across.”12 A senior physician, treating the boy at Al-Ittihad Hospital in
Nablus, said, “I did not know exactly what it is but the only thing I had ever heard of that
is anything like this is napalm. We call these things mini-napalm bombs. We have never
seen anything like this before.”3
According to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) statistics
compiled just in Gaza Strip from the start of the Intifada to the first of March this year,
19,715 children under the age of 15 required medical attention due to IDF acts of
violence. Of these, 2,590 were wounded by live ammunition, not rubber bullets.’4
In 1989, the Palestinian fatalities under age 17 increased to 80, compared to 51 in
1988. Twenty-eight children below the age of 12 were killed in 1989, compared to nine
in 1988. In January 1990, military sources confirmed that 72 Palestinian children age 14
or younger had been killed by the security forces since the Uprising began. Young
children continued to be shot and killed. In March 1990, a ten-year-old boy was shot
12Phyllis Bennis, 89.
‘3Phyllis Bennis, 89.
t4stephen J. Sosebee, “How to Explain American Apathy Over Israel Killing of Palestinian
Children.” The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs X, no. 2 (199 1): 24.
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dead. In April 1990, of nine Palestinians shot dead by the security forces, one was 11
years old and three were between the ages of 13 and 16.’
The United States State Department Country report stated, “IDF guidelines often
were not followed, resulting in avoidable deaths and injuries. Many deaths and wounds
were from bullets in the head or upper body. Misuse of plastic and rubber bullets
continued to result in death and serious injury.’6 A report from Amnesty International
reported that there were some 128 deaths as a result of the use of plastic bullets.”7
In Jabaliya Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip on April 26, 1990, the incident began
shortly after dawn prayers, the day of Bid al-Fitr Feast which marks the end of Ramadan.
In keeping with Moslem religion and custom, families visit cemeteries and private homes
to honor the dead. In the wake of stone-throwing by residents, soldiers responded with
gunfire and teargas dropped from helicopters. Three Palestinians were shot dead and
many more were injured. According to the initial statistics compiled by IJNRWA, 215
men, women, and children were injured, 147 by lead, plastic, and rubber-coated metal
bullets and 67 by beating.18 The worst atrocity of the Uprising to date occurred on April
7, at the village of Nahalin, near Bethlehem. Members of the Israeli border police
‘5Ben Lynfield, “IDF Violating Its Rules on Shooting Children.” The Jerusalem Post, 19 January
1990.
6U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1988. 9 May 1990, 46.
17Ibid., 46.
18U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Development in the West Bank and Gaza,
May 1990, 81.
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entered the village early in the morning and attacked people leaving the mosque, killing
five and injuring more than 50.’
The Jenin area, at the northern end of the West Bank, is a center for young
desperadoes. Several have been shot by soldiers in what looks suspiciously like a shoot-
to-kill policy. After one incident in nearby City of Nablus, the army spokesman gave
contradictory accounts of how three wanted men had been killed. Israel boasted publicly
that much of its action was being carried out by undercover units of Arabic-speaking
soldiers.2°
Based on press accounts, the estimated number of Palestinian deaths in June and
July of 1989 was 94 of which 27 were instances of Palestinians killing other
Palestinians.2’From December 9, 1987 until December 10, 1989, 795 Palestinians died
in the Occupied Territories at the hands of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The victims
ranged in age from newborn infants to elderly and included women; however, the vast
majority were in their teens and early twenties.22
Patrick Leahy, a senator from Vermont, observed on February 10, 1993. after a
visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, that there must be a better way for a
democratic country to defend itself against a 13-year-old girl throwing stone than
‘9Michael Adams, 61.
20Anonymous, “Palestinians: A Deadlier Intifada.” Economist 323, no. 7754 (1992): 43-44.




shooting her dead. More than a quarter of those killed by soldiers in recent months had
been minors, less than 18 years old.23
In the village of Salem near the city of Nablus, soldiers buried several inhabitants
alive, and three Arab workers were burned alive in the settlement of Or Yahude.24
The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were at war not only with the Israeli
government apparatus (the IDF, the Secret Service, the border police, and the undercover
Arabic-speaking soldiers), but with the settlers from neighboring settlements, too. Since
June, the IDF instigated eight highly coordinated attacks by Jewish militants against
Palestinian civilians. The settlers were armed with a bewildering array of war material,
including grenade launchers, mortars, land mines, and assault rifles. “The idea of this
kind of advance weaponry in untrained hands is particularly distressing,” says a Mossad
(Israel Intelligence Service) director.
The IDF soldiers asked to assist in the resettlement of Jews have received death
threats from anonymous organizations. The threats, according to Jonathan Silvers, can be
read as follows:
We are at war not only with Arabs, we are forced to do battle with all who
oppose God’s will, including the common Israeli soldier, if you execute
the lunatic orders of your superiors, we will in turn execute you.”2’
Phyllis Bennis, wrote the following describing the settlers action against the
Palestinians:
23Anonymous, “Guns and Stones.” Economist 326, no. 7798 (1993): 43-43.
24Lockman and Beinin, 224.
25Jonathan Silvers, “Wholly War,” Net’ Statesman and Society 8, no. 378 (1995): 28.
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One Autumn afternoon, in the tiny village of Hawwara, off Nablus Road,
Neal and I found two she-goats, two kids, and five chickens, that had been
shot by Israeli settlers only moments earlier. The youngest child in the
family that owned these animals, about six-years-old, had thrown a small
stone at the settlers’ car as it passed the family’s house. In response, the
carload of six settlers entered the back of the house and fired 20 to 30
shots at the sheep and goats. “Next time I’ll come back to kill you and the
sheep,” one of the settlers shouted. Two carloads of soldiers arrived
during the settler attack, and waited outside until the settler left.26
On May 24, 1992, a Palestinian from Gaza’s Nusseirat Refugee Camp killed an
Israeli teenager in a town south of Tel Aviv. The murder set off days of rioting by Jews
chanting, “death to the Arabs.”27
Collective Punishment
This kind of punishment is illegal under international law. Nevertheless,
collective punishment was used against the Intifada. There are many forms for this
punishment, ranging from house demolition to curfew, school closure, to many other
actions taken by the authorities against the Palestinians and all of them are in violation of
human rights.
House Demolition
This is the worst form of collective punishment used against the Palestinians in
the Occupied Territories. By the end of 1988, 184 Palestinian homes had been totally or
partially sealed. In addition, 363 homes had been demolished on the grounds that they
26Phyllis Bennis, 60.
27Anonymous, “The Gaza Strip Bottled Up.” Economist 323, no. 7763 (1992): 43-44.
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had been built without licenses. These demolitions were widely viewed by Palestinians
as punitive, because such licenses were almost impossible to secure.28
According to a press release by B’Tselem (the Israeli Human Rights Monitoring
Organization) dated January 28, 1990:
432 Palestinian houses in the West Bank and Gaza were demolished or
sealed from the beginning of the Uprising through January 1990.
Typically, the houses of Palestinians suspected of serious security
offenses.... such as murder or the throwing of Molotov cocktails.... have
been demolished within days of a suspected offender’s arrest, often before
he is charged, tried, and prosecuted in the court of law.29
In addition, Defense Minister Rabin stated the following:
505 illegally built houses were demolished in the first year of the
Intifada.3°
In most cases of demolition, entire families are rendered homeless before the
suspect is even tried; in a small number of cases he has not even been apprehended.3’
Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director of Human rights Watch, testified before the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization saying the following:
While we (in the U.S. House of Representatives) favor the introduction of
judicial review, we note that the court never overturned a demolition order
on appeal, more important, we share the U.S. administration’s view that
demolitions are a form of collective punishment and, as such, contravene
the Fourth Geneva Convention.32
28Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada. Palestine and the Palestinians
(Canada, 1989), 60.
29U.S. HR, 9 May 1990, 71.
30U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Development in the West Bank and Gaza,
May 1990, 71.
31Christian Science Monitor, 28 June 1989, 12.
32U.S.HR,9 May 1990, 120-121.
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According to information taken from Palestine Human Rights Information Center
in Jerusalem and Chicago, the number of the houses demolished or sealed is 2013 from
the beginning of the Uprising to July 31, 1991.
Curfew
Israeli measures of collective punishment impose hardship on every Palestinian
resident of the Occupied Territories. The use of curfews is one example. At the start of
the Intifada, they were imposed mainly in response to disturbances. Soon, Israeli
authorities began regularly imposing them in anticipation of disturbances, and eventually
as a form of collective punishment. In the fall of 1989, the village of Beit Sahour was
under round-the-clock curfew almost continuously for 40 days during its nonviolent tax
revolt. Nablus, a city of more than 100,000 inhabitants, was twice placed under curfews
lasting at least ten days during 1989. Curfews like the ones imposed in Beit Sahour and
Nablus are clearly punitive and violate the prohibition against collective punishment in
the Fourth Geneva Convention.34 Curfews are accompanied by the disconnection of
power, water and phone lines. Food supplies run low, sick persons have difficulty
obtaining medicine and treatment, and farmers must sit at home while their crops rot.35
The focus of the Palestinian Uprising remained on the Gaza Strip until mid-
January 1988, when the authorities imposed long curfews on all eight Gaza Strip refugee
camps. No one was allowed outside. Food and water shortages added to the people’s
33Palestine Human Rights Center X, no. 2 (1991).
34U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Situation in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, 9 May 1990, 117.
35Ibid., 118.
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misery. Soldiers fired tear gas into homes and dropped tear gas into courtyards by
helicopter.36
On March 30, 1988, the Israeli government sealed off the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, barring 130,000 Palestinians from their jobs inside Israel.37 In Gaza Strip two
weeks into closure, the price of eggplant had dropped 50 percent, green peppers by 55
percent, tomatoes by 65 percent, cucumbers by 81 percent, and squash by 90 percent.38
Reports of food and medicine shortages during the long curfew on Gaza camps brought a
tremendous outpouring of emergency relief from Palestinian institutions inside Israel and
the West Bank, including trucks of food, milk, and clothing from the Galilee and Golan,
and from women’s groups and other charitable organizations in the West Bank.39
Hunger was a problem in the Occupied Territories between 1989 and 1990. By
June 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, UNRWA was already distributing
emergency food rations to 120,000 refugees and non-refugee families in Gaza Strip and
to 165,000 families in the West Bank.4°
To the Palestinians, closure is a form of apartheid, segregation in its most bitter
and destructive form. Israeli author Meron Benvensiti said recently, “This is apartheid,
complete with a pass system. The Arabs are perceived as a work force, and beyond that,
36Lockman and Beinin, 48.
37Sara M. Roy, “Joyless in Gaza: Apartheid, Israel Style,” Nation 257 (1993): 136-139.
38Jbid., 136-139.
39Lockman and Beinin, 49.
40Anonymous. “Palestinians: A Deadlier Intifada.” Economist 323, no. 7754 (1992): 43-44.
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no one cares what happens to them.”4’ One woman from a refugee camp in Gaza Strip
tragically captured the mood of the people when she said, “I have nothing left to feed my
children but black milk, what good am I?42 In the fall of 1992, the UNRWA field office
in Gaza advertised eight jobs for garbage collectors and received more than 11,000
applications. Many of the applicants had a post-secondary education.43
Detention, Deportation and
the Treatment of the Prisoners
The U.S. State Department, in its Country Report, May 9, 1990, stated the
following:
The Israeli Supreme Court is not the guardian of Palestinian rights that
Israeli officials often claim it to be. As the report pointed out, the Court
has never overturned an IDF decision to deport or administratively detain
a Palestinian or demolish the home of his family.44
Since the outbreak of the Intifada, the authorities have doubled the sentences for
administrative detainees to a maximum sentence of one year which could be, however.
renewed indefinitely. As well, authorities empowered all officers with the rank of
colonel and above to issue detention orders which were then carried out without adequate
judicial review. Thousands of those arrested were held in extremely harsh conditions in a




44U.S. State Department. Country Report, 9 May 1990.
45U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affair: r)plop,,e,t in the West Bank and Gaza. 9 May
1990, 402.
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In the first two years of the Uprising, an estimated 48,000 Palestinians were
arrested and detained for three days or more. Of these, some 7,900 were placed in
administrative detention, without charge or trial. Another 61 persons were deported
during this period.46
There were numerous reports of ill treatment and torture of detainees “to extract
information or confession or to harass and intimidate.” This form of torture mentioned in
the statement included beating and kicking of prisoners all over the body, including the
head and genitals; falaga (beating soles of the feet); hanging by rope from the ceiling and
being swung from wall to wall; prolonged exposure to cold; use of electric shocks; long
periods of solitary confinement and sleep deprivation; and verbal abuse and threats.47
An Israeli officer served in the Occupied Territories and registered his confession
on a cassette that was sent by Israeli Knesset member Dedi Zucker to military police.
The officer stated:
He and his soldiers persecuted Arabs on the Jewish religious holiday, Yom
Kippor. Stripping people of all their clothes and leading them to orchards.
The soldiers tied them up and released dogs at them. Then they chained
and tied them to tree trunks for the entire night. The officer and his
soldiers established a “private” prison surrounded by barbed wire for
“drying the Arabs in the sun” and baking them. “You have to understand
that the issue is about harsh conditions, severe cold in the night, and dogs,
and unbearable heat in the day,” the officer confessed.48
The story was disclosed when the officer was interviewed by the Israeli newspaper
Yerushalirn on October 7, 1988.
46Rex Brynen, 33.
47Don Peretz, 47.
48Yerushali,n Newspaper, Israel. 7 October 1988. In Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 1990.
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Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch, testified before a
subcommittee hearing emphasized that, “The U.S. is on record as opposing the practice
of “widespread” administrative detention, a characterization that applies to the current
reality in the territories. During the first two years of the Uprising, there were some
50,000 Uprising-related arrests and imprisonments. This month, the IDF stated that some
10,000 Palestinians had been placed in administrative detention during the Intifada.49
B’Tsalem, the Israeli human rights group, reported that more than 25,000
Palestinian prisoners were tortured by the Israeli authorities in the first five years of the
Intifada alone, and more than a thousand were killed.°
The number of Palestinians who have died in Israeli prison custody since the
Intifada began numbered 12. One 1989 case was clearly proven to be the murder of a
prisoner by interrogators.’ Amjad Jabriel, a 14-year-old American citizen and native of
Denver, Colorado, was the victim. He was taken into custody by Israeli authorities and
later found dead, shot in the back at close range.2 The Israeli Supreme Court refused to
temporarily prevent Israeli interrogators from tying a Palestinian detainee onto a tilted
9U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Situation in the West Bank and Gaza.
9May 1990, 119.
50Sara Roy, Women’s Review ofBooks 12, no. 6 (1995): 26-27.
51U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Development in the West Bank and Gaza,
9 May 1990, 25.
52Ibid., 52.
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stool with his hands cuffed behind his back, a sack over his head and music blasting in
his ears.53
The most shocking part of this report is the torture of children in Israeli military
prisons. They were young persons who civilization normally shelters and cares for;
youths between ten and eighteen, not yet finished their schooling, and usually thought, in
industrial societies, to be not yet able to earn a living and to care for themselves. The
report claims that even though these youths were described as “only” eighteen, sixteen,
twelve, or ten, nevertheless they were “terrorists,” violent antagonists of the State of
Israel, if not full-fledged, then in the making.54
Torture chambers may be referred to as “guest houses” and particular methods of
torture by pet names, such as “a birthday party” or the “parrot perch.” The prisoner is
stripped of all dignity and privacy. The most intimate parts of the body, the ones
normally sheltered, are exposed to glaring lights and public gaze, before being made the
apertures for pain to invade the body.33
Evidence compiled from this report reveals that children are subjected to arbitrary
arrest, are interrogated, humiliated, and tortured during lengthy periods of
incommunicado detention, and were denied access to fair trial. The report includes
instances of children being shot by the military with live ammunition.56
53The Atlanta Journal Constitution, 13 January 1988. A 10.





In many cases, children were imprisoned without charge and released without a
trial, usually after 18 days of detention. In its 1986 Occupied Territories Human Rights
Report, the U.S. State Department found that most Palestinians do not know the reason
for their arrest. During the first 18 days, they are prohibited from seeing family, lawyers,
the Red Cross, or any civil rights organization. There is no appeal process: The military
judge’s sentence is final.57
In this story, we will see how the Israeli justice system works when it comes to
interfacing with the Palestinians. Haim Gordon, in his book, Quick Sand: Israel,
Intfada. and the Rise ofPolitical Evil in Democracies (1995), recorded an incedonte that
appeared in the Israeli press in October 1989:
An Israeli officer caught a young Palestinian man and accused him of
throwing rocks at him and then running away when he was told to stop.
The young Palestinian was jailed immediately, even though he firmly
denied any involvement. He was put on trial after about two months. At
his trial it turned out that the young man was blind; his lawyer submitted
medical documents proving that he had been blind from birth, and school
certificates indicating that he had been enrolled in schools for the blind
throughout his life. The lawyer then asked the judge how his client could
have aimed and thrown rocks at the Israeli officer when he could not see?
How could he have run away, when all his life he used a blind man’s
cane? The judge found the blind man guilty, and he was sentenced to a
period in prison identical to the period he had already been jailed. Thus,
he was released, but told he was guilty.8
57Ibid., 98.
58Haim Gordon, Quick Sand: Israel, Intfada and the Rise ofPolitical Evil in Democracies (East
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 1-2.
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Unfortunately, however, much sadism emerged during Israel’s six-year oppression of the
Palestinian Uprising, especially, but not exclusively, in the interrogation of Palestinian
suspects by the Israel Security Service.59
IDF Judge Advocate General Amnon Strashnow stated on January 28, 1989:
It is not allowed to shoot at people who are running away. Only during
demonstrations when someone is changing position in order to come back
and throw stones. It is forbidden to open fire at people who are escaping,
or to shoot people in the back.6°
Deportation is one of the strongest weapons Israel used to stop the Uprising, especially
when the deportees were the leaders. As a result of the deportations, the original unified
leadership of the Uprising was decimated: 69 leaders sent into exile by mid-1991, there
were well over 600 shooting deaths, and 40,000 were arrested through May 1990.61 The
deportation of 415 Palestinians from Israel’s Occupied Territories has been described by
former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen as “illegal and immoral.”62
Phyllis Bennis, in his book, From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising
(1990), stated the following:
The Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights, reported that Israeli
soldiers repeatedly barred ambulances, doctors, and health teams from
their work in refugee camps and villages when there were no
demonstrations, particularly in communities that had been placed under
curfew. At every hospital, clinic, physician’s office and UNRWA facility
our team visited told with special urgency of repeated instances in which
59Ibid., 90.
60JoeI Greenberg and Michal Sela. “One killed during security raids on villages in areas. Troops
not ordered to shoot fleeing rioters, says IDF Legal Chief.” Jerusalem Post, 29 January 1989.
61Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making ofthe People (New York,
New York: The Free Press, 1993), 265.
62iames M. Wall, “Immoral” Deportations”, Christian Centuiy 10, no. 6 (1993): 195-196.
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Israeli soldiers and police had refused entry to ambulances, physicians,
and other health workers trying to reach the victims of beatings and
shootings. These reports were precise and specific.63
Proportional to the populations, more Palestinians were killed by Israeli soldiers
during the Intifada than U.
S. soldiers during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. All of this was part of an orchestrated
campaign to exterminate Palestinians as a political presence in Palestine.64 This is one of
the Israeli occupation’s more successful efforts to de-Palestinize Palestine from its
people, and we saw the tactics Israel used to achieve its goal of uprooting the Palestinians
from their homeland.
Human Rights Violations
During the Palestinian Uprising
In a statement to the forty-fourth session of the U.N. Commission of Human
Rights in New York on February 5, 1988, Amnesty International reported that “human
right violations on an extensive scale have become the feature of the Israeli occupation in
the West Bank and Gaza in recent months. Women and children were beaten by soldiers
with clubs and rifle butts. Many have been hospitalized with broken limbs, fractures,
head wounds, and extensive bruising. Some were reportedly beaten after soldiers had
taken them into custody and after being injured by gunfire. Soldiers were reportedly seen
dragging wounded Palestinians from hospitals and beating them.”65
63The Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, Palestine and the Palestinians,
(1989), 60.
64Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, 11.
65Don Peretz, 46.
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The delegation sent by the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights visited the
Occupied Territories in February, two months after the Intifada began. The team found
that hospitals in the Territories were “overwhelmed” by the flood of casualties and their
condition was “worse than the TV series ‘Mash’
,,66
The Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights reported the following in their
report:
Israeli soldiers repeatedly barred ambulances, doctors, and health teams
from their work in refugee camps and villages when there were no
demonstrations, particularly in communities that had been placed under
curfew.... At every hospital, clinic, physician’s office and UNRWA
facility our team visited, we were told with special urgency of repeated
instances in which Israeli soldiers and police had refused entry to
ambulances, physicians, and other health workers trying to reach the
victims of beatings and shootings. These reports were precise and
specific... ,,67
The use of tear gas by Israeli troops in enclosed spaces was responsible for a large
number of miscarriages. On two nights in Gaza alone, 23 women who had been
subjected to the gas miscarried in hospitals.68 Women were shot in the streets, they were
gassed, and they were imprisoned under administrative detention.69
Early in March, a CBS television crew in Nablus filmed from a distance, without
being seen, a sequence in which four Israeli soldiers beat two Arab youths who were
sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs. The soldiers kicked the
66Ibid., 49.
67Phyllis Bennis, 54.
68The Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, Palestine and the Palestinians
(Canada, 1989), 60. In James A. Graff and Farid Ohan.
69Phyllis Bennis, 31.
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Arabs in the head and chest, and then beat them on arms and legs with heavy rocks.
According to the CBS Israeli bureau chief, the beating lasted about forty minutes. Within
a day, the television clip was being shown throughout Europe and the United States. The
incident aroused a storm of protest, and Israeli embassies in Washington, London, Paris,
and Amsterdam were flooded with angry calls. In some countries, the incident sparked
anti-Israel demonstrations; even supporters of Israel were shocked or chagrined.70
However, as the U.S. State Department noted in its 1988 Country Report, “Many
individuals, including academics, journalists, and human rights workers, who have not
engaged in or advocated violence or other acts threatening security..., are administratively
detained by Israeli military authorities.”7’
The toll of human rights violations by Israeli forces since December 9, 1987
through July 31, 1991 includes the following:72 968 Deaths; 115,970 Injuries requiring
hospitalization; 66 Expulsions; 15,100 Administrative detentions; 10,391 Curfews (areas
with 10,000+ population under 24-hour curfew); 94,825 Land confiscation (acres); 2,013
House demolitions/sealings; and 118,735 Tree uprootings.
70Don Peretz, 5 L
71Don Peretz, 51.
72Palestine Human Rights Information Center X, no. 2 (1991).
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School Closure
In a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives on May 9, 1990, the
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East heard a report on the situation in the West
Bank and Gaza, which stated the following:
One of the most wide-ranging and controversial administrative sanctions
has been the forced closure of Palestinian educational institutions,
including all universities. For more than two years now Israeli authorities
have effectively closed Palestinian schools, community colleges, and
universities by imposing a succession of military orders and extended
curfews on entire communities. Israeli authorities have justified school
closures on security grounds, charging: “Since 1987 the schools have
frequently served as one of the centers for organizing and launching
violent activity.”73
The U.S. House Subcommittee also concluded:
These closures have directly affected approximately 320,000 school
children ranging from kindergarten through twelfth grade and 18,000
students in institutions of higher education. More than 10,000 high school
students have recently passed their matriculation examination and so are
eligible to attend local colleges and universities. Sources associated with
the universities report that thousands of young Palestinians have been
forced to emigrate in search of higher education and many professors also
have had to seek positions abroad.74
In other hearings before sub-committees on Europe and the Middle East, Mr.
Bereuter, a member of the Subcommittee, substantiated the following conditions:
I also find Israel’s treatment of Palestinian systems of education to be quit
troubling. Palestinian people have always placed a high priority on
literacy and higher education. Education is pivotal to their society, Yet,
for two years the university system has been closed by order of Israeli
73Consulate Report, Development in the West Bank and Gaza, Suprs, No. 5, at 17.75.
74Ibid., 5.
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authorities. Elementary and secondary schools have been closed, opened,
and closed again. Alternative education in the home has been banned.7
Economic Measures
The economy of the Occupied Territories is subordinate to the Israeli economy
and bound to fit in a periphery-centered relationship.76 At the same time, Israel used its
policies in the Occupied Territories as an instrument to destroy the fabric of the
Palestinian society and consequently, de-Palestinianize the West Bank and Gaza.77
According to Uzi Amith Kohn, et al, in The “Intfada” and the Rule ofLaw
(1993),Israel took some economic measures to make the people’s life in the Occupied
Territories miserable and stressful in order to stop the Uprising. Some of these measures
can be stated as follows:
The regulations concerning importation of monies to the area (permit and
request for a permit) (Amendment No. 2), 1988, restricted the general
permit to import money. In the case of truck drivers driving trucks
between Jordan and the Area, 200 Jordan Dinars (J-D) per entry, a sum at
that time approximating 500 U.S. dollars. Because of the frequency that
the truck drivers were likely potential carriers of funds to fuel the
Uprising, and these regulations represented an attempt to meet the danger.
This amount of money reduced to 100 J-D by Amendment No. 5 in
1988.78
75u.s. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Development in the West Bank and Gaza,
9 May 1990, 5.
76Lockman and Beinin, 225.
77Ali Jalal Abed, 2,
78Uzi Amit-Kohn, et al,, The “Intfada” and the Rule ofLaw (Israel Ministry of Defense
Publication, Israel, 1993), 183-184.
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Under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, and in particular, regulation
84(1), the commander of the IDF forces in the Area had the authority to confiscate
property of unlawful association even if there was not enough evidence.79
Also, Uzi Amith Kohen, , added the following:
On March 30, 1988, the commander of IDF forces in Gaza District issued
the order concerning the use of telephone services (Temporary Provision),
1988. On April 10, 1988, the commander of IDF forces in Judea and
Samaria issued an identical order. These orders determined that for a six-
month period (or a short period to be determined by the commander),
“Area residents will not be given..., telephone services for international
communications either directly or through a telephone exchange.8°
The orders in both Judia and Samaria (on February 16, 1989) and the Gaza
District (on January 25, 1989) were accordingly amended to restore international
telephone services to residents of the territories.”8’
Furthermore, a hearing before the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Development
in the West Bank and Gaza, revealed:
In January 1988, the Israeli Government introduced changes into the
income tax law which raised tax brackets for Palestinians. Palestinians
earning $16,000 are taxed at 55%, Israelis, by contrast, do not reach the
top tax rate until annual income reaches $30,000, and then the rate is 48
percent. 82
Another measure creating hardship for Palestinians involved the acquisition of
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In December 1988, a military order was enacted which included
conditions for the acquisition of permits and licenses upon payment of all
taxes, including income, property, and value-added tax, and the payment
of all fines and levies imposed by the military government.83
Phyllis Bennis, in his book, From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian Uprising
(1990), affirmed:
On a broader scale, Palestinian agriculture in general has been one of the
targets of Israel’s effort to suppress the Intifada. According to the
Jerusalem-based Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, “Olives
and olive oil constitute the most important single crop in the West Bank.
The olive harvest season opened on October 15. By October 24.... at least
12 villages had been formally prohibited from harvesting. They included
Asira Ash-Shama-lia, Kufur Malek, Maythaloun, Saris, Bela, Nuba,
Kharess, Burká, Kufdr thilith, Brtaia and Luban Ash-shargiya.84
At the same time, the impact of curfews on the harvesting of other crops,
especially tomatoes, watermelon, squash, peppers, and grapes should not be
underestimated.
Don Peretz, in his book, Infifada: The Palestinian Uprising (1990), wrote:
A major constraint against expansion of Palestinian agriculture in the
Occupied Territories has been the limited water supply. The vital resource
was removed from the control of the indigenous population and integrated
into the Israeli imposed “Common Market.”8
According to Israel Shahak
By autumn of 1987, according to official Israeli data, the 60.000 settlers in
the West Bank were using more water than the 850,000 or million
Palestinians.86 In addition to the water problem, there is another problem






100,000 olive and fruit trees were uprooted, as well as hundreds of
thousands more seedlings and other plants.87
All these measures had one purpose: to force Palestinians to abandon their
agrarian way of life, and to become workers in Israeli factories and in the Israeli cities.
SUMMARY
The Palestinian Uprising was a source of trouble to the Israeli government and its
leadership. The authorities had to use every available means to stop the Uprising. Here
are some of the tactics and policies that Israel took to stop the Uprising. (1) A shoot-to-
kill policy, instituted almost immediately, resulted in 650 Palestinian deaths and 64,000
injuries in the first 18 months of the Uprising. By March 1989, 19,715 children under the
age of 15 required medical attention because of the new policy. (2) Israeli settlers were
allowed to both in fact and spirit to operate above the law. They were permitted to invade
any Palestinian village or city, indiscriminately shooting, killing, and destroying property.
IDF soldiers typically ignored the carnage, much to the dismay and anger of Palestinians.
(3) The policy of house demolition or sealings as a collective punishment tool against the
Palestinians was justified by universal denial by Israeli authorities of “necessary” licenses
and permits. By July 31, 1991, around 2013 homes were demolished and many more
were demolitions were planned for the future. (4) Israel used curfews to restrict
Palestinian movement and disrupt business and agricultural progress. Sometimes
curfews were imposed to prevent upcoming demonstrations or disturbances. But, later on
during the Uprising, the curfew was used as a collective punishment tool designed to
further control the entire Palestinian community. In the village of Biet Sahour, a forty
87Phyllis Bennis, 8-82.
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day, around-the-clock curfew was imposed. At the same time, two curfews, lasting ten
days each, were enacted on the City of Nablus. Most of the time, curfews were
accompanied by the disconnection of the electricity, water, and food supply. Treatment
of the ill and infirm posed a special problem with no electricity or water. Many crops,
such as tomatoes, okra, watermelon, squash, peppers, and grapes, were lost, and
thousands of Palestinians were unable to sustain their livelihoods in Israel or support their
families and were therefore forced to live in extremely uncomfortable conditions. The
IJNARWA, by 1991, supplied more than 320,000 families with food in both the West
Bank and Gaza because of wide-spread hunger. (5) Detention and deportation were other
anti-Palestinian policies instituted by Israel. By 1989, more than 48,000 Palestinians were
arrested. Some detainees spent three days in confinement, others a few months and
always, the Israelis mistreated their prisoners.
Many human rights organizations from Israel, the Occupied Territories, the U.S.,
and Amnesty International monitored the arrests and exiles. According to B’Tselem, an
Israeli human rights monitoring group, more than 25,000 Palestinian prisoners were
tortured and one thousand were killed while incarcerated during the first five years of the
Uprising. Israel used many ways to torment the prisoners including the use of electrical
shock, very bright lights to prevent prisoners from sleeping, blasting music in their ears
and forcing prisoners to function in the nude, a form of sadistic humiliation for many.
Finally, more than 500 Palestinians were deported with no means of legal appeal or
redress. (6) Human rights violations, unacceptable by the standards of the Geneva
Convention, regularly occurred in the Occupied Territories. Women and children were
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routinely beaten by soldiers. Hospital workers and emergency vehicles were prevented
from serving hospital and clinics. The use of tear gas by the military police resulted in
many documented cases of miscarriages and stillborn births. In the village of Salem, east
of Nablus, three Palestinians were buried alive. (7) Israel crippled the entire Palestinian
education system by methodically closing all institutions of learning throughout the
Territories from the lowest grades to the colleges and universities. More than 320,000
students in the school system and 18,000 university students were prevented from
attending school. Many students were forced to leave for other countries in order to
continue their educations. At the same time, a large number of teachers and professors
left the Territories searching for a country in which to continue their careers.
(8) Israel targeted their most powerful directives towards the prevention of a viable
Palestinian economy. The goal of these policies was to reduce economic
competitiveness, desert their land due to lack resources such as water, and become the
central work force for Israeli manufacturing and industrial factories. To achieve this
goal, Israel placed a $500 limit on the amount of money that could be imported by
truckers who entered the Territories from Jordan. The area military commander had the
authority to confiscate any land or properties without any legal justification, and that land
became off-limits to Palestinians. Last, the residents of the Territories were forced to pay
all taxes owed to the government before any permits or licenses were issued. (9) Israeli
agricultural policies also helped to provoke the Uprising. Many crops were lost because
of curfew laws and unfair control of the water supply. Even more virulent was the
uprooting of 100,000 trees in the Territories by both soldiers and settlers. As a case in
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point, Israel once prevented 12 villages from harvesting their olive crops, thus impeding a
key source of income and forcing many farmers out of business.
Israeli leaders thought that the tactics and the policies they carried out in the
Territories would stop the Uprising. They were wrong. The policies exposed Israel’s
true intentions to the entire world, and engendered a heightened awareness of injustices
and atrocities. The images of soldiers killing children, women, and elderly people
sparked anger and Israel’s image was tarnished. An unexpected result of Israel’s
exposure as a rogue nation that ignored human rights was the response of at least some of
the Israeli citizens, who began to publically question the ill treatment of the Palestinians
in the Territories. Envoys from countries friendly to Israel began to express disapproval
of what they read about and saw in the media about Israel and its treatment of the
Palestinians. Even the Jewish community in the United States asked Israel to reconsider
their response to dissident activities and perceived threats to Israel’s right to exist. At last,
Israel began to feel the pressure and leaders reluctantly acknowledged that the Uprising
could not be stopped by force alone. Negotiations with the Palestinians could be a more
constructive alternative.
In the following chapter, these issues will be discussed: the impact of the
Uprising on both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and the impact of the Uprising on the
peace process.
CHAPTER 1V
The 1987 UPRISfNG AND THE PEACE PROCESS
1NTRODUCTION
The late Dr. Edward W. Said wrote:
The Intifada therefore accomplished a number of unprecedented things. In
my opinion, the future of the Middle East as a whole is going to be
influenced by them, and Palestine and Israel will never be the same again
because of them.1
The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 is considered one of the major events of the
twentieth century. The impact of the Uprising went far beyond the changes in political
and economic dynamics between the parties involved. The Middle East as a whole was
affected and inevitably, the super powers were too.
Amos Oz said of the Intifada, “What was will never be again, and what will be, is
not what was.”2
This chapter will answer many of the questions which were raised at the
beginning of Chapter One, such as how the
Uprising brought both parties to the peace table; how both parties adjusted their political
positions to accommodate each other; and how the Uprising influenced the PLO to make
changes to its position regarding Israel, including a no negotiation, no reconciliation
‘Quoted in Lockman and Beinin, 20.
2Freedrnan, 336. in Jerusalem Post, 19 February 1988, 4.
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stance (the outcome of Al-Khurtom Summit in the 1970s). Another policy is the one in
which the PLO Charter called for the wiping out of Israel.
Other considerations are encapsulated in the following questions: How did the
Israeli public influence their government to participate in peace negotiations with the
Palestinians? What was the role of the United States of America in the peace process?
What was the role of the International Community in encouraging open dialogue between
the Israelis and the Palestinians? What was the role of the media in influencing
worldwide public opinion to support peace and end the cycle of violence in the occupied
Territories? This chapter will explore the ramifications of the Uprising utilizing the
above questions as an organizational framework.
The Impact of the
1987 Uprising on Israel
The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 successfully challenged many assumptions that
had previously been taken for granted by many, if not most, Israelis and many
Palestinians as well.3
To Shmuel N. Eisenstadat, the Lebanon War and the Intifada had an even deeper
impact on Israel than the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
The Lebanon War was especially important because for the first time in the
relatively short history of the State of Israel, matters of security and military
arrangements were no longer a matter of a narrow political consensus. These areas of
3Robert 0. Freedman, 377.
4Moshe Máoz, 150.
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national interest were at last opened to public discourse and debate, particularly in the
media. The Yom Kippur War, while certainly important, did not result in a more flexible
approach to security matters.5
Moshe Mãoz, et al (1994), stated the following:
The Intifada had the same impact but in a different way because it shook
some of the implicit assumptions about the nature of the Palestinian
political will, the Palestinian entity, and possible relations between Israel
and the Palestinians. The Intifada had a very important effect, the
culmination of which, in my opinion, has led to the opening up of the
areas of security, international relations, and military relations, to intensive
political debate, the life of which has not been known in the State of Israel
since its establishment.6
Robert 0. Freedman, in his book, The Intfada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arab
World and The Superpowers (1991), agreed:
The Uprising seemed to force Israeli public and political leadership to
think about the future of the Territories in a more concrete and realistic
manner than they had in the past. In a survey conducted in the weeks
before November 1, 1988, election (and about ten months after the
beginning of the Intifada), 55 percent admitted that their opinions
regarding security and politics had changed as a result of the Tntifada.
Also, Israel appears to have become more “realistic.”7
Israel appears to have become more “realistic” as a result of the Intifada.
It is not only the leadership of Israel that has changed its attitude. The Israeli
public wants peace and prosperity and the same lifestyle as other Western, consumer
oriented industrial societies. They tend to be less interested in Zionist notions of settling





fire. They realize that war has become a loser’s game; that cities could become
battlefields; that civilians can become combatants, and that weapons of mass destruction
can unleash horror.8
Haim Gordon, in his book, Quick Sand: Israel, Intfada and The Rise ofPolitical
Evil in Democracies (1995), wrote:
The Intifada was a topic of great concern, at least according to the
discussions in the media and in many debates in the Knesset and in the
Israeli government. Moreover, it was a concrete event that took place
daily, not many kilometers from Tel Aviv University.9
Rami Tal, an Israeli journalist added:
The most important feature of the Uprising is it put the future and the fate
of the Occupied Territories back on the political agenda of the government
and the political parties. Also, he added, “The events in the Occupied
Territories required from us to make decision we ignored for the past
twenty years. If the lad is part of the land of Israel, let us annex it and if it
is dangerous to the Jewish State and its Jewish makeup, let us start the
procedures to get rid of it or its inhabitants (transfer), the most important
thing is to do something.”°
The Uprising of 1987, also sparked an unprecedented debate over the strategic
importance of the Occupied Territories for Israel. Lockman and Beinin expressed their
opinions:
One group of senior officers believes the Occupied Territories are the
most important strategic defense factor for Israel in the upcoming war and
should be kept under Israel control even if this prevents peace. In any
case, peace with the Arab world is not on the agenda, and Israel should
8Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “Toward Peace in the Middle East,” US. News and PVorldReport , 113,
no. 6 (1992): 80.
9Haim Gordon, 238.
10Rami Tal, YidihutAhranot. 17 December 1987. In Hani Abdullah, “The Uprising is Not a
Passing Cloud,” Palestinian Affairs, vol. 179, February 1988, 78.
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adopt Henry Kissinger’s notion that no-war arrangements are better for
Israel than peace agreement.”
A second group would give up most of the territories with certain security
arrangements. Proponents of this view advocate a wide range of political
positions, from autonomy to confederation with Jordan. It is best
represented by former Chief of Staff General Mota Gur Urior, former
Commander of the Central Region, and Avraham Ben Gal, former
Commander of the Northern Region.’2
A third group of officers regards the territories as a burden with threatens
internal security and increases the likelihood of a future war. They call for
negotiations with the PLO and do not object to the establishment of a
Palestinian State, if that is the only solution.’3
Yehoshafat Harkabi, a retired general and the head of the Israeli military
intelligence, spoke out. In 1988, he warned:
We will have to negotiate with the Palestinians, the majority of whom, in
any referendum, would vote for the PLO as their representative, not out of
love, but as the unparalleled symbol of the idea that the Palestinians are a
human public worthy of a political expression. The U.S. does not
determine the composition of the Soviet delegation to negotiations, and
Israel’s presumption in trying to determine the composition of Arab
delegations is an absurdity.’4
In the words of Major General Mota Un Orr, “I think we should all agree that the
occupation should end because maintaining it does more damage to our security than
ending jt.”15
“Lockman and Beinin, 222.
12Ibid., 222.
‘3ibid., 222.
‘4Audeh G. Rantisi and Ralph K. Beebe, 121.
‘5Rex Brynen, 83.
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At the same time, Israel was beginning to find, as the Intifada indicated, that the
Occupied Territories were a metaphorical bone in its throat. The captured land could not
be swallowed, nor could it be spit out.16 By 1988, the Uprising seemed to have increased
the number of Israelis willing to negotiate with the PLO by nearly 50 percent.17 Indeed,
the Intifada had left the ruling Labor Party in a state of ideological and political disarray.
Its chairman, Shimon Perez, understood that there was no hope of reaching an
understanding with the Palestinians without the involvement of the PLO.’8
Rabin’s concern is not with the ideology of “greater Israel,” but with the
practicality of a “safer Israel.” He knows too well that Israel’s security cannot come from
American guarantees. As former Prime Minister Golda Meir said of a later offer of
American guarantees, “By the time you get here, we won’t be here.”19
During the course of the Intifada, Rabin had changed his thinking on three critical
issues. First, he realized that Hussein would not bring the Palestinians to the negotiating
table but rather the king would follow Israel’s leadership on the Palestinian question. In
addition, Rabin realized that Israel must negotiate directly with the local Palestinians, not
just treat them as “mailmen” bearing messages to Jordan and the PLO. Finally, he
16Yossj Melman and Dan Raviv, 206.
‘7David McDowall, 218.
18Zeëv Schiff and Ehud Yáari, 322.
19Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 80.
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appreciated the benefit of holding elections in the Territories—a prospect he had earlier
refused to consider.20
Rabin conceded that, “Since the start of the Intifada, [Israel has come] to the
conclusion that it will be impossible to end the conflict without reaching accommodation
with the PLO. Any other settlement will be only a partial one and thus liable to
collapse.”2’
Army commanders agreed with Defense Minister Rabin that a political rather than
military solution would have to be found.22 Also, after a long period of ambivalence, the
high command openly acknowledged that “there is no military solution to what we are
facing.... It is mainly a political problem.”23
In March 1989, an Israeli intelligence report was leaked stating:
That the Uprising could not be ended in the near future—that a political
solution could be found only if the government entered dialogue with the
PLO. The report also maintained that “there was no serious leadership in
the occupied territories outside of the PLO and that the PLO had truly
moved toward moderation.”24
For the first time since the occupation began, the Israeli forces lost control
of the population in the Occupied Territories.25





25Kimmerling and Migdal, 262.
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It would appear that the single event leading to realization of the need for
compromise with the Palestinians was the Intifada. Furthermore, Israeli policy makers
became aware that this time they were faced with a national struggle whose solution
could only be found in the realization of and Israeli readiness to allow, the
implementation of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.
The Intifada led to the awakening from the illusion that, from the start, had
no chance of succeeding. . . . the Jordanian option.26
The Intifada played a remarkable role in pushing Israel toward political
accommodation with the Palestinians in spite of Israel’s resistance to negotiations that
could have potentially pressured it to give up control over the West Bank and Gaza.27
By May 1989, Shamir and Rabin presented what came to be known as the
Shamir-Rabin Plan. This model for peace emphasized the need to come to terms with the
Palestinians and suggested a method of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiating
process.28 Rabin himself declared early in 1988 that “I’ve learned something over the
past two and one half months. You cannot rule by force over one-and-a-million
Palestinians.” A week later, Rabin further reflected, “You cannot saddle the IDF with a
mission that is outside its proper function. The unrest in the areas reflects a problem that
can only have a political solution.”29
26Reuven Pedatzur, “Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967.” Middle East
Journal 49, no. 2 (1995): 269-29 1.
27Ed Koufman, et al, Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli — Palestinian Conflict (Boulder,




A former member of the Israeli military establishment substantiated a popular
sentiment among a growing number of Israelis: “The Palestinians do not need to throw
any more stones to convince us. They have made their point and sensible people in Israel
and the rest of the world have gotten the message.”3°In January 1989, with public
opinion strengthening in support of peace, four Israeli Knesset members joined PLO
officials in Paris for discussion-debate on Middle East Peace, which both sides
characterized as a step toward formal and high-level dialogue.3’
Describing the Israeli feelings toward the Uprising, Cohen wrote:
Israelis are very upset by the Intifada. From August 1988, when we first
asked, to November 1990, 60 percent of Jewish reported feeling insecure
as a result of the Intifada.32 They also added that in 1988 (February, June,
August) 23 percent of Israeli Jews felt “the way we behave toward the
Arabs in the territories is not good enough,” compared with only 1-2
percent who thought so in the early 1970s.33
In another place they wrote:
The Uprising of the Palestinians in the areas occupied by Israel has, no
doubt, had significant influences on Israelis as individuals and on the
Israeli society as a whole. While this conclusion might have been reached
by logic alone, the present empirical findings led to empirical support.34








Compared to the Palestinians and their unity, the Israeli public is very
much divided in its response to the Intifada. At one end of the spectrum
are the left wingers, who believe that the Palestinians deserve to have their
own state and that peace is the best solution for both Israelis and
Palestinians.3 At the other end of the spectrum are the Orthodox Jews
who are both religious and nationalistic, and who believe that Israel was
promised to Jews by God and that all means are justified to protect it.
Right wingers share the Orthodox Jew’s nationalistic conviction but are
less religious. Israeli Arabs like the Palestinians. They see the Intifada as
a just struggle and take pride in it.36
One man explained, “What I read in the papers reminds me of stories of the Nazis
and I feel horrible guilt. This is what burns me out.”37
From a military point of view and because many officers had direct contact with
the Intifada, a large percentage (72%) described themselves as apprehensive about the
continuing conflict with the Palestinians. One officer explained: “The Intifada is very
unpleasant to see our soldiers dealing with this instead of doing their military duty.”
Another said, “I started feeling more stressed since the Intifada crossed the borders of the
Green Line. But I make a complete separation between these things and what I need to
do on my job.” Still another said, “I’m not one of those who hits but when I was in Gaza,
I chased an Arab who threw rocks at me. When I caught him, I hit his face with my gun
and split it open. It’s a terrible memory that follows me all the time. But when you’re
there, you become apathetic. You have no choice.”38
35Ayala M. Pines, “The Palestinian Intifada and Israel. . . burnout. . . .,“ Journal ofCross





Early in the Intifada, there were enough signs of stress among the Occupation
troops to warrant recruitment of additional psychologists to deal with the situation.39
In the first days of the Intifada, Yesh Ovul decided to sharpen its tone and
circulated an updated version of the same petition (2,500 reserved soldiers signed a
petition that they do not want to participate in operations of repression in the Occupied
Territories). It also published a “declaration of refusal” to serve in the territories or to
“take part in the suppression of the Uprising.” Close to 500 reservists, including two
majors, had signed it as of early June 1988.°
Adding to Israeli willingness to come to the negotiation table was the weakening
of the economy with an estimated loss in 1988 of at least 1.5 billion dollars because of
the Uprising. Minister of Finance Shimon Perez confirmed in June 1989 that “the
Intifada had cost Israel, directly and indirectly, between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars per
year.”41 One bank reported in September 1988 that the Uprising was responsible for a
two percent drop in national income, with a 30% decline in tourism and a 15% decline in
key Arab employment areas of textile production and sales, building construction, and
related industries.42
David McDowal, in his book, Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond
(1989), reported:
39Don Peretz, 127.
40Lockrnan and Beinin, 236.
4tShaIev, 154.
42Bank Hapaolim Statement, reported in Facts Weeklj’ Review, No. 26, Sept. 18 - Oct. 1, 1988, in
David McDowall, 207.
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Based on information from Bank Hapaolim statement of September
19878, that the Uprising was responsible for a two percent drop in national
incomes, with a decline particularly marked in tourism (30 percent down),
and in Arab employment in areas of textiles, cement, and in construction
industries (15 percent down).43
The United States Embassy in Israel estimated the monthly military and police
bill at 120 million dollars, plus a further $38 million in indirect costs.44 Israeli exports
decreased by 30 percent.45 Moreover, in normal times, about 50,000 Palestinian
workers crossed the border every day, generating millions in income for the Israeli
economy. The dependency is mutual, if unequal: many Israeli building sites, farms,
garages, and restaurant kitchens closed down without cheaply paid Palestinian laborers.46
The Impact of the 1987 Uprising
on the Palestinians
The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 had a tremendous impact on the Palestinian
society inside and outside the Occupied Territories. In this regard, the late Dr. Edward
W. Said summarized some of the unprecedented goals that the Uprising achieved:
In the first place, collaborators with the occupation were encircled and
gradually rendered ineffective, as the entire mass of people under
occupation. Even the class of merchants and shopkeepers played a major
role in this transformation. Second, the old social organizations that
depended on notables, on family, on traditional hierarchy, all they were
large marginalized. A new set of institutions emerged and, in fields like
health, education, food, and water supply, and agriculture, these provided
an alternative social organization to that dominated by the occupation
regime. Thirdly the role of women was substantially altered. During the
43David McDowaII, 207
44David McDowaIl, 207.
45A1 Hamishmar, 5 May 1988.
46Anonymous, “The Gaza Strip: Bottled Up,” Economist 323, no. 7763 (1992): 43-44.
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Intifada, women became equal partners in the struggle. They confronted
Israeli (male) troops; they shared in decision-making; they were no longer
left at home.47
The Uprising of 1987 transformed a Palestinian society in which members of the
professional elites had often been forced to become farm laborers in daily contact with
the peasantry and other manual laborers with whom they had little in common.48
The Palestinian Uprising represents a landmark in terms of Palestinian self-
assertion. With the impetus of Intifada courage and spirit, Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories took the initiative and established new patterns of collective behavior,
including the formation of progressive grassroots organizations. Taking one’s destiny
into one’s own hands and collective behavior are two characteristics of democratic
behavior.49
The Intifada also enhanced the role of women in the Palestinian community.
Many women became community leaders, and some even emerged as international
spokeswomen for the Palestinian cause (Dr. Hanan Ashrawi). The centrality of women
in the Palestinian community undermines the traditional view of women in the Arab
world and brings the Palestinian society one step closer to social equality.° A woman
belonging to the City of Ramallah Branch of the Union of Palestinian Women’s
Committee stated:
47Lockman and Beinin, 20.
48Ibid., 92.
49Kaufman, et al, 47.
50lbid., 47.
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The role of women has changed a lot in the course of the Uprising.
Palestinian women’s role has been very involved in all aspects of the
resistance: from participating in demonstrations. throwing stones, to
taking care of what we now call ‘being ready’ for the national
disobedience stage. That means taking care of the work at home, being
ready in their houses, with stored food, with supplies. . . . They are getting
used to this idea of home economy. Women have been shot in the streets,
they have been gassed, they have been imprisoned under administrative
detention. So you can feel that there is a big change in the role of women
during the Uprising.5’
With the outbreak of the Intifada and the imposition of Israeli curfews, the
Palestinian Relief Committees served as models for coping with the hardship caused by
the new situation. Food supplies had to be organized for besieged refugee camps and
villages, a much more extensive medical emergency network was required for the
mounting casualties, care was needed for the families bereft of wage earners, and child
care was necessary for younger children locked out of schools. Committees to meet the
challenge of these new emergency needs were organized in camps, villages, and sectors
of large cities.52 A village leader from Beit Sahour reflected:
We are creating a different kind of person now, even as we build the
Uprising. In the past, sometime there was selfishness, or a lack of
cooperation. People wanted to build their own castle, alone, to say, “I
want my wife, my children, to be better off.” Now it is different, now
people are cooperating. We all have the same feeling toward the future,
because we had the same problems in the past. We share the same dreams
now.53
A popular committee in Qabatiya, a village south of Jenin City, described how





determined by family ties. Now it is based on our new democracy, with respect based on
how much each person participates. We are changing our culture and consciousness.
Building a new culture is part of building a new state.”4 Perhaps one of the more
encouraging changes was in the way disputes were settled by Sulha, or peace made
between two parties, rather than through courtroom judgments and decisions, which often
did not provide satisfactory justice or was overly influenced by Israeli legal impediments.
The return to the traditional Suiha was still another result of the Intifada and helped to
reinforce resistance to the Occupation.’5
The Uprising signified a shift in the center of gravity of Palestinian politics, from
the Palestinian diaspora communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to the territories
occupied by Israel in 1967.56 The Uprising is also significant because it involved not
only the West Bank and Gaza but, for the first time, full participation of Israeli Arab
citizens in Galilee and elsewhere.57 The Uprising today sets the tone for the formulation
of Palestinian politics outside.58
The Uprising created an instrument of political unification for almost all the
Palestinian factions that had, up to that point, been divided. The United National
Leadership of the Uprising, which since the war has been issuing political directives, was
54Ibid., 28.
55Frank Robert Hunter, 132.




a direct result of the Intifada. The often politically and religiously diverse population has
actually responded to and followed these directives, whether they concern strikes,
confrontations, or civil disobedience.9
Another significant result of the Uprising was the a far-reaching shift in the
political position of the national movement away from a focus on preserving the option of
military struggle and liberating all of historic Palestine to a commitment to political
negotiations as the exclusive means of achieving the goal of a Palestinian state confined
to the West Bank and Gaza.6°
The Uprising also furthered the political prospects of the Palestinian struggle. It
did so primarily by focusing international attention on the continued contestability of
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza at a time when many Israelis and
members of the world community were displaying a growing tendency to acquiesce to
the political territorial status quo. A direct consequence of this heightened world
attention to the Palestinian issue was a greater emphasis on the centrality of the Israeli-
Palestinian intercommunal--and not only the Israeli-Arab interstate--conflict in the
consideration of possible formulas for a Middle East peace.61
Still another result of the Intifada was the re-Palestinization of the conflict—
confrontation between inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel.62 Now the
59Ibid., 133.
60Erika G. Aim, “Dynamics of the Palestinian Uprising: An Assessment of Causes, Character, and




Arab states were the secondary participants, with Palestinians again in the lead.63 Máoz
wrote the following about the Palestinian Uprising:
On the Palestinian side, the Intifada created the need to achieve practical
political results on grounds that were attainable only by means of
negotiations with Israel and thus induced the Palestinian leadership to
adopt a more flexible attitude and seek—like the government of Israel—an
acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace
negotiations 64
F. Robert Hunter, in his book, The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means
(1991), postulated that:
The Intifada had great impact upon the PLO. Not only did the Intifada
rescue the PLO from the relative importantly, it resolved the long-standing
political struggle within it between those who clung to the old idea of
replacing Israel by a secular democratic state, and those who supported the
negotiating tactics that had been developed by Arafat since the mid
197Os.6 It was the Intifada, however, that brought Arafat’s strategy to
fruition. Without the impetus provided by the revolt, the PLO could not
have moved so fast or traveled so far toward a political settlement.66
The Intifada was incapable, by itself, of ending Israel’s rule or creating a
Palestinian state. Only diplomatic agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis could
achieve this goal. Since the Intifada did not have a structured, independent leadership or
the power to force Israel’s withdrawal, it was the task of Arafat and the PLO to reach a
63Ibid., 193.




negotiated solution. If he was unable to do so, local activists might look elsewhere for
leadership, or, deprived of hope, the Uprising could collapse.67
In February 1988, at a dinner hosted by Hani al-Hasan at his house in Saudi
Arabia, Abu-lyad agreed, up to a point, that the Uprising was not a PLO revolution but
the Palestinian’s own revolution, though the PLO could play an important role in
negotiations. “Seeing children risking their lives imposed on us the need to achieve a
realistic peace.”68
Along with broadening the role of the PLO, the Intifada put the Palestinian issue
back on the world agenda, winning it considerable international sympathy. It
strengthened the PLO’s hand vis-a-vis Jordan, polarized Israeli opinion, and isolated
Israel.69 At the same time, the PLO was able to take advantage of the Uprising to
place the Palestinian problem on the international agenda and keep it “hot.”7°
By the end of 1989, the Intifada had stabilized at its own level. Politically, its
main achievement during the second year had been to produce direct talks between Israel
and the PLO, which had become established de facto.7’
If the PLO was still in Beirut, “there would have been no Intifada” because people







leader called the Intifada, “the real mother of the peace process.”72The Intifada gave the
PLO and the Palestinian people enhanced standing as a party to the conflict.73
The Impact of the 1987 Uprising
on the Peace Process
Ed Koufman, in his book, Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict, expressed it well:
The intellectuals understood, too, that postponing settlement of the
conflict was impossible. The Middle East is going to be in grave danger if
we wait. It seems to me that Arafat was very alive to that factor of threat,
to himself and to his movement, from Hamas (Islamic Resistance
Movement). If Hamas should take over, it will become a conflict to the
bitter end because of the involvement of the religious elements. You
cannot compromise on religious views, especially when you believe that
God is on your side and you will prevail in the end, and that victory is
bound to be yours.74
Yossi Beilin is one of the most respected scholars in Israel in the field of political
science. Israelis and Arabs, according to Dr. Beilin, were experts in missing peace
opportunities:
Perhaps the earliest was in 1947, had the Palestinians then decided to have
their own state, we would have been in a much better situation. Two
states, two people, some such arrangement. All their dreams which have
not been fulfilled—-and God knows whether they will be fulfilled--could
have been met in l947.’
And about another opportunity that was missed, he wrote:
72Barry Rubin, 92.
73Rex Brynen, 137.
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Then we missed a chance too, to use Itamar’s example, Hosnie Zaim, who
was elected in April 1949 and assassinated in August 1949, did not want
our land. The situation was different from today. When Zaim suggested
talks with Ben-Gurion (first Prime Minister of Israel) about peace between
Syria and Israel in spring of 1949, Ben-Gurion was not ready to talk to
him because Syria was encroaching on our side of the border between
Syria and Israel.76
In another place he wrote:
Another opportunity was missed by the Arabs. Immediately after the 1967
War, we were ready to withdraw, especially from the Sinai Peninsula and
the Golan Heights. A famous secret resolution on June 19, 1967, a
resolution one week after the war, referred especially to this idea: that
Israel was ready to withdraw, to negotiate with Syria and Egypt on the
basis of international borders and Israel’s security needs.77
The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg, who submitted the secret
resolution to the Egyptians and Syrians, received in return the famous No’s of Khartum:
No negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of Israel. That was an opportunity totally
missed by the Arabs.78 Just as frustrating for those interested in sincere peace efforts: in
1971 Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, rejected Gunnar Jarring’s plan for peace—total
withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace with Israel. Anwar Sadat’s
was that a full, just, and comprehensive peace would not take place in the Middle East
unless Israel withdrew from all occupied territories.79 Dayan, Israeli Defense Minister,







Moshe Máoz analyzed the missed opportunity:
Yossi Beilin believed that Golds Meir can be blamed for the disaster of the
Yom Kippur War in 1973. She did not read the answer. I think that was
perhaps the biggest opportunity missed by Israel since statehood.8’
Shimon Shamir further commented:
Israel needed the October War in order to make peace with Egypt based
on the principle of territory for peace, and Israel needed the Intifada for
making a compromise with the PLO.82
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, described Egypt’s perspective on the Israeli-
PLO agreement with the following words:
The glorious October War had opened wide the chance of peace to all the
peoples of the region. The Palestinian-Israeli agreement could not have
happened without the deep influence the October War had created in the
region of the Middle East.83
In his November 1977 Knesset speech, President Anwar Sadat’s words reflected
his broad and correct assessment of the new trends in the Arab-Israeli conflict:
There are certain facts that have to be faced with courage and clear vision.
There are Arab territories which Israel occupied [since 1967]. We insist
on complete withdrawal from these territories. As for the Palestinian
cause, no one can deny that this is the heart of the whole problem.... In
all faith I tell you that peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians.
the only language to deal with it, for a just and lasting peace, is the
establishment of their state. With all the international guarantees you
request, there should be no fear of a new-born state.... When the bells of
peace ring, there will be no hand to beat the drums of war, and if there are
any, it shall be soundless.84
8tIbid., 27.
82ibid., 38.
83A1-Ahram Newspaper, 6 October 1993. In Máoz, 56.
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Yair Hirschfeld was the main Israeli negotiator during most of the secret talks
held with the PLO. He believed that, “Israeli-Palestinian talks in the 1 970s made no
progress because of the PLO’s high level demands.”8’
In May 1989, Shamir and Rabin revealed what became known as the Shamir
Rabin Plan. It emphasized the need to come to terms with the Palestinians and suggested
a method of bringing the Palestinians into the negotiation process. On the Palestinian
side, the Intifada created the need to achieve practical political results on grounds that
were attainable only be means of negotiations with Israel and thus induced the Palestinian
leadership to adopt a more flexible attitude in seeking—like the government of Israel—an
acceptable formula that would enable the beginning of the peace negotiations.86
Finally, the decisive stage in the history of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations
began. With the help of the country of Norway, a secret back channel was created,
providing a venue for clandestine negotiations between the government of Israel and the
PLO and ultimately leading to the mutually agreed upon Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
of Principles. A formal agreement ceremony between representatives of the two sides





Without Rabin’s support, analytical thinking, and decision making, the Oslo
process would never have been significantly advanced or concluded.88 Rabin’s
willingness to explore the Oslo channel derived in part from his analysis of international
and regional changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and the political shifts
caused by the Gulf War.89
In a seminal speech at Tel Aviv University in November 1992, Rabin explained:
I believe that among the leadership of the territories and outside of the
territories, maybe in [PLO headquarters in] Tunisia, there are today
Palestinian leaders who have wised up, and they understand that they
cannot repeat the mistakes of the past. . . There are so many among them
who understand that it is better to establish the nucleus of a Palestinian
entity, even if it is administrative.90
In short, peace was more than an opportunity not to be missed—-it was imperative
that Israel needed to seize to stave off threats down the road.9’
Then in his inaugural Knesset speech on July 13, 1992, Rabin stressed the need to
explore the unparalleled window of opportunity in the peace process in order to avert
long-term threats:
We must join the international movement toward peace,
reconciliation and cooperation that is spreading all over the entire globe
these days. We don’t want to be the last to remain, all alone, in the
station. . . . A number of countries in our region have recently stepped up
their efforts to develop and produce nuclear arms . . . The possibility that
nuclear weapons will be introduced in the Middle East in the coming years






This situation requires us to give further thought to the urgent need to end
the Arab-Israel conflict and live in peace with our Arab neighbors.92
Rabin told his friend Shimon Sheves, “The premiership for me is an option, not an
obsession. I have done everything and have had jobs that people only dream of. I don’t
need the honor of being prime minister again. But I think I can bring peace to Israel and
a change in priorities. The money we spend building settlements in the West Bank
should be used for education, building industries, providing jobs and absorbing new
comers.93
In a further step towards peaceful negotiations, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres struck a deal with King Hussein in Paris 1987. Meeting secretly in London, both
agreed to an international conference (which Hussein believed was necessary to confer
legitimacy on any agreement) that would serve as an umbrella for separate bilateral talks
between Israel and its neighbors.94
in remarks that surprised American officials, Rabin admitted that only Arafat
could make a deal for the Palestinians because the Palestinians living in the territories
were not willing to defy him.9
92Ibid., 111-112.
931bid., 423.
94David Makousky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo
Accord (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 7.
95Jbid., 47.
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Shimon Peres stressed the following when he said, “I have never doubted that the
Palestinian problem is a mine that could trigger any number of others, and that defusing
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is the key to regional peace.”96
Israel found it necessary to come up with its own initiative for negotiation on an
interim agreement between Israel and a Palestinian representative from the territories
whose members would be chosen in a free and democratic election. According to this
framework plan, negotiations on a permanent settlement would begin following several
years of an interim settlement.97
Israel came with its “Seven Points,” which was Israel’s idea of mutual recognition
between Israel and the PLO. The Seven Points were:
PLO recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security; its
commitment to resolving the conflict on the basis of U.N. Security
Council resolution 242 and 338; repeal of the provision of the PLO
Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel; renunciation of terrorism
and cooperation with Israel in countering violence; ending the Intifada; a
commitment to resolve all outstanding issues with Israel peacefully; and
Arafat’s agreement to represent himself in meetings with Israelis in his
capacity as Chairman of the PLO and not as president of Palestine.98
6David Landau, ed., Shimon Peres: Battling for Peace Memoirs (London, England: Weidenfleld




There could be no military means of ending the Palestinian Uprising without
undermining the ethical foundation on which Israeli democracy is based. Ironically, the
Intifada, which began without PLO initiative or direction, has proven that Israel cannot
achieve a political resolution of the conflict without negotiating with the PLO.99
The children who are living today’s nightmares will become the leaders of
tomorrow. If the Intifada continues for long, their fears of the Israeli intruder may turn to
hatred, which will undermine possibilities of dialogue. And as we have seen, the longer
the uprising, the greater the support for Islamic fundamentalists who oppose all
compromise. How imminent, then, is the prospect that Israel will recognize that there is
an urgent need to reach settlement, before it is too late?’°°
In his article, May 4, 1990, Joel Brinkley wrote:
It would be a mistake to believe that the Uprising is “controlled” or that
the Palestinian resistance will cease before a political settlement is
reached)°’
By the same token, the Israelis cannot hope to usurp Palestine, to uproot and expel
its inhabitants, to pillage their homes and to live thereafter in peace. These facts are
recognized by leading Zionists. “Israel has no long-term future without accord with the
Arabs,” said Nahum Goldman, late President of the World Jewish Congress.’°2
A keen political observer Lord Mayhew wrote:
99Freedman, 338.
100Don Peretz, 116.
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‘°2Andrew C. Kimmens, ed., “The Palestinian Problem,” The Reference Shef61, no. 1 (The H.W.
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If Israel continues in its present path, relying solely on military firepower
and the Washington Lobby, its survival as a sovereign Jewish state into
the next century seems problematical.’°3
Yehashafat Harkabi, one time Chief of the Israeli military intelligence, and now a
professor of international relations at the Hebrew University substantiated the need to
keep talking and negotiating: “Our choice is not between good and bad. That bad and
worse. Israel cannot defend itself if half its population is the enemy. The Arabs
understand that if there is no settlement, then there will be hell, for them and for us.”104
Herkabi, in another place said, “The establishment of a Palestinian state, with
appropriate security guarantees and a commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel,
may be the best way for Israel to maintain its own integrity.”° Related to this point,
Rabin, in an interview with Time Magazine continued to clarify his position: “I oppose
the creation of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan, and I don’t
believe that at this stage it would be a good idea if I brought out the option.”°6
Nasser E. Nashashibi said, “In his office, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres told me
that the future solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict will depend on two “Pillars”:
1. A political confederation between Jordan and any Palestinian entity in the
West Bank.
2. An economic confederation between Israel, Jordan, and the
Palestinians.’07
103Middle East International, 17 May 1985. In Kimmens, 187.
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Dr. Azmy Bishara talked about peace and the Israeli public support to peace when
he wrote:
Rabin contributed more to peace with his death than he did in his life.
Israeli public opinion was never as supportive of the peace process than it
is now, and the Israeli right was never so reluctant to go against it. A
prominent leader of the settlers worried after Rabin’s death that the
campaign against Oslo lost its morality. A deep feeling prevails in Israel
that the integrity of the land threatens to destroy the integrity of the
people.108
Bassam Abu-Sharif the political advisor for Arafat in an interview stressed the
following:
The Palestinians want the kind of lasting peace and security for
themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the
ruins of another’s. We are confident that this desire and this realization is
shared by all but an insignificant minority in Israel. The means by which
the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and security is direct talks, with
no attempt by any outside party to impose or veto a settlement.’°9
In an interview with Time Magazine, Chairman Arafat said, “For many years, I
have been asking the Israelis to start making peace.”°
The Intifada shook up PLO policy and thinking, especially when the local
residents spearheading it demanded the PLO act effectively to end the occupation.”
108Dr. Azmy Bishara, “Facing Up to a Violent Society.” World Press 33, no. 1(1996): 20-21.
‘°9Bassam Abu-Sharif, “Prospects of Palestinian-Israeli Settlement,” Palestine News Agency, 6
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The PLO was pushed toward tough decisions and irreversible choices as West Bank and
Gaza Palestinians demanded action.112
At the same time, the Palestinians have been coming to terms with the
irreversibility of Israel’s existence as an established state and adjusting to their demands.
They now seek the end of the occupation in the remaining areas of Palestine occupied by
the Jewish army after 1967. In a special sense, accommodation to two states, side by
side, seems available long-term proposition.”3
In summer of 1988, Arafat’s adviser, Bassam Abu-Sharif, unequivocally accepted
a two-state solution and indicated that Arafat would welcome a meeting with Israel’s
Prime Minister. There had been such indicators earlier, as Shimon Peres acknowledged
at the end of 1987.”
The Intifada has had a profound effect on the course and dynamics of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and many have pointed out the need for political, rather than
military solutions to the Palestinian issue. The Intifada also had created new regional
pressures, constraints, and opportunities, and altered political environment for Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, and other regional actors. Finally, the Uprising has affected the foreign
policies of the two super powers, just as hope for settlement will necessarily be shaped by






The conclusion to be drawn from this uprising is that the present state of affairs in
the Palestinian occupied territories is unnatural and the Israeli occupation cannot continue
forever. Real peace cannot be achieved except through the recognition of Palestinian
national rights, including the right of self-determination and the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state on Palestinian national soil.’16
Only after the Intifada began and the international media—led by television news—
brought the violence into hundreds of millions of homes worldwide, did the leaders of the
great powers realize that something had to be done. The United States, committed to
Israel’s existence and security, quickly developed a new peace plan to attempt to sell to
political leaders in the Middle East.”7 The Intifada also helped to motivate the Reagan
administration to undertake a new diplomatic effort to foster movement toward Middle
East peace.”8
Washington utterly neglected the peace process until the Palestinian Uprising
forced it back on the agenda. The Intifada had inspired a significant portion of Congress,
and of the Organized American Jewish Leadership, to recommend greater attention to
peacemaking on the part of the United States and Israel alike.”9 Unfortunately, as
Secretary Shultz observed:
116U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle
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As of September 1 988, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians seemed
ready yet for political talks with each other. Talks that would require, in
America’s view, a different approach by both sides: Palestinians must
renounce terrorism and violence, they must accept the right of Israel to
exist... They cannot murder or threaten other Palestinians who maintain
contact with Israeli authorities. Israel . . . cannot claim there is no one to
talk to while suppressing political expression, arresting or deporting.
even those who speak in moderate terms.120
Despite these obstacles, the United States according to Shultz. continued to
advocate “direct negotiations. Launched if required, through an international conference
tha5t could support direct negotiations without interfering in them.”2’
Secretary of State George Shultz began his first visit of the year to the Middle
East on February 1988, impelled not so much by an overriding desire to settle the
region’s problems as equitable as possible, as by pressure from within the United States,
particularly the Jewish community to do something to relieve the pressure on Israel
which the Intifada had brought about.’22
In much the same vein. Shultz’s initiative of 1988 was a reaction to the Intifada.
Without the eruption of violence in the Occupied Territories, Shultz would probably not
have devised his plan.’23
While the Intifada resulted in heightened international attention to the Palestinian
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and 1990 stalemated.124 King Hassan, the late King of Morocco summed up the situation
when he said that President George Bush told him: “My friend, tell your Arab brothers
and especially the Palestinians that after me... and for a long time to come, they shall
not find support such as the support I am giving now and will continue to give in the
future.”25
At a news conference, Secretary of State George P. Shultz issued a statement:
The PLO today issued a statement in which it accepted U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist in
peace and security and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States
is prepared for substantive dialogue with the PLO representative. In that
light, I view this development as one more step toward the beginning of
direct negotiations between the parties, which alone can lead to such a
peace. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an
independent Palestinian state.26
Also, American Jewish leaders, who were deeply distressed by the daily television
images coming from Israel of violent clashes resulting from the Palestinian Uprising, had
reportedly played a significant role in persuading Shultz to resume an active American
role in reviving the moribund peace process.’27
President Clinton said, “For more than a quarter of a century, our nation has been
directly engaged in efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. We have done so because
it reflects our finest values and our deepest interests ... Our interests in a stable Middle
‘24Erica G. AIm, 293.
‘25Mortirner B. Zuckerman, “Toward Peace in the Middle East,” U.S. News and World Report
113, no. 6, (1992): 80.
126Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Statement at a news conference on the U.S.-PLO dialogue.
December 14, 1988. Washington Post, 15 December, 1988.
127Robert 0. Freedman, 273.
East where Israelis and Arabs can live together in harmony and develop the potential of
their region, which is tremendous.”28
Robert 0. Freedman, in his book, The Inti/ada: Its Impact on Israel, The Arab
world, and The Superpowers (1991), mentioned that President Gorbachev, stated the
following:
The Palestinian people have extensive international support and this is the
earnest of the solution of the main question for the Palestinian people—the
questions of self-determination. Just as recognition of the State of Israel
and accounts for its security interests, the solution of this question is a
necessary element of the establishment of peace . . . in the region on the
basis of the principles of international law.’29
During the first three or four months of the Uprising, the media was the single
important influence in moving Middle East peace work forward.13° One of the
Uprising’s most notable achievements in its earlier stages was to bring about international
press, particularly television, coverage which was unprecedentedly hostile to Israel.’3’
Western TV viewers were shown footage of Israeli troops firing live bullets and tear gas
at Palestinian demonstrators; most spectacularly, perhaps, on January 15, when the
‘28Bil1 Clinton, “The Middle East: Opening the Door to a Comprehensive and Lasting
Settlement,” Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 37, 13 September 1993.
‘29Robert 0. Freedman, 143.
‘30Lockman and Benin, 281.
‘31Michael Adams, 57.
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security forces invaded the precincts of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and attacked
worshipers.’32
The place where Israel’s reputation was beginning to suffer greatest damage was
in the United States, most significantly among the American Jewish community, its
staunchest and most crucial source of support. Shocked by the extensive TV coverage of
violent scenes in the Uprising, American Jewish leaders began to voice the community’s
discontent to their Israeli counterparts and to the U.S. Government.’33
The Uprising also scored another international success when European Economic
Community Commissioner Claude Cheysson publicly condemned Israel’s action as
“shameful” and called for its “evacuation” of the Occupied Territories. Also, the
incoming Chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, the West German Foreign Minister
Hans Dietrich Genscher, caused further embarrassment to Israel by stating his intention
to make the Middle East the priority of his foreign policy during his six-month
‘presidency.’ He made clear, with the full EEC backing, his intention to seek a role for
Europe in pushing forward plans for an international peace conference under U.N.
auspices.’34
The European Parliament joined the chorus of criticism when it called on Israel to





“scandalous” acts of repression.’35 France, Spain, and Greece would renew the 1980
Venice Declaration that called for PLO “association” in peace talks and recognition of
Palestinian right to self-determination.’36By the end of 1988 diplomatic fallout from the
Intifada had spread across Europe. Poland scuttled its plan to raise the level of
diplomatic representation from the existing Interest Section to a higher level. Greece
reneged on a promise to raise diplomatic representation to an ambassador when it took
the chair of the EEC. The U.S.S.R. delayed issuing visas to Israel’s Moscow Consular
delegation. Ireland continued to refuse to accept an Israeli ambassador. Portugal decided
not to open a chancery in Tel Aviv.’37 It is not surprising that African countries began to
pass resolutions through the Organization of African Unity and at the United Nations in
support of Palestinian rights to a homeland and to Palestinian representation at peace
negotiations—with the PLO as the sole legitimate representative.’38
According to Abu-Lebdeh, several important events influenced, shaped, and
permitted the process that resulted in the signing of the accord. Some of those events
were the following:
1) The fragmentation of the Soviet Union in 1991, following the fall of
Communism, removed the Arab-Israeli conflict from the realm of the
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states that had depended on military support from the Soviet Union
could no longer rely on it--Syria and the PLO.
2) The active U.S. role in the lengthy process of mediating Middle East
peace, from the early 1950s to the present. It was this incremental
process that brought the Arabs and Israelis closer to peace and to the
signing of the Camp David Accord, March 1979, between Egypt and
Israel.
3) The Arab-Israeli conflict took its toll on the people of the region and
created constituencies that supported peace in Israel and in the Arab
countries. Those who oppose the peace process are on the fringes and
are likely to be isolated and marginalized by the prevailing sentiment.
4) The domestic influence of the Arab-Israeli Conflict on the economies
of those countries, and the diversion of national resources to the arms
race to serve as preparation for the next war or a deterrent to one.
5) Perceptual changes of Israeli and Arab leaders stemming from the
mutual benefits in achieving comprehensive peace in the Middle East,
and from historical precedents of making peace between enemies.139
Also, in another place and according to Abu-Lebdeh, major political and military
events in the international system and in the Middle East influenced the evolution of new
perceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of these included:
‘39Hatem ShareefAbu-Lebdeh, CoI?Jlict and Peace in the Middle East. National Perception and
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The Intifada in 1987-1993 in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza,
represented a different political and military challenge to Israel. (The Intifada was an
uprising of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.) Unprecedented mass
Palestinian Uprisings, protests, military clashes, and strikes on a continuing basis evolved
to become a national movement that exposed the heavy cost of Israeli occupation.
The Gulf War in 1991 created a political and military realignment in both the
international system and the Middle East. During the Gulf War, Iraq’s Scud missile
attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia underscored Israel’s vulnerability and diminished the
importance of proximity in warfare.’4°
Furthermore, in a series of interviews conducted in the West Bank and outside the
Occupied Territories, one question was asked: Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising
of 1987 had an impact on the peace process? Dr. Kamel Abu-Jaber, head of the
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference, answered this way:
The Uprising had a deep impact on the Israeli leadership by convincing
them it is important and necessary to reach a peaceful settlement with the
PLO. Also, the Uprising had a far reaching impact on the Israeli society,
and for the first time, the Israeli public opinion started to talk about the
occupation to the territories, law, morals among soldiers serving in the
territories, the treatment of the Palestinians which is inhumane, division
among the scholars and the educated people about Jewish values and the
future of the Jewish state. And, for the first time in the history of the
Jewish state that the international opinion at the official and unofficial
level no longer have sympathy for Israel as it did before. All these
phenomena played a role in pushing Israel to the negotiating table,
hopefully to find an acceptable political solution to the Palestinian
question by the Palestinians.
‘40lbid., 156.
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In the same interview, Dr. Abu-Jaber talked about the military procedures which
had been carried out in the occupied territories by the IDF, and all these procedures
targeted the young, the women, and the elderly, which all was in violation of
international laws, human values, and all God’s religions. Such heinous acts gave the
Uprising international media coverage, which gave the Uprising the sympathy and the
support of the international communities. At the same time, that put the Israeli
government in an untenable position and in obvious violation of international law, and
they had to resolve this dilemma.
In another interview that took place in February 19, 2001, Mr. M. Erekat
affirmed, “The Uprising of 1987 was one of the most important causes which led to the
peace process, because the U.S. and Israel had reached a conclusion that the region will
not be calm as long as the Palestinian people are under occupation, and there is no peace
between Israel and the Palestinian.” He added that “the Gulf War also participated in
pushing the peace process forward.”4’
In another interview that took place in February 21, 2001, and in the words of Mr.
Salama Hujazi: “I do not think that the Uprising of 1987 was a major player in pushing
both parties to the peace process. The peace was a result of the Gulf War, and the
emergence of Arab and international policies to reorganize and to reshape the politics of
the Arab countries and the Middle East as a whole. The settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict was the first priority of this new policy.”42
‘11Máin Erekat, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.
‘42Salama Hijawi, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.
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In another interview that took place in February 21, 2001, Mr. Hassan Al-Kashif
said, “Itzhak Rabin was aware that the military solution to the Uprising was a failed one,
and there must be another solution, which is the negotiation one.”143
Also, the Uprising tarnished Israel’s reputation in the world, especially through
the media coverage, and Israel had to react to what was at least a public relations and
image nightmare. The only alternative seemed to be to end the Uprising by discussing
peace with the PLO through an international peace conference.
In another interview that took place on February 21, 2001, Mr. Abu-Ali indicated
that, “The peace process took place because the PLO was afraid of the existence of the
alternative leadership in the territories.” To re-affirm leadership, the PLO reopened the
negotiation channels with Israel, especially after the Madrid Conference. The Israeli
objective after Oslo was to end the Uprising and to bring the PLO leaders from outside,
for the people to see them from close distance.”44
Dr. Hussein Al-Araj said, “As a result of the Uprising, and as a result of six years
of fierce fighting, Israel was forced to discuss peace with the PLO.”45
Abu-Ahmad said, “The New World Order, and the tendency toward the
Globalization, and the need for change in cultures, values, and religious beliefs required
peace in the world, and without peace none of these can be achieved. For that, the world
143Hassan Al-Kashif, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.
‘44Abu-AIi, T, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February 2001.
‘45Dr. Hussein A1-Araj, interview by author, tape recording, Harvard University, 21 February
2001.
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community has to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in other to
achieve the Globalization.”46
Dr. Waled Jarar said, “There was no relationship between the Uprising of 1987
and the peace process. Peace came as a result of the Israeli reaction to the Uprising, and
to the way that Israel dealt with the Uprising.”47
Dr. Maruan Jarar said, “The international opinion and especially the American,
pushed Israel to negotiate peace with the PLO. The same pressure applied to the
Palestinians to do the same.”148
Mr. Naser Zakameh said, “The Uprising forced both sides—the Israeli and the
Palestinian—to look for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Also, the international pressure
on Israel forced Israel to open a dialogue with the PLO as the sole representative of the
Palestinian people. Also, the media coverage participated in showing to the world the
Israeli oppression to the Palestinian in the Occupied Territories.”49
Abu-Hassan said, “The peace negotiation came to put an end to the Uprising,
because this Uprising cost Israel too much.”5°
146Abu-Ahmad, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Village of Burkeen, 14 June 2003.
‘47Dr. Waled Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of Al
Jadedah, 14 June 2003.
‘48Dr. Marwan Jarar, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Village of Jabá, 14 June 2003.
‘19Mr. Naser Zakarneh, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of
Qubatiah, 14 June 2003.
150Abu-Hassan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Jerusalem Open
University, 14 June 2003.
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Abu-Ahmad said, “There was a strong feeling in the Israeli military establishment
that it is not in the best interest of Israel to control the Palestinians militarily, but to
substitute their existence with somebody else (PLO) to control the Palestinians and to do
what Israel wants without being in contact with the Palestinians.” Also, he said, “Israel
was afraid that if the Uprising continued and for a long time that might awake the
conscious of the Arabs and the Muslims, and that is not in Israel’s interest, for that,
setting on the negotiating table is the best to end the Uprising)”’
Abu-Muhammed said, “There was no relationship between the Uprising of 1987
and the peace process. Peace was a result of the Gulf War. America entered to liberate
Kuwait, at the same time, American had to show the world communities that we have to
solve the Palestinian questions, and we have one standard in dealing with different issues,
and we do not want to be accused of a double standard when it comes to Israel.”52
Abu-Marwan said, “After the evacuation of the PLO forces from Lebanon in
1982, the PLO could not find basis to continue the fighting against Israel. At the same
time, the PLO was under tremendous pressure from some Arab countries to end the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict because these countries were under pressure from Israel, the
U.S. and other countries.”
‘51Abu-Ahmad, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Al-Farea Refugee
Camp, 14 June 2003.
‘52Abu-Muhammed, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Jenin,
14 June 2003.
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Abu-Muhammed said, “There was not relationship between the Uprising of 1987
and the peace process. Peace came because international public opinion took a decision
to solve the Palestinian problem.”3
Abu-Hantash said, “The Palestinian people were tired from the continuation of the
Uprising and from the Israeli treatment to them. That led them in searching for a new
way, and the peace process was the way. Also, the desire of the Palestinians to be free
from dependency on Arab regimes by establishing their own system where they can be
free to do what is good for their lives.”54
Abu-Yousef said, “The Uprising was the reason for highlighting the Palestinian
problem to the world. Also, the Uprising created an atmosphere in the world, interested
some count4ries to initiate a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to
give the Palestinians people the right to live as any nation or any people in the world.”
Abu-Khaled said, “The Uprising of 1987 was the vehicle that was used by the
PLO as an instrument to pressure Israel before international opinion to negotiate peace
and to find a solution to the long-standing conflict.”56
Dr. Amin Ghanim, a Palestinian businessman residing in the U.S., said, “There is
no doubt that the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 participated in pushing both parties—the
153Abu-Marwan, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, Village of
Maythaloum, 14 June 2003.
‘54Abu-i-iantash, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Arabeh, 14
June 2003.
1’Abu-Yousef interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, City of Ramallah,
14 June 2003.
156Abu-Khaled, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, The West Bank, 14 June 2003.
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Palestinians and the Israelis—to negotiate peace, especially when the United States and the
international communities decided to solve the Palestinian problem, because it is the core
of all problems in the region and the hottest spot in the world.”7
The late Lutfi Al-Barghuthi, from the Jordanian Parliament, said, “The Uprising
of 1987 participated in pushing both parties to accept peace.” Also, he said, “The United
States and other Arab countries realized that if the Uprising continued for a long time, it
might put some Arab regimes in danger and that will not be in the interest of the United
States, Israel and other countries in the region, For that, a peaceful solution to the
Palestinian problem has to be found, and negotiation between Israel and the PLO is the
best way to solve the conflict peacefully, to end the Uprising, and to insure the safety of
some regimes in the region.”’8
For the purpose of this study both Palestinians and Israelis alike were interviewed.
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Palestinians residing in the United States
were interviewed as were Israelis from Israel and Israelis who live in the United States —
especially in the State of Georgia. Also included are Palestinians who are Israeli citizens
and live in Israel and in Georgia.
The most difficult part of the study was convincing the Israelis to answer the
question around which this study evolved. Do you think that the Palestinian Uprising of
1987-1993 had any impact on the peace process between the Palestinians and the
157Dr. Amin Ghanim, interview by author, tape recording, Atlanta, GA, 16 June 1998.
‘8Lutfi al-Barghathi, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 August 1999.
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Israelis? If not, what factors do you think motivated the Israeli government to negotiate
peace with the Palestinians?
Professor Shlomo Aronson, Head of the Political Science Department at the
Hebrew University wrote:
In my view, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987-1993, did not contribute to the peace
process between Israel and the PLO, but on the contrary created a sense of siege
related to the very personal security of each Israeli in Israel proper due to suicide
bombing and the inability of the Palestinian authority to constrain Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, and its own Al-Aksa guerillas. Hence, for most Israelis, the Palestinians
are playing a zero sum game, aimed at the destruction of Israeli society, not at a
peace process. As such, the Israelis will fight, of course, and go on fighting until
the Palestinians may realize that they need a domestic structure, that may bring
them back to the peace track. b9
In another response from Professor Manachem Klein, Political Science
Department at Bar-han University, wrote:
Honestly, my answer is very simple — Yes. Israel saw it cannot crack down the
Intifada and that the occupation costs too much for Israel, therefore Israel was
ready to sign an interim agreement with the PLO and make some concessions. It
was not a peace treaty. Unfortunately both sides violated their commitments
during the Oslo years, and managed a failure negotiation on a final status peace
treaty.’6°
Another response came from Dr. Hillel Cohen, Department of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Studies at Hebrew University. Dr. Cohen wrote:
I think that the Uprising was a major consideration in the Israeli decision-making
in all what regards the Palestinians, including the decision to go to Madrid
conference (and to lesser extent — to Oslo process).161
‘59Dr. Shiomo Aronson, Head of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, November 14, 2004.
160Dr. Manchem Klein, Political Science Department, Bar-Ilan University, November 12, 2004.
‘6tDr. Hillel Cohen, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University.
Jerusalem, Israel, November 29, 2004.
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Dr. Zadka Shaul, Department of Political Studies at Bar-han University wrote:
My answer is yes, that the Uprising of 1987, had impact on the peace process, but
not the only factor to influence peace.’62
Professor Sam Lehman-Wilzig, Chairman, Department of Political Studies, at
Bar-Ilan University wrote:
Given my position, I do not have time to answer such questions which demand a
long discourse and explanation.’63
In another telephone interview, Debbi, Master Coordinator of Political Graduate
Studies at the University of Haifa, said:
I am not in a position to answer your question, but I will give you a number of
professors’ names from the Political Science Department and they will answer
your question.’64
In addition to that, in January of 2005, I sent more than 40 c-mails to professors,
Doctors, and Directors in many of Israel’s higher education institutions such as the
University of Haifa, University of Tel-Aviv, Bar-han University, Hebrew University,
Ben-Gurion University, and many other universities and colleges. Unfortunately, none of
them wrote me back. Also, I found it necessary to include the Palestinians who are living
inside Israel, and the so-called Arabs of Israel.
In a telephone interview Mr. Zaid Oruk, 59, owner of Driving School and from
the City of Nazarit, said:
162Dr. Zadka Shaul. Department of Political Studies, Bar-han University, Israel, November 21,
2004.
163Dr. Sam Lehamn-Wilzip, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Bar-han University,
Israel, November 21, 2004.
164Debbi, Political Science Department, University of Haifa, Israel. November 21, 2004.
151
The Palestinian Uprising of 1987 was a major factor in pushing Israel to negotiate
peace with the PLO. Israel wanted to put an end to the Uprising because it cost
Israel a huge amount of money. Force and the use of power did not do anything
to the Uprising, and the only way out to the Israelis from this, is to negotiate
peace.’6
Toni Daud, 45, construction worker, from the Triangle district, said:
Without the Uprising. Israel will never sign a peace deal with the PLO. The
Uprising with its determination and continuation forced Israel to realize that there
is no way to end this uprising by using the Israel might force. Peace, even if it is
not a real peace, is the only way out.1 6
Ashraf, 35, former Israeli border police, said:
I was serving in Gaza during the Intifada. The Palestinians have no fear from the
Israeli army. We shoot at them, they shoot back. We killed from them, they
killed from us. I saw soldiers depressed, burned-out, disoriented, and tired. We
do not want this war, because there is not ending for the fighting, and that put the
military personnel in a difficult position. for that, we soldiers refused to fight.
Others refused to serve in the Territories and other committed suicide. I believe
that the Uprising forced Israel to take the path of peace in order to rescue itself
from further destruction to its society, its economy, and its reputation
worldwide.’67
Labib Abur-Aqel, 35, owner of a landscape company, from the city of Kufor
Yassif, resident of Marietta, Georgia, said:
The Uprising of 1987 created many things that Israel does not like. One of these,
the renewing of the national sentiment to the Palestinians who are living in Israel.
We are Arabs. We are Palestinians. We have to stand with our brothers in the
Territories in their fight against the occupation. Israel does not like these feelings
to be reborn. The Uprising also made it very difficult and unsafe for the Israeli
civilians to do business in the Territories for security reason. Israel used
everything in its power to end the Uprising and they could not. For that, the
military leaders with the political leaders saw peace is the only way to put an end
16Zaid Oruk, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 13 March 2005.
166Toni Daud, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 15 June 2005.
167Ashraf, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA 15 June, 2005.
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to the Uprising, and they did. The Palestinians, with this peace agreement,
achieved a little of what they fought for.168
Jehad Abdullah, 48, from Kufor Qassim, resident of Marietta, Georgia, owner of a
gas station, said:
Without a doubt, the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 is a major factor in forcing
Israel to accept to negotiate peace. Israel was not used to this kind of war. It is a
costly war in all measures— economically, socially, and politically. Also, Israel in
its wars was used to a quick war, but this one is too long for them for that. It
touched every Israeli in every aspect of their lives. For that, something must be
done to end this uprising, and peace is the only way out, and they did it.169
Before ending this chapter, I find it important to discuss the position of the
Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) regarding the peace process.
Hamas’ charter stated that the Land of Palestine is an Islamic trust (waqf), to be
held as such for generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgment. No one has the
authority to give up any part of Palestine.170
This premise infers that negotiations with the enemy over the Land of Palestine
are tantamount to treason. Hamas also rejected the international conference to decide the
future of Palestine because such conferences are, according to Hamas, nothing but a form
ofjudgment passed by infidels on the land of the Muslims.’71
Harnas considers itself part of the Uprising without subscribing to its slogan and
objectives: It does not recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
168Labib Abu-Agel, interview by author, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 June 2005.
‘69Jehad Abdullah, interview by author’s brother, tape recording, Marietta, GA, 14 June 2005.




Palestinian people. It is against the convening of an international conference and it does
not support the establishment of a Palestinian state.172
It is difficult to understand Hamas’ zeal in furthering the Uprising while at the
same time rejecting its main slogans. This enigma can be understood on two different
levels, the most simple explanation, and one which has some currency in the Occupied
Territories, is that Israeli Intelligence Services (Musad) has incited or at least encouraged
Hamas to sow discord and disunity among Palestinians.’73 Hamas knows that it cannot
block a political settlement once the process is initiated. Given this, it aims to guarantee a
presence “on the street” so to speak, during the process leading up to and beyond such
settlement. 174
Hamas’ active participation in the Uprising, then, should be seen as part of the
campaign of a prospective opposition Islamic party in the future Palestinian state. As
such, there is no doubt that Hamas should be taken seriously)7 Shimon Peres said in
1993, “That the PLO under the leadership of Arafat signed the Oslo agreement because
of fear that Hamas will pull the carpet from under its feet and take over.”
From the materials collected and presented in this study, I can say that the
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The region west of the Jordan River has been the scene of many wars between
many nations throughout history. For the last seventy years, there were wars between the
Israelis and the Palestinians. In 1948, the majority of Palestine was occupied by the
Jewish army and became known as Israel. As a result 750,000 Palestinians became
refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In 1967’s Six Day War, the rest of Palestine
came under Israeli occupation. Twenty years later, the Occupied Territories erupted in
violent demonstrations against the Israeli domination and the Israeli forces, and later
became known as the Palestinian Uprising of 1987 or the Intifada.
The goals of the Palestinian Uprising were to achieve self-determination, to
establish the Palestinian State, and to achieve peace with Israel.
In the upcoming pages, there are a few subjects that need to be discussed: first,
the future prospect of a Palestinian state next to the State of Israel; second, peace and
cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian State, and neighboring states, such as Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, and other countries in the region; and third, democracy in the Palestinian
State and its impact on the region.
The establishment of a Palestinian State on Palestinian land is the ultimate goal of
every Palestinian, because tens of thousands of Palestinians have paved the way to
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statehood by their blood. Having a country, a flag, a passport, an independence day, a
national anthem, and a president, all these are priceless to the Palestinians who have
experienced nothing like it for a long time.
The new Palestinian State will have to live side by side with the State of Israel.
The advocates of the Palestinian State say that the Palestinian State would not only pose
no danger, it would enhance Israeli security by enabling Israel to make peace with other
Arab countries.1
Some say once Palestinians becomes independent, it will be advantageous for
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria to absorb the Palestinians now living in “refugee camps” in
those countries. This could mean the addition of another million refugees. Still, even a
hostile and armed Palestine will pose no great threat by itself to the powerful Israeli
army.2
The issue of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria should
and will be discussed between the Israeli and the Palestinians. This issue is a very
complicated one. Israel, according to its officials, will not allow and will not accept any
Palestinian to return and live in Israel. At the same time, Israel may accept the idea of
paying compensation to the Palestinians in the refugee camps, as long as the U.S., Europe
and the Arab states pay the bill.




Prime Minister of Israel, Rabin, responded to a question by Time Magazine,
September 27, 1993. How do you assess the security risk to Israel from a Palestinian
state? Rabin in his answer stated, “The Palestinians do not present a military threat to the
existence of Israel. There are certain risks to personal security of a limited number of
Israelis.”3
In his speech before the Israeli Knesset, November 1977, President Anwar Al
Sadat of Egypt said:
In all faith, I tell you that peace cannot be achieved without the
Palestinians.... The only language to deal with it, for a just and lasting
peace, is the establishment of their state. With all international guarantees
you request, there should be no fear of a newborn state.4
President Sadat was a man with a clear vision of the future of the region,
especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirty years after that speech, the leaders of
both parties are still struggling with what to do with the issues of peace, the Palestinian
State, and many other concerns such as water, cooperation, security, arms control,
refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.
Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock wrote:
There are two national communities, with two separate and distinctive
national identities who have distinct values and norms and are governed
by two sets of social, cultural, and political structures that may not meet
the national needs of the two peoples in a satisfactory manner; each must
seek its expression equally and independently in a structure of its own
making on the same soi1.
3Lisa Beyer, “1 Oppose the Creation of a Palestinian State, Time 142, no. 13 (1993): 33.
4Máoz, 59.
5JamaI R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 10-11.
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The Israelis and the Palestinians are two different people in every aspect of their
lives. You cannot apply to the Palestinians what is right for the Israelis and vice versa.
As such, the separation of both people in separate political structures will be the best for
both people. A Palestinian State is the answer because it will meet the needs of the
Palestinian people and their aspirations.
The late Faysal al-Husayni, a Palestinian activist from East Jerusalem, said:
When a Palestinian state will be established, it will have an open
relationship with Israel. We do not need an army or heavy weapons to
protect us, if we are safe from an Israeli attack.6
I believe that most of the Palestinians have the same point of view that Mr. al-Husayni
had.
The reason for the failure to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian agreement has its
roots in the political culture and apparatuses that have developed in Israeli and
Palestinian societies. Their political cultures developed over the course of seven decades
of conflict and were nurtured by violent incidents, military struggle, deportation, and
denials by each side of the rights of others. There was no real opportunity following the
June 1967 War to reach a settlement between the two nations. An analysis of the
conditions and the constraints under which the attempt was made to reach a historic
compromise between Israel and the Palestinians show that it was doomed to failure from
the start. A quarter of a century of living together had to pass, in the shadow of the
Israeli occupation, in order for both sides to realize that only compromise would lead to a
6Zeév Schiv and Ehud Yaári, 232.
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political settlement.7 Israeli policy toward the Palestinians has always contained a large
element of denial--denial of rights, denial of legitimacy, and denial of voice.8
It would appear that the event that led the Israelis to understand the need for
compromise with the Palestinians was the Intifada. Israeli policy makers became aware
that they were faced with a national struggle whose solution could only be found in the
realization of, and Israeli readiness to allow, the implementation of the national
aspirations of the Palestinian people.9
During the signing of the peace agreement between the Israelis and the
Palestinians on September 13, 1993, Rabin’s speech was a reflection of what he wanted
and what the Israelis wanted from the agreement, as well as his vision for the future of
the Middle East. In a speech, Rabin stated the following:
It was not easy to achieve peace after there had been so many casualties
and victims; but, he went on, those who had fought were now saying,
enough of blood and tears. Enough. We have no desire for revenge....
We, like you, are people who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love,
live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free
men.... We wish to turn over a new chapter in the sad book of our lives
together -- a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of
mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the
history of the Middle East. Such a shift will give us an opportunity to
embark upon the process of economic, social and cultural growth and
development, and we hope the international participation in that process
will be as extensive as it can be.’°
7Reuven Pedatzur, “Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967,” Middle East
Journal 49, no. 2 (1995): 269-29 1




At the same time, Yasser Arafat, in a speech, assured the Israelis to calm their fear
of a Palestinian state next to them, and he said:
Our people do not consider the exercising of the right to self-
determination could violate the rights of their neighbors or infringe on
their security. On the contrary, he added, doing so was the “strongest
guarantee” for coexistence.1’
Even before that, Arafat was looking to make peace with Israel. In 1989, Arafat said,
“We are looking to have peace for our children and their children.”2
It is not only the leadership of Israel that has changed, but its overall attitude. The
Israeli public wants peace and prosperity and the lifestyle of other Western, consumer-
oriented industrial societies. They are less interested in Zionist notions of settling new
land or battling with the Arabs for every stone. They are tired of land, blood and fire.
They realize that has become a losers’ game; that cities could become battlefields; that
civilians could become combatants, and that weapons of mass destruction could unleash
horror.13
In order to achieve long-lasting peace between Israelis and the Palestinians, the
conditions for peace must be acceptable to the Palestinians, not imposed upon them by
force. Also, the peace conditions must be clear and easy to understand by both societies.
Cooperation must exist between the two peoples. In addition, these conditions must be
respected by both peoples. If this is achieved, no one will violate the rights of others.’4
‘1Barry Rubin, 199-200.
1Ibid., 207.
‘3Mortimer B. Zuckerman, ‘Toward Peace in the Middle East,” US News and World Report 113,
no.6(1992): 80.
14Zeév Schiv and Ehud Yéari, 272-273.
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Once the peace agreement is finalized by both peoples, no one has the right to come back
and ask the other for any more things.15
Also, the Palestinians have to understand that their dream to go back to their
homes in Israel of 1948 is not realistic. Both parties have to discuss the settlement of this
issue and any related issues in a civilized and faithful manner. Peace will not last long as
long as hundreds of thousands of refugees live in miserable conditions in Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan.’6
One other condition that the Palestinian State will have to ensure and guarantee is
not to represent the Palestinians in Jordan or the Palestinians who are living in Israel, and
not to encourage them to do something against the State of Israel, or encourage them to
ask for separation from the State of Israel.’7
Other changes in the region demonstrate the power of the peace process to
catalyze regional stability and cooperation. True peace will afford the participants the
opportunity to discuss some issues very important to the stability of the region, such as
water, the environment, economic development, refugees, arms control, and security.’8
This region has a wealth of resources, including a well-educated population of
over 100 million, a rich culture and history, enormous natural resources, and critical




18Department of State Dispatch, 6, no. 38, September 1995.
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policies, have prevented the region from realizing its economic potential.’9Only the
United States can play the honest broker to bring the Israelis and the Arabs together.2°
The key to the shift from confrontation to conflict resolution will come to fruition
when Arab leaders prepare their people to accept peace with Israel on realistic terms.21
Syrian-Israeli relations are pivotal to the Middle East peace process; no
comprehensive, stable, and durable peace can be achieved without a political settlement
between the two countries.22
Zeev Schiv and Ehud Yeári wrote the following:
We cannot mention the role of the United States in the peace settlement in
the Middle East without mentioning the role of Russia, too. Because there
is no hope in achieving peace in the region without Russian
participation.23
They think that Russian involvement in the peace process will prevent Syria from
derailing the peace process because Russia is Syria’s strongest ally. At the same time,
Russia is a friend to the PLO.
Democracy in the Palestine State is something that every Palestinian is looking
for. There is little or nothing written about this subject. The Palestinians are the only
Arabs exposed to a democratic system, second to the Arab people in Lebanon. They saw
the Israeli democracy and they lived it for more than four decades. They understand the
‘9lbid., 696-699.
20Ibid., 696-699.
21Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 80.
2Moshe Máoz, 157.
‘3 . .




meaning of democracy and the meaning of the rule of law. The question here is whether
the Palestinian leaders are ready for democracy. We believe that democracy is the
peoples choice not the leaders, because people have the power to elect their leaders,
especially when there is a constitution, institutions and laws designed to protect the rights
of the individuals and the rights of the state.
I believe that democracy in the new Palestinian State will be a good example for
other states in the region to follow. Everybody knows that the seeds of democracy need
much care and nurturing, and it takes time to produce results. It takes a lot of time and
effort to prepare the societies in Palestine and across the region to accept changes in their
lives. Societies that have lived decade after decade in a dictatorship find it is very
difficult to change their way of life overnight, but they can adapt to the new democratic
life in a short period of time. What really do the people in the Middle East want? The
people of the Middle East want justice and equality to govern their life in a democratic
system. The people of the Middle East have their own way of life, norms, traditions,
history, religion, and culture. An imported democracy from the West will not work in the
Middle East. The West can help by improving the life of the people in the region through
education, communication, development in the economic, political, and social systems.
The changes have to come from the people themselves, not forced upon them by
outsiders. I believe that the people of Palestine and the people of the region will love
democracy and will nurture it and will defend it. Democracy will become a way of life to
the people in the region because without it they cannot function.
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In the final analysis, peace and cooperation between the Palestinians and the
Israelis is a very important step toward peace and cooperation between Israel and other
countries in the region. The Israelis have to understand that the Palestinians have
aspirations they would love to achieve -- a Palestinian State living in peace side by side
with Israel. This new state will work with Israel in every aspect that may enhance peace,
such as economic development, communication, transportation, intelligence, security
issues, and the implementation of the peace conditions.
It is in the best interest of Israel to have peace with the Palestinians, because this
peace will encourage other countries in the region to come and talk peace with Israel.
Arabs would love to see peace take place between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This
peace will help the leaders in the region prepare their people to accept peace with Israel,
by arguing that if the people of the problem -- the Palestinians -- sign peace with Israel,
why are we not? Israel will be safer if Israel has peace with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and
Iraq.
From an economic point of view, peace in the Middle East and cooperation
between Israel and the Arab world will open the door wide for economic development in
that part of the world. Israel has the expertise in almost every aspect of development,
especially the economic and the technological development and what the countries in the
region need. At the same time, the Arab world has the wealth of natural resources,
manpower, educated people, waterways, location and money. Cooperation, trust, and
mutual understanding between Israel and the Arab world, combining Israeli expertise and
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Arab resources, would make the Middle East region a major political and economic
player in the world. This region would have the power to reshape international politics.
To the United States, by achieving peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis
on one hand, and the Arab world and the Israelis on the other, the nations in a very
volatile region will have time to reshape its policies toward the world and resolve its
internal problems. Also, instead of spending billions of dollars in development assistance
to the countries in the region, the United States would save many millions at a time of
economic duress for the country.
Opening the door for regional cooperation will encourage economic development
that will impact the lives of the people in a very positive way. These developments will
lead to political stability and to the democratization process that would take place in the
region. With peace and cooperation, there is no need for military expenditures of billions
and there is no need for standing armies by hundreds of thousands. Also, there will be no
need for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the region. We want the Middle
East to be an oasis for peace and love.
In case there is not settlement of the Palestinian problem, and there is no peace
between Israel and its neighbors, the Middle East return to the cycle of violence. Also,
we will witness more and more wars between the Arabs and the Jews, and the upcoming
wars will be more destructive than the previous ones because of the involvement of high
tech weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
In addition, I believe, also, many countries will be involved in any Middle East
conflicts that have never been involved before, such as Iran and Pakistan. In this case,
the United States will become involved in the conflict to help Israel, and to grasp the
opportunity to attack Iran and Syria.




Here is a list of some of the Israeli colleges and universities, and the names of the
professors I tried to contact through E-mail, for the purpose of this study. Some of them
E-mailed me back, and the majority did not.
From Ben-Gurion University
Department of Research Contracts, Moshe Amir, Director,
tivo1ibgumail.bgu.ac.il
Natalie Haimovitch, natalibgumai1.bgu.ac. ii, Judith Fried, Budget
officer, jfriedbgumail.bgu.ac.il
Moshe Palombo, Budget officer, palambobgumail.bgu.ac.il
Oshra Pinuan, pinuanbgumai1 .bgu.ac.il
David Spivak, sdpivalbgumai1.bgu.ac.il
Daniel Rosenthal, Budget officer, danrosbgumail.bgu.ac. ii.
From the University of Bar-han
Department of Psychology, Prof Alan Apter, apter@posttau.ac.il
Lecturer, Eva Gilboa-Shechtman, gilboae@mail.biu.ac.il
Prof. Rachel Levy-Shift’, levyra@mail.biu.ac.il
Ass. Prof Shaul Fox, Foxsha@mail.biu.ac.il
Ass. Prof. Rachel Ben-An, benarir@mail.biu.ac.il
Ass. Prof Yinon Yeel, yinony@mail.biu.ac.il
Prof. Yehuda Shlomo, yehudas@mail.biu.ac.il
Prof. Weller Aaron, weller@mail.biu.ac.il
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Dr. Amara Hasan Mohammad, amaram@mail.biu.ac.il
Prof. Don-Yehiya Eliezer, Director of the Argov Center for the Study of
the Jewish People and the State of Israel, donyee@mail.biu.ac.il
Dr. Moshi Mira, moshemi@mail.biu.ac.il
Dr. Tzabag Shmuel, tzabagsmail.biu.ac.il
From the Hebrew University, Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
Prof. Amikam Elad, amikam2.hum.huji.ac.il
Prof. Amnon Cohen, amnoncvms.huj i.ac.il
Prof. Miriam Hoexter, mshoxtermscc.huji.ac.il
Dr. Miriam Frenkel, mfrenkelh2.hum.huj i.ac .il
Mr. Shraga Assif, shrassif@hotmail.com
From Tel-Aviv University, Department of Psychology
Prof. Daniel Algom, algomdfreud.tau.ac .il
Prof. Nehemia Friedland, nehemia@post.tau.ac.il
From Tel-Aviv University, Department of Public Policy
Dr. Dan Ben-David, danib@post.tau.ac.il
Dr. Israel Drori, droris@post.tau.ac.il
Prof. Thaima Lobel, taima@freud.tau.ac.il
Prof. Ariel Marari, mararipost.tau.ac.il
Dr. Gilla Menajhem, gilampost.tau.ac.il
Prof. Elia Werczberger, wrcabrgrpost.tau.ac .il
Prof. Abraham Ben-Zui, doreen@post.tau.ac.il
Prof. Azar Cat, azargat(post.tau. ac.il
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Prof. Zeev Maoz, zeevmoaz@post.tau.ac.il
Prof. Shaul Mishal, mishal@pst.tau.ac.il
Prof Dan Zakay, dzakay@post.tau.ac.il
Dr. Ama! Jamal, ajamal@post.tau.ac.il
From the University of Haifa
Dr. Amalia Levanoni, levanoni@research@haifa.ac. ii
Prof Joseph Nevo, jnevo@research.haifa.ac.il
Dr. Itzchak Wiesman, weisman@reasearch.haifa.ac.il
Prof Arieh Kochavi, akochavi@research.haifa.ac.il
In addition, I e-mailed the entire membership of the Political Science Department
at Haifa University. Unfortunately, none of them responded.
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